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v HEC±, 

JUL' 







STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF 



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 



Volume XIV] 



[Number 3 



THE 



EASTEKN QUESTION 

A STUDY IN DIPLOMACY 



BY 



STEPHEN PIERCE HAYDEN DTJGGAN, Ph.D. 

Instructor in Philosophy in the College of the City of New York 




THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, AGENTS 

London : P. S. King & Son 

1902 



Columbia TOnlrerstty 
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 



Nicholas Murray Butler, LL.D., President. J. W. Burgess, LL.D.,Professoi 
of Political Science and Constitutional Law. Professor of Polit- 
ical Economy. Munroe Smith, J.U. D., Professor of Comparative Jurisprudence. 
F. J. Goodnow, LL. D., Professor of Administrative Law. E. R. A. Seligman, Ph.D., 
Professor of Political Economy and Finance. H. L. Osgood, Ph.D., Professor ot 
History. Wm. A. Dunning, Ph.D., Professor of History. J. B. Moore, LL D., Pro- 
fessor of International Law. F. H. Giddings, LL.D., Professor of Sociology. J. B. 
Clark, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy. J. H. Robinson, Ph.D., Professor of 
History. W. M. Sloane, L.H.D., Professor of History. A. M. Day, A.M., In- 
structor in Economics. W. Z. Ripley, Ph.D , Lecturer on Anthropology. Wm. R. 
Shepherd, Ph.D., Lecturer on History. G. J. Bayles, Lecturer on Sociology. 
M. R. Maltbie, Ph.D., Lecturer on Administrative Law. 



COURSES OF LECTURES. 

I. HISTORY. — [A] Epochs of History; [l] Mediaeval and Modern History to 
1648; [2] Continental European History, 1648-1899; [3] English History to the 
Reform Bill; [4] The United States to the Close of Reconstruction; [5] Transition 
Epochs in European History; [6] Great Britain during the XVIIIth and XlXth Cen 
turies ; [7] History of Rome ; [10] Sources of European History and Methods of 
Study; [11] The Reformation; [12] Mediaeval Institutions and Culture ; [13] Open- 
ing of the Lutheran Reformation; [14^ J France under Louis XVI ; [14^] The Age 
of Revolution, 1791-1815; [15] Work ot Napoleon; [16] Constitutional History of 
England to 1689; [19-25] Periods of Church History; [30] Transitions in Ameri- 
can History; [31] Constitutional History of the United States; [32, 33] American 
Colonial History during the XVTIth and XVIIIth Centuries ; [34] The War of 1812 ; 
[35l T^ e United States since 1861 ; [37] Seminar in American Colonial History. 

II. ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.— [A] Elements of Political Econ- 
omy; [1] Economic History ; [3] Historical and Practical Political Economy; [4] 
Science of Finance; [5] Fiscal and Industrial History of the United States; [7] 
Railroad Problems; [8] History of Economics; [9-10] Economic Theory; [11] 
Communistic and Socialistic Theories; [12] Theories of Social Reform; [14] Semi- 
nar in Political Economy and Finance; [15] Principles of Sociology; [16] Racial 
Demography; [17] Statistics and Sociology ; [18] Statistics and Economics; [19] 
Theory of Statistics; [20] Social Evolution; [21] Progress and Democracy; [22J 
Pauperism; [23] Crime and Penology ; [24] Civil Aspects of Ecclesiastical Organi- 
sations; [29 I Laboratory Work in Statistics; [30] Seminar in Sociology. 

III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.— [1] Compara- 
tive Constitutional Law of Europe and the United States; [2] Governmental Organ- 
ization of Dependencies of the U. S. [5] Seminar in Constitutional Law; [16] 
Comparative Administrative Law; [18] The Law of Taxation; | 19] The Law of 
Municipal Corporntions; [20] Seminar in Administrative Law; [31] Colonial Ad- 
ministration. 

IV. DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.— [6] History of European 
Diplomacy; [7] History of American Diplomacy; [8] Principles of International 
Law; [10] Seminar in International Law. 

V. ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE.— [21] His 
tory and Institutes of Roman Law; [22] Roman Law; Cases from the Digest; [23J 
History <>f Kuropean Law; [24] Comparative Jurisprudence: General Principles; 
[25] Comparative Jurisprudence: Special Relations ; [25] International Private Law; 
[ 29] Seminar in Legal I listory and Comparative Legislation; [30] Private Law of 
Colonies of t 

VI. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.— [40] General History of Political Theories ; 
[41] History of American Political Philosophy; [42] Seminar in Political Philosophy 



f study covers ttm at the end of which the degree of Ph.D. 

ken. Any person not a candidate for a degree may attend any of the courses 
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~ — 



3 

THE EASTERN QUESTION 



STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Volume XIV] [Number 3 



THE 

EASTERN QUESTION 

A STUDY IN DIPLOMACY 



BY 



STEPHEN PIERCE HAYDEN DUGGAN, Ph.D. 

Instructor in Philosophy in the College of the City of New York 




THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, AGENTS 

London : P. S. King & Son 
1902 






3 



PREFACE 

The continued residence of the Ottoman Turks in Europe 
is due to two causes : the jealousy of the Christian powers, 
and the lack of unity among the subject Christian peoples of 
the Balkans. With the latter cause, this thesis is concerned 
only in so far as it is necessary to an understanding of the 
former. The first chapter, therefore, treats of the races of 
the Balkans, their attitude towards each other and their re- 
lations with foreign states. Though my subject is the dip- 
lomatic side of the Turkish question, the thesis is by no 
means a history of Turkey, nor even a diplomatic history of 
.Turkey. It practically begins with the treaty of Kainardji, of 
1774 ; for though the maintenance of the integrity of the Otto- 
man Empire was considered essential to the balance of power 
in Europe before then, the positions held by the various Euro- 
pean states on the Turkish question, and especially by England 
and Russia, really date from that treaty. 

The materials for this thesis have been taken from a number 
of sources. The collections of treaties have been carefully ex- 
amined. Dumont's Corps Diplomatique, Wenck's Codex Juris 
Gentium, De Testa's collection of Ottoman treaties, De 
Clercq's of French, Neumann's of Austrian, and Martens' of 
Russian, not only give the texts of the treaties themselves, but 
also generally the notes, protocols and conventions associated 
with them. And the Histoire des Traites de Paix of De Garden 
and that of Schoell have frequently clarified what has been 
obscure in the collections. Much information was obtained 
from the Annual Register, and from Lesur's Annuaire Histori- 
que. Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty has been very help- 
4*9] 5 



PREFACE 



[430 



ful for the nineteenth century. The British and Foreign State 
Papers, the Parliamentary Papers and Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates were invaluable. I have not had access to the French 
foreign papers, but Sorel's " Les Instructions donnees aux 
Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France " have been of much 
service. Many of the memoirs of statesmen, such as Metter- 
nich and Bismarck, and the lives of others, like Palmerston, the 
Prince Consort and Napoleon III., throw light on the motives 
which have actuated policies. With the exception of the first 
chapter, the matter of which was gathered principally from the 
works of others, the statements in this thesis have been made 
from the above sources. I have not hesitated to use the treat- 
ises of other men and sometimes have adopted their views, but 
in every case have made a foot-note to that effect. The works 
of two authors must be specially mentioned. Von Hammer's 
" Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches " is the mine from 
which every writer on Turkey digs. Unfortunately, his great 
work ends with the Treaty of Kainardji, where this thesis 
practically begins. Debidour's " Histoire Diplomatique," 
though it begins at 1 8 14, is a guide which I have freely con- 
sulted. 

In conclusion, I gratefully acknowledge that the advice and 
encouragement given by Professor John Bassett Moore have 
been more valuable than the aid received from any books. 

S. P. H. D. 

College of the City of New York, April 2j, 1902. 



CONTENTS 



PACB 



CHAPTER I 

TURKS, RAYAHS AND FRANKS 

The mixed character of the population of the Balkans — Turkish 
administration — The subject peoples — The Greeks — The Rou- 
manians — The Servians and Bulgarians — The Montenegrins 
and Albanians — The relations of the Turks with the Franks — 
The Capitulations — The exclusive privileges of the French. . 1 1 

CHAPTER II 

THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI OF 1 7 74 

The decline of the Turks — The treaty of Carlowitz, 1699 — The 
conflict with Peter the Great — The victories of Prince Eu- 
gene — Turkey and the European diplomacy of the eighteenth 
century — The treaty of Belgrade, 1739 — Turkey and the 
Polish question — The struggle with Catherine II 27 

CHAPTER III 

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 

Potemkin and the annexation of the Crimea — The designs of 
Catherine II. and Joseph II. on Turkey — The war of 1778- 
1792 — The French invasion of Egypt — The revolt of the 
Servians — The war of 1 806-1 81 2 — Turkey and the treaty of 

Tilsit — The treaty of Bucharest of 181 2 47 

43i] 7 



8 CONTENTS [432 

CHAPTER IV 

THE GREEK REVOLUTION 

Turkey and the Congress of Vienna — Ali Pasha of Janina — The 
revolt of the Greeks — Nicholas I. becomes Emperor of Rus- 
sia — The Russian demands granted — The treaty of London 
of July 1, 1827 — The battle of Navarino — War with Russia — 
The treaty of Adrianople 61 

CHAPTER V 

THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION 

Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt — The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi of 
1833 — The rebellion of 1839 — The attitude of the European 
Powers — The quadruple alliance of 1840 — The excitement in 
France — The defeat of Mehemet Ali — The treaty of the 
Straits of 1841 — The question of the Hungarian refugees . . 81 

CHAPTER VI 

THE CRIMEAN WAR 

Quarrel between the Latin and Greek monks in the Holy Places 
— The plans of Nicholas — The mission of Mentschikoff — The 
Vienna note — Turkey declares war against Russia, Oct. 4, 
1853 — The massacre of Sinope — The position of Austria and 
Prussia — France and England declare war against Russia, 
March 27, 1854 — The Austro-Prussian treaty of April 20, 
1854 — The four points — Sardinia joins the allies — Death of 
Nicholas I. — Fall of Sebastopol — The Congress of Paris of 
1856 — Terms of the treaty — Results of the Crimean war . . 99 

CHAPTER VII 

THE TREATY OF BERLIN 

The decay and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after 
1856 — The revolt of 1875 m Herzegovinia and in Bosnia — 
The Andrassy note — The Berlin memorandum — The Bulga- 



433] 



CONTENTS 



rian atrocities — The conference of Constantinople — Russia 
delares war against Turkey, April 24, 187 7 — The fall of Plevna 
and the treaty of San Stefano — Excitement in England — The 
Cyprus convention — The Congress of Berlin — The terms of 
the treaty 126 

CHAPTER VIII 

PRESENT STATUS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, 1885 — The Cre- 
tan and Armenian insurrections, 1 889-1 896 — The Turco- 
Greek war of 1897 — The English control of Egypt — Present 
attitude ofjthe European Powers to Turkey 147 



CHAPTER I 



TURKS, RAYAHS AND FRANKS 



During the period of the Roman Empire the Balkan Pen- 
insula was inhabited by three different races : Hellenes, the 
forefathers of the present Greeks; Illyrians, the ancestors ol 
the Albanians of to-day; and the Thracians and Dacians, who, 
although geographically separate, were of the same race, and 
who became more Romanized than either of the other two, and 
adopted the Latin tongue. These last were the progenitors 
of the Roumanians (Romanians) of the present day, compris- 
ing the Wallachians (Vlachs) and Moldavians. The Wallach- 
ians, however, are not confined to the territory that bears their 
name, but are found scattered over Macedonia and Thessaly. 
During the sixth and seventh centuries there forced themselves 
among these races the various Slavonic tribes whose descend- 
ants, including the Servians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and 
Montenegrins, to-day inhabit the Balkans. Though many of 
the Greeks remained in the plains and valleys, they were for the 
most part driven to the coast, or to the large towns which the 
primitive methods of Slavonic warfare were unable to reduce. 
The Albanians were compelled to retire to the mountains of 
the western part of the peninsula, which they inhabit to this 
day. As the Slavonic invader came chiefly from the north- 
west, the Dacians, whose territory lay to the east on the Black 
Sea, remained comparatively unaffected. The newcomers and 
the old inhabitants never fused, as did the people of the West- 
ern Roman Empire, but established themselves side by side 
and maintained their separate nationalities, languages and cus- 
toms. In the tenth century a Turanian tribe, the Bulgars, 
435] " 



I2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [436 

coming from the northeast, pushed through the Dobrudja into 
what is now Bulgaria and imposed their sway upon the Sla- 
vonic inhabitants ; but in less than three centuries they became 
thoroughly assimilated by the conquered and undistinguish- 
able from them. So that when the Ottoman conquest of the 
Balkan peninsula occurred in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, it was already peopled by Greeks, Albanians, Bul- 
garians, Servians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians and Montenegrins^ 
and the Roumanians, comprehending the Moldavians and 
Wallachians. In some parts of the peninsula each nation 
formed the much greater portion of the inhabitants, but in 
other districts, particularly in those which constitute the pres- 
ent Turkey in Europe, there was and is a medley of races, 
each remaining distinct from the other, and each filled with 
prejudice and animosity toward the remainder. In the cities 
there must be added to this admixture of peoples, Jews, Armen- 
ians, and the various European races by the Turks indiscrim- 
inately denominated as Franks. Under any conditions, it would 
be difficult to form a single stable state in the Balkans ; the 
conditions under which the Turks entered made it inevitable 
that they should fail to do so. Unlike the other invaders ot 
the Balkans they came not as heathen, unconnected with any 
established form of worship, but as representatives of a great 
religion which enjoined upon its adherents the duty of ex- 
terminating or enslaving the unbeliever. The Turks became 
an army of occupation in a conquered country, and such they 
have remained ever since. 1 

To the Turk, government consists in the maintenance of 
his supremacy and the collection of tribute, and if these are 
not resisted he is contemptuously tolerant of the usages of his 
subjects. After the conquest, therefore, the rayahs, the 
Christian inhabitants, besides being allowed to retain a part of 
their property, were permitted to exercise their religion on 
conditions which would mark them off as an inferior part ot 

1 Freeman, Ottoman Power in Europe, chap. ii. 



437] TURKS, RAYAHS AND FRANKS {g 

the community. Besides the land tax, which is a tithe paid 
by all the inhabitants of whatever religion, they paid the 
Kharadj or capitation tax, as a tribute for their unbelief. The 
customs duty, levied alike on imports and exports, amounted 
to 2j4 per cent, when the goods were Mohammedan, but to 
5 per cent, when they belonged to an unbeliever. The rayahs 
were also forbidden to carry arms or use horses, and their 
costumes were required to be of a nature to distinguish them 
from the true believer. But the hardest of the Turkish im- 
positions was the tribute of children. Every fourth year 
Turkish officials appeared in the Christian villages and selected 
the strongest and most intelligent fifth of the children between 
the ages of six and nine, who were to become the slaves of the 
Sultan. They were sent to Constantinople and educated as 
Moslems, and were taught that it was a privilege as well as a 
duty to assist in the propagation of the true faith. A few of 
them entered the civil service, but the majority entered the 
corps of Janissaries. This celebrated body consisted exclu- 
sively of those who had been tribute children. They received 
regular pay, but were not allowed to marry nor to engage in any 
business. Entirely cut off from their early Christian associa- 
tion, having a contempt for and being at enmity with the 
Timariot or Mohammedan feudal soldiery, they were at the 
absolute command of the Sultan; and until the decay of the 
Ottoman Empire they formed the best army in Europe. 
While the rayahs thus supplied their enemy with his finest 
weapon, they were themselves deprived of their most virile 
element, and we hear of no rebellious show of discontent with 
their condition until the system of tribute children fell into 
disuse two hundred years later. 

As the Turk makes no distinction between church and state, 
the civil and the ecclesiastical law being founded on the Koran, 
it was natural for him to place the various subject peoples 
under the supervision of their spiritual heads. The Greek and 
Armenian patriarchs and the Jewish chief rabbi, for example, 



I4 THE EASTERN QUESTION [^^8 

were regarded by the Porte as the civil and religious heads of 
their respective nations and many administrative functions were 
performed by them ; all law suits between members of their 
millet, i. e., religious community, being in the last analysis 
settled by them. If the parties belonged to different millets 
and could not settle their difficulty by arbitration, the case 
went to the Turkish tribunals. After the decay of the Otto- 
man Empire began, in the seventeenth century, the corruption 
of the Turkish tribunals was equalled only by the rapacity of 
the tax gatherers. 

Immediately after the conquest, the conquered territory was 
divided into provinces ; but the Turks have always permitted 
local self-government. Over each province was placed a bey, 1 
who was the head of the feudal soldiery of his pashalik. The 
people of each village elected their own elders, who assessed 
and collected the taxes which were demanded of the village, 
and the Kodja-Bashi, or headman, with the assistance of the 
parish priest, settled all disputes between the villagers unless 
they were of so important a nature as to be referred to the 
spiritual head. 2 

Before the decline, the government of the provinces was well 
administered, and the native population gained a great advant- 
age in escaping from the petty tyranny of the local despots 
who had flourished under the weak Byzantine government. 3 
But Turkish virility and honesty in administration disappeared 
after the reign of Suleiman the Great (1520-1566). The pro- 
vincial pashas, especially those far removed from the central 
government, came thereafter to exercise almost absolute power. 
Besides, as they held office at the pleasure of the Sultan, their 

1 The title of pasha was originally one of mere honor, implying that the person 
was in the highest employ of the state. Gradually it became confined to leaders 
of forces, especially when they became governors of provinces. 

1 Urquhart, Turkey and its Resources. Chapters ii. and iii. give an excellent 
description of local self-government in Turkey. 

1 Finlay, History of Greece, vol. ii, p. I. 



439] TURKS, RA YAHS AND FRANKS j 5 

tenure was uncertain ; and as they usually obtained their ap- 
pointment by the purchase of influence and favor at court, and 
as their salaries were nominal rather than real, they were obliged 
to resort to extortion and corruption in order to reimburse 
themselves. Moreover, their subordinates were appointed from 
Constantinople, often as spies, and these had to be conciliated. 
If a pasha, being exceptionally honest, tried to govern well 
and won the good will of his people, he was likely to be re- 
moved, since the Porte preferred an official who merely filled 
his pockets to one who might, by reason of his popularity, 
become dangerous. Provided the pasha sent to Constantinople 
the required revenue, the government cared little how he gath- 
ered it or how much more he gathered. 1 Of this vicious sys- 
tem, the rayahs, with no superior authority to appeal to, felt 
the full weight. 

From the very beginning the Turkish government adopted 
the pernicious policy of farming the taxes. Until 1695, the 
grant was for one year only, and each tax-farmer wrung out 
of the people all he could during that year, lest he be outbid 
for the privilege in the next. It was a common thing for a 
tax-farmer, who had a rich district, to become opulent out of 
the proceeds of a single year. This system was not confined 
to one species of tax, but applied indiscriminately to all — cus- 
toms, land, capitation and other forms. The farmer-general of 
a province often was the pasha, or some other high official, 
who sublet the various districts usually to Jews or Greeks. 
These farmers habitually employed as collectors soldiers, whose 
pay was generally months in arrears, but who yet had to live. 
Indeed, in the gathering of taxes, all agencies of the govern- 
ment, military as well as civil, were so united in interest that 
complaint by the sufferers was useless and practically impos- 
sible. Of all the immense sums extorted from the rayahs, 
and the almost equally unfortunate Turkish peasantry, only a 
small part reached the treasury; but the system was fast hurry- 

1 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 150 et seg. 



1 6 THE EASTERN QUESTION [440 

ing the state to its ruin. The Hatti-sheriff of Gulhane(i839) 1 
promulgated reforms, such as the separation of various func- 
tions formerly united in one person, and the prohibition of 
leases of taxes to officials, but without avail. The officials ob- 
tained contracts in the name of other persons, and then sublet 
them to rapacious usurers.* 

The land of the conquered was divided into three kinds. 
One portion was set off for religious purposes, such as the 
building of mosques and schools, and this was called vakouf 
land. It paid no taxes, nor could it be confiscated or taken 
for civil purposes. The amount of this land was much in- 
creased by direct donations of the faithful, but even more by 
devices similar to those against which the mortmain laws were 
made in England. It was a common thing for the holder of 
unencumbered land to deed it to a mosque for a tenth of its 
•value. In return, there was granted to him the right to lease 
it on payment of a rent equal to the interest on the money the 
mosque paid for it. During his lifetime, he could sell the 
lease, and at his death, his heirs inherited it. So extensively 
was this system practised, that by the middle of the last cen- 
tury, more two-thirds of the territory was vakouf. The con- 
sequent loss of revenue to the treasury gave rise to increased 
demands upon the rayahs. 

The second division of land was mirie or domain land. A 
part of this consisted of the Sultan's private property, and 
land the income of which was devoted to the expenses of ad- 
ministration ; but the major portion was granted to persons 
who held it on condition of rendering military service. These 
timars, as they were called, furnished the feudal levies of the 
Porte. In the beginning their estates were not hereditary, 
but they soon became so, and the timariot became the chief 
supporters of the provincial pashas in their defiance of the cen- 
tral authority. This kind of land was tilled by rayahs, who 

1 Hatti-sheriff is an irrevocable edict signed by the Sultan. 
a Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, vol. i, letter 13. 



44 1] TURKS, RA YAHS AND FRANKS X y 

suffered all the forms of oppression into which Turkish admin- 
istration degenerated. The taxes were collected irregularly 
and frequently, and the landlord was constantly devising fresh 
methods of extortion. 1 

The third kind of land is mulk, or freehold land. The 
amount of this in Turkey is not large, owing to the difficulty 
of obtaining secure titles. 2 

Although the evils inseparable from Turkish administration 
fell heavily upon the Christian rayahs, comparatively few of 
them changed their faith. The Bosnian land owners, actuated 
by the desire to save their property, and the small element of 
Pomaks in Bulgaria, are instances to the contrary ; but the 
only case in which a large part of the population was con- 
verted was that of the semi-barbarous Albanians, whose Chris- 
tianity was of a crude kind. The lot of the rayahs was not, 
however, everywhere the same. In the large cities, where they 
engaged in profitable trade, their burdens were comparatively 
light. Especially was this the case in the capital, where the 
taxes were not farmed, and where, in later times, the rayahs en- 
joyed to a great extent the good offices of the foreign ambas- 
sadors. It was in the provinces, where foreign influences were 
not felt, and which were difficult of access, the roads being few 
and poor, that the rayahs suffered most. Nor in the pro- 
vinces were the fates of the different races the same. The Bul- 
garians suffered most, the Roumanians least. 

In discussing the condition of the Greeks under Ottoman 
sway, we must carefully distinguish those who dwelt in the 
rural districts, both of modern Greece and of modern Turkey, 
from the Greek clergy and the inhabitants of the great cities, 
and particularly from the Phanariot aristocracy of Constanti- 

1 One of the Sultan Mahmoud's (1808-1829) reforms was to abolish this sys- 
tem, and to-day the holders of Mirie lands cannot sell, transfer or mortgage them 
without a license from the authorities, nor make them Vakouf without a special 
permit from the Sultan. 

1 The People of Turkey, by a Consul's Daughter, vol. i, chap. vii. 



iS THE EASTERN QUESTION [442 

nople. The rural inhabitants experienced to the full extent 
Turkish oppression, and their history from the fifteenth to the 
nineteenth century is almost a blank. But, as a result of the 
conquest, the influence of the Greek church and the power of 
the Greek clergy were much increased. One of the causes of 
the fall of Constantinople was the opposition of the Greek 
clergy to the last emperor, who had allied himself with Rome 
hoping thereby to gain aid against the Turk. The Greek 
clergy hated the Pope more than they did the Sultan, and pre- 
ferred the latter in Constantinople to the former. Mohammed 
the Second, the Conqueror, adopted as his deliberate policy 
the encouragement of this feeling and determined to use the 
hierarchy for his own purpose. He placed all the orthodox 
Catholics of the Empire under the control of the Greek patri- 
ach of Constantinople, and conferred upon him the rank of 
pasha. Under the Byzantine emperors the patriarch had con- 
trol over ecclesiastical affairs, but there was now delegated to 
him supervision over a large number of civil matters. All 
questions of marriage, divorce and inheritance ; all disputes 
between Christians which did not concern Moslems in any 
way, were committed to his charge or that of his subordinates. 
He was granted the right of collecting tithes and dues, and of 
enforcing his commands by excommunication, which few 
orthodox Catholics dared incur. In the course of time his 
powers became as extensive in civil matters as in religious. 
And the powers of the Greek metropolitans and bishops were 
proportionately great. The result of the introduction of this 
system was to make these offices much sought after. Simony 
soon developed, and the patriarchate was sold to the highest 
bidder, often bringing as much as one hundred thousand 
ducats. The patriarchs reimbursed themselves by charges 
for consecrating bishops ; the bishops by charges for conse- 
crating priests ; and these in turn by charges for performing 
the simplest rites of the church for the people. After the de- 
cline of the Ottoman Empire began, the Sultan frequently 



443] TURKS, RA YAHS AND FRANKS \ 9 

deposed the patriarch in order to put the place up for sale 
again, and the clergy did not scruple to buy the influence ot 
officials and of women of the harem in the scramble for the 
post. In return for the privileges they enjoyed, the clergy 
became the willing instruments of Turkish tyranny, enjoining 
obedience to the government, smothering nationalistic move- 
ments, excommunicating leaders. Their rapacity and avarice 
equalled that of the Turkish governors, and the people heard 
with as much dread of the visit of the Greek bishop to their 
district as of the presence of the Turkish pasha. Amid this 
carnival of venality and corruption, indulged in by monks and 
the higher clergy of the Greek orthodox church, the married 
parish prjests of the rural districts remained comparatively 
pure. They were bigoted and fanatical, but they shared the 
burdens of their flocks and kept them true to the faith and to 
the nation. 1 

The Turk is no money-getter; and the control of commerce 
and finance soon fell almost entirely into the hands of the 
Greeks, though in recent times they share it with Jews and 
Armenians. It was not remarkable, therefore, that the Greek 
merchant families of the Pharior 2 acquired in course of time 
great wealth, withwhich they could buy privileges from the 
Turk; and a GreeK aristocracy rose at Constantinople which 
played for a century and a half a most prominent part in the 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It is a peculiar anomaly that 
although the Turks have ruled the Balkans for over four 
hundred years, they have never had sufficient political or ad- 
ministrative ability to man the state with the necessary 
officials. For the first century and a half the tribute children 
supplied them with civil officials, as well as filled their armies. 
After the decay, of that system, Christian renegades furnished 
the necessary material, the majority of the grand viziers 

1 Finlay, History of Greece. For a vivid description of the condition of the 
Orthodox Church, see vol. v, chap. iii. 

3 The district of Constantinople inhabited by the patriarch and wealthy Greeks. 



20 THE EASTERN QUESTION \jAA 

being of that class. But from the middle of the seventeenth 
century, the high official class of Constantinople was recruited 
almost entirely from the Phanariots. With the decline of 
their military strength, the Turks found it necessary to have 
more intimate and more constant relations with foreign powers, 
but as they refused to learn either foreign languages or foreign 
ways they fell to employing the Phanariots, who were adroit, 
skillful and sufficiently servile. At first the latter occupied 
only the humbler positions, such as interpreters and go- 
betweens; but from the time of the greatest of Turkish grand 
viziers, Kuprili Mohammed (i 585-1661), almost the entire 
control of foreign affairs and to a great extent of domestic 
affairs fell into their hands. Kuprili Mohammed appointed 
the Phanariot Panayoti as dragoman of the Porte, a position 
which soon became analogous to that of minister. So suc- 
cessfully did this office work, that soon afterwards the position 
of dragoman of the fleet was created. This official was 
assistant to the Capudan Pasha or High Admiral, who not 
only controlled the navy, but practically governed the Archi- 
pelago. The dragoman of the fleet soon obtained almost 
complete power in the Aegean, buying from the Capudan 
Pasha all the offices in his gift and then selling them at a 
profit. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that at the be- 
ginning of the nineteenth century the Balkans were governed 
as much by Greeks as by Turks. The influence of the 
Phanariot aristocracy, as well as that of the Constantinople 
patriarchate, was broken by the Greek Revolution. Both had 
in the beginning opposed the movement as destructive to their 
selfish interests and their influence ; and after the revolution 
the Porte became suspicious of Christian officials, while one 
of the first desires of the new Greek state was the establish- 
ment of a national church. 

What is now Roumania was not in the path of the warfare 
which the Turks constantly waged with Hungary and Venice. 
It never became a province of the Turkish Empire, nor was it 



445 J TURKS, RAYAHS AND FRANKS 2 I 

much influenced by the Turks. On the contrary, in the early 
part of the sixteenth century, an agreement was made between 
the two principalities of which it is now composed and the 
Porte, by which the former were to become a vassal state of 
Turkey and pay an annual tribute, but were to have the ex- 
clusive management of their own affairs. No Turks were to 
be admitted into the two principalities, and they were freely 
to elect their hospodars or governors. 1 The Roumanians 
are the only people of the Balkans who have an aristocracy of 
birth, Turkish dislike to hereditary rank having destroyed it 
among the Greeks and Slavs. The Roumanian Boyards, 
however, could not brook the rule of any one of their own 
families, and in the contest for the office of hospodar some of 
them did not hesitate to invoke Turkish influence and favor. 
The result was that in time the Porte appointed and main- 
tained the hospodars, usually giving the office to the highest 
bidder among the Boyards. This system ended in 171 1. In 
the war of that year with Peter the Great, the hospodars were 
found aiding the Russians; and from that time until 1821, the 
beginning of the Greek Revolution, they were appointed 
directly by the Sultan, and although never Mohammedans, 
were usually Phanariot Greeks. They bought their privileges 
from the Porte, and they exercised their powers of office 
chiefly for the ends of personal gain, and of filling all offices 
in church and state with their own class. After the Greek 
Revolution, the Porte appointed natives to the position, and a 
national party arose antagonistic to both Greek and Turk, 
which succeeded finally, as we shall see, in working out inde- 
pendence for the country. 

The lot of the Slavonic inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire 
was for four hundred years indeed pitiable. The Servians to 
a great extent, and the Bulgarians entirely, disappeared from 
history. Bulgaria, lying helpless and hopeless immediately 
behind Adrianople, the first capital of the Turks, from the 

1 De Testa, Recueil des Traitls de la Porte Ottomane, vol. v, p. 283. 



22 THE EASTERN QUESTION [446 

beginning resigned itself to oblivion and oppression. The 
Servians, farthest removed from the central government, which 
could not control the local officials, were for a large part of 
the period a prey to the organized brigandage of Janissary 
rebels. 1 The national churches of both nations were destroyed; 
and as a reward for their fidelity to the Christian faith they 
suffered four centuries of a twofold tyranny, that of Turkish 
pashas and Greek priests. The Phanariot clergy sent from 
Constantinople wrung from the people as much money as pos- 
sible for Hellenic schools and institutions at Constantinople, if 
not for more questionable purposes. The native Slavonic 
priests, who were poor and ignorant, possessed little influence 
among the people, whom the Phanariots endeavored in every 
way to Hellenize. Educated Bulgarians until within almost 
a generation called themselves Greeks ; and we shall see with 
what difficulty those nations recovered their lost independence 
and their national churches. Only the Montenegrins and 
Albanians, of the Christian population in the Balkans, were 
able to maintain themselves against Turk and Phanariot. 
The Montenegrins were never conquered, and the Albanians, 
in their mountain fortresses, proved so difficult and costly to 
subdue that the Turks were glad to make terms with them, 
granting practical independence. 

The Koran, which in Turkey is the source of all law, civil 
and ecclesiastical, divides the earth into two parts: Dar-ul- 
Islam, i. e., the house of Islam, and Dar-ul-Harb, the house of 
the enemy. The only relation the former can have with the 
latter is the Djihad, or Holy War. Such a relation, so long as 
its existence was active, prevented the maintenance of any 
international law between Turks and Franks, and their inter- 
course was determined entirely by exigencies. Indeed it was 
not until 1856 that by the treaty of Paris the Ottoman Empire 
was formally admitted to the benefits of the European system. 
$ut the necessities of commerce and afterwards military weak- 

1 Ranke, History of Servia, chap. iii. 



4 47] TURKS, RAYAHS AND FRANKS 33 

ness constrained the Turks to enter into peaceful international 
relations with the Christian states of Europe; and until 1856 
the international law governing their relations with foreign 
states was founded on treaties called capitulations, which to a 
great extent embodied the previous customary laws with re- 
gard to Franks. The capitulations are actual treaties ; but, 
according to the Sheri or ecclesiastical law, only truces, not 
treaties, could be made with infidels. Besides, according to 
Mohammedan ideas, the Sultan was the Lord of the world, 
having no equal with whom he could conclude a treaty. The 
international instruments, by which privileges were granted to 
the inferior infidel nations, without requiring any reciprocal 
obligations, were therefore called capitulations, and from them 
has arisen that peculiar condition of things by which the resi- 
dents of foreign nationality form separate communities within 
the Turkish dominions. 

The Franks, or Christian foreigners, are divided into two 
classes: (1) Those possessing official privileges, viz., ministers 
and consuls, and (2) the ordinary private individuals. A con- 
sul in the Turkish dominions practically enjoys the privileges 
which in the case of an ambassador are comprehended under 
the term exterritoriality. His person and house are inviolable; 
he is not subject to the local law, civil or criminal ; he pays no 
personal taxes or custom duties, and his privileges extend to 
his family and suite. But he also has powers which do not 
ordinarily belong to an ambassador. He exercises civil and 
to some extent criminal jurisdiction over his fellow country- 
men. It is his duty to preserve law and order in the com- 
munity of which he is the judicial and administrative head; in 
a word, the consulate is the seat of government on a small 
scale for all persons under its flag. 

To a great extent, an ordinary foreigner in the Levant also 
enjoys the privileges of exterritoriality. He is subject in civil 
and, to a great extent, in criminal matters only to the jurisdic- 
tion of his consul. His legal domicil is in his own country 



24 THE EASTERN QUESTION [448 

His house is inviolable, no Turkish official being permitted to 
enter it except with the consul's permission. His real prop- 
erty, however, is subject to the law of the land. If he engages 
in litigation with a foreigner of a different nationality, the case 
is decided not in the local tribunals, but in the consular court of 
the defendant. These are extensive privileges and they some- 
times give rise to conflict with the local authorities, especially 
as they are much envied by the native rayahs, who attempt 
at times to take advantage of them. 1 

Although the Porte granted capitulations to the Genoese, 
Venetians and Pisans before 1535, the French capitulations of 
that year were more important, because of the greater extent 
of the privileges which they conferred and because they served 
as a model for those afterwards granted to other countries. 2 
Moreover, in European history, they mark the beginning of 
that great influence which France has since almost continu- 
ously enjoyed, an influence unequaled by that of any other 
nation. The capitulations of 1535 confirmed the powers of 
the foreign consuls and the privileges of foreign residents; but 
a great extension of privileges to France was granted by the 
capitulations of 1604 and by later ones. There was granted 
to her citizens freedom of worship ; the Holy Places in Pales- 
tine were to be safeguarded by her religious functionaries, who 
were not to be disturbed ; Frankish priests and dependents, of 
whatever nation, were not to be annoyed in the exercise of 
their functions. These privileges were so construed by the 
French as to include the right of protection of all Catholics 
in the East. 3 

1 Van Dyck, Ottoman Capitulations. An excellent account of the origin, de- 
velopment, and present status of the Turkish capitulations. 

1 De Testa, Recueil des Traites de la Porte Oltomane, vol. i, p. 15 ; Charriere, 
Negotiations de la France dans le Levant, vol. i, p. 285 ; Flassan, Diplotnatie 
Frangaise, vol. i, p. 366. 

s It is curious that so many of the English writers on the Eastern Question refer 
the privilege obtained by France to safeguard the Holy Places to the capitulations 



449] TURKS, RA YAHS AND FRANKS 2 $ 

The commercial privileges granted were also large. French 
ships secured freedom of traffic in all Ottoman seas, the navi- 
gation of which was also forbidden to the ships of other states 
with which the Porte had no friendly treaties, unless they 
sailed under the French flag. As Venice was the only other 
state that had a commercial treaty with the Porte in the six- 
teenth century, the advantage thus obtained by France in the 
East is obvious. Her flag was seen everywhere in the Levant, 
on the shipping in the harbors, on the monasteries in the 
interior; pilgrims journeyed under her protection to the Holy 
Places, and her ambassador was ever ready to maintain the 
rights of the Giaour at the capital. The French capitulations 
were frequently violated but were always renewed, and in 1740 
all the special privileges granted to France were solemnly 
confirmed ; and we shall see that it was a violation of these 
privileges in the nineteenth century that was the occasion, if 
not the cause, of the French participation in the Crimean War. 

The capitulations of 1535 were inspired by mutual consider- 
ations of expediency and policy. The power of the House of 
Hapsburg in Spain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
menaced the very existence of France. The House of Haps- 
burg was also the chief enemy of the Ottoman Bmpire ; and 
the object of the French alliance with the Mohammedan Turk 
for more than two hundred years was the abasement of the 
House of Austria. It was to France that the Porte almost 
invariably turned for advice when in trouble, and the friend- 
ship between the two countries was constant, though severely 
strained by Louis XIV and Napoleon I. It is worthy of note 
that in a short time the relations between the Porte and 

of 1535. There is not a word in them about those places. Nor does the 
firman of 1528, wherein Solyman granted to the French in Egypt the privileges 
enjoyed there before its conquest by the Ottomans, contain any reference to 
the Holy Places. The first mention of them that I can find is in the capitula- 
tions of 1604. The source of the error is probably D'Ohsson, Tableau General de 
r Empire Ottomane. 



2 6 THE EASTERN QUESTION [450 

France became so cordial that the King of France, Henry IV, 
was referred to in 1604 as Padishah, i. e., Great Ruler or 
Emperor. This title was reserved by the Moslems for the 
Sultan as being without equal on earth, and it was with 
extreme reluctance in the nineteenth century that they grad- 
ually extended it to some of the other rulers of the great states 
pf Europe. 

Until the latter part of the eighteenth century the Porte 
never maintained permanent embassies at the various Euro- 
pean capitals, although other states had such embassies at 
Constantinople. The Ottoman capital indeed was not a de- 
sirable post, for the foreign ambassador was often treated with 
contempt and insult, and even thrown into the prison of the 
Seven Towers, especially on the outbreak of a war between his 
country and Turkey. The conduct of negotiations with the 
Porte required great skill in diplomacy and even greater skill 
in the effective use of money. In the nineteenth century, how- 
ever, a great change took place in the diplomatic intercourse 
between the Porte and other powers. 



CHAPTER II 



THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 



The power of the Turks reached its zenith in the reign of 
Solyman the Great (1520- 1566), and except for intermittent 
revivals of energy, the decline after his death was steady. He 
was the last of the great Sultans who personally conducted the 
government and led the armies in the field. After him the 
administration of government fell into the hands of the grand 
viziers, and the Sultans devoted themselves chiefly to the 
pleasures of the harem. With the completion of the conquest, 
habits of luxury became general among the official class, and 
the old martial spirit decayed. While the Turk was thus 
declining in power, his Christian enemies were growing 
stronger. In the seventeenth century feudalism in Europe 
began to decay, succumbing to the development of the 
national state. Monarchs ceased to rely on feudal levies and 
maintained armies of trained soldiers, furnished with the new 
weapons of warfare. The Turk, on the other hand, lost his 
old discipline and refused to adopt that of Europe. The 
greatest blow to his military power was the revolution in the 
constitution of the Janissaries. At first they were permitted 
to marry, then to introduce their children into the corps, and 
finally to allow Turks to serve in it. Thus the institution of 
the tribute children gradually died out, the last instance of its 
enforcement being in 1676. The Christian rayahs were no 
longer depleted of their best and strongest, while the Porte 
lost its most efficient weapon. With the great depreciation of 
the currency, which took place in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, came a corresponding fall in the wages 
450 *7 



28 THE EASTERN QUESTION [452 

of the Janissaries, who were soon allowed to enter trades and 
to supply substitutes for foreign service. They remained 
chiefly at Constantinople, the most turbulent part of the 
population, opposed to all reform, fomenting rebellion, more 
dangerous to the Turkish than to any other government. It 
was a fortunate thing for the Ottoman Empire that the Chris- 
tian states devoted themselves during the first half of the 
seventeenth century to their religious wars, and did not unite 
against the common enemy. 

The diplomacy of continental Europe during the latter half 
of the seventeenth century and the former half of the eigh- 
teenth was determined by the rivalry of the Houses of Haps- 
burg and Bourbon. Finding herself endangered by the union 
of Spain and Austria, France erected what has been known in 
French diplomacy as the Barrier of the East, i. e., the union of 
Sweden, Poland and Turkey with France against the house of 
Austria. Until the reign of Peter the Great, the Barrier of the 
East proved very efficacious, France usually being able to 
obtain the support of one of her allies in her contests with 
Austria. But with the growth of Russia came a change. 
Russia, desirous of expanding to the south and west, 
naturally came into conflict with the Barrier, and as naturally 
allied herself with the enemy of the Barrier, Austria, at first 
tacitly, and then by the formal compact of August 6, 1726. 1 
This situation continued with but few changes until what is 
known in diplomatic history as the Overthrow of the Alliances 
in 1756, caused by the rise of Prussia. Austria, finding she 
had more to fear from Prussia than from France, and France, 
conceiving that her chief enemy was not Austria but England, 
renounced their hereditary enmity in 1756 and became allies." 
France by no means broke with her allies of the Barrier, viz., 
Sweden, Poland and Turkey. On the contrary she supported 
them uniformly ; but as their existence was no longer indis- 

1 Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, vol. vii, part 2, p. 131. 
* Wenck, Codex Juris Gentium, vol. iii, p. 14 1. 



453] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 2 g 

pensable against Austria, she supported them to maintain the 
equilibrium of the East. As a counterpoise to the union of 
the houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon, Catherine II. formed 
the System of the North, founded on an alliance between 
Russia, Prussia and England. The System of the North 
lasted until the American Revolution, when the exorbitant 
pretensions of Prussia, especially in Poland, and the abuse of 
power by England on the seas caused Catherine to approach 
first Austria and then France ; and when the French Revolu- 
tion broke out, a plan of a quadruple alliance of Russia, 
Austria, France and Spain against Great Britain and Prussia 
was under discussion. 1 We must now trace the influence of 
these diplomatic changes on the fortunes of Turkey. 

The bigotry of the Hapsburg emperor, Leopold I, caused 
the Hungarian rebellion of 1682. The grand vizier of the Ot- 
toman Empire at that time was Kara Mustapha, who owed his 
office to the circumstance that he was son-in-law to the Sultan, 
and in whom wild ambitions were united with mean abilities. 
He sought to take advantage of the Hungarian rebellion, not 
only to conquer that part of Hungary which still remained to 
the House of Austria, but to set up a Turkish pashalik of his 
own at Vienna. 2 His army, however, was utterly defeated 
before Vienna by John Sobieski, King of Poland, who had 
come to the rescue of Austria, and the result of the defeat was 
the immediate declaration of war against Turkey by Russia 
and Venice. For seventeen years the Turks attempted to de- 
fend themselves against these combined attacks, but each year 
saw their frontiers receding towards Constantinople. Once 
more the quarrels of the Christian states saved the Ottoman 
Porte. Louis XIV, who had aided the Hungarian rebels and 
had inspired the Ottoman policy, was exhausted by his struggle 

1 For a complete view of the diplomacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies, see " Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de 
France" especially the volumes relating to Russia and Austria. 

2 Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, book 48. 



30 THE EASTERN QUESTION [454 

against half of Europe, and was compelled to sign the treaty 
of Ryswick in 1697. This would have enabled the Austrians 
to turn their entire forces against the Turks, had the general 
European situation permitted it. William III., of England, 
the soul of the alliance against Louis XIV., endeavored to 
bring about peace between Austria and the Porte. He fore- 
saw the inevitable struggle over the Spanish succession, and 
wished the entire strength of Austria to be exerted against 
France. Lord Paget, the English ambassador at Constanti- 
nople, offered the mediation of England to the Porte, and at 
the instance of William he was seconded by the Dutch am- 
bassador. Louis used strenuous efforts to prevent the Porte 
from making peace, assuring it that the peace of Ryswick was 
but a temporary truce, and exhorting it to continue the 
struggle until France should be ready for war. But Louis' 
reverses had, for the moment, impaired French prestige at 
Constantinople, where English influence now stood high, and 
the Porte listened to the suggestions of England. Negotia- 
tions were opened at Carlowitz, on the Danube, on the basis 
of the Uti Possidetis, i. e. y that each power should keep the 
territory which was in its possession at the beginning of nego- 
tiations. The Porte protested against this, as it would involve 
the loss of some of its finest territories, but Austria insisted, and 
the Porte had to give way. All the contestants were anxious 
for peace except Peter the Great, whose armies had conquered 
Azof, and who hoped to gain still more by continuing the war. 
He entreated the Emperor to keep up the struggle, warning 
him that England and Holland were actuated by selfish con- 
siderations- His entreaties, however, were in vain ; and al- 
though certain deviations were made from the Uti Possidetis, 
the treaty of Carlowitz 1 was signed January 26, 1699, on that 
basis. The Ottoman Empire lost many of its fairest provinces. 
Austria obtained practically all of Hungary and Transyl- 
vania; Poland secured Podalia and the Ukraine ; Venice, the 

1 Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, vol. vii, part 2, p. 448. 



455] THE TREA TY OF KA [NARDJI 3 ! 

Morea ; Russia, Azof. Moreover, all payments of tribute by 
the Christian powers to the Porte were abolished. But it is 
not the loss of territory, however great, which makes the 
treaty of Carlowitz so important in European history, but the 
change in the relative positions of the parties. The Ottoman 
Empire, till then so dreaded by Christendom, lost its military 
prestige, sank into a position almost devoid of diplomatic in- 
fluence, and became a political machine which could be used 
by the European powers in future to serve their own selfish 
ends. 1 Austria, menaced so long on the south, found herself 
consolidated and with a splendid military frontier. And for 
the first time Russia obtained a foothold near the Black Sea. 

Peter the Great was determined that his dominions should 
reach the sea both on the west and the south, but to accom- 
plish this purpose he must come into conflict with Sweden and 
Turkey. Both these countries feared the growth of the Mus- 
covite power, and in the diplomacy of the eighteenth century 
we find Sweden and Turkey working together. In his con- 
test with the Swedes, Peter was eventually successful, and after 
Pultowa (1709) the Swedish king, Charles XII. , found refuge 
in Turkish territory. A diplomatic struggle then began in 
Constantinople. From the outbreak of the war of the Spanish 
Succession, Feriol, the French ambassador, had been urging 
the Porte to retrieve its fortunes by declaring war against its 
former enemies in conjunction with France. He was now 
strongly seconded by Poniatowsky, Charles XII. 's agent at 
Constantinople. Sutton and Collyer, the English and Dutch 
ambassadors, were for a number of years able by persuasion 
and by bribery, to which all ambassadors at Constantinople re- 
sorted, to prevent hostile action by the Porte. The Turks 
were not desirous of war, but they watched with grave anxiety 
the growth of the Russian fleet in the Sea of Azof, and the 
erection of strong fortresses on the Russian southern border. 
Moreover, the frequent violations of Turkish territory by 

1 Schlosser, History of the Eighteenth Century, vol. iii, introduction. 



32 THE EASTERN QUESTION \^t§ 

the Russians caused the greatest indignation at Constanti- 
nople, and this feeling, inflamed by French and Swedish in- 
trigues, led the Porte finally to declare war against Russia 
November 28, 17 10. Peter was taken at a disadvantage, being 
at war with the Swedes in the north, but he led an army in 
person towards the Danube. The Russians in this war 
adopted the practice, which was to become so prominent a 
part of their policy with reference to Turkey, of rousing the 
subject Christian peoples, and an agreement was made with 
Cantemir, hospodar of Moldavia, whereby he should rise in 
favor of Peter on the approach of the Russian army. In re- 
turn Moldavia was to be made an independent state under 
Russian protection, the sovereignty to remain with Cantemir 
and his heirs. 1 Peter greatly relied on the assistance which he 
was to receive from the Moldavians, but his expectations were 
disappointed; and in June, 171 1, he was surrounded by the 
Turkish army and compelled to agree to the humiliating 
Peace of the Pruth. 2 By this treaty Peter was obliged to give 
up all he had gained by the former war, to demolish his 
fortresses, to engage to abstain from interference in the affairs 
of Poland, and to forego the privilege of keeping an ambassador 
at Constantinople. To retrieve the disgrace of the Peace of 
the Pruth became for the next century one of the chief ends of 
Russian diplomacy. 

Nothing in the treaty of Carlowitz so hurt the pride of the 
Turks as the cession of the Morea to feeble Venice, and the 
Porte waited for a favorable opportunity to retake it. That 
opportunity apparently presented itself in 17 14, for although 
the war of the Spanish Succession was then ended, great dis- 
cord prevailed among the states of Europe. The western 
powers were apprehensive of further trouble from Spain, and 
Peter was involved in war with the Swedes. Repeated collis- 
ions between Turkish and Venetian galleys furnished the Porte 

1 Schuyler, Peter the Great, vol. ii, chap. Ixiii. 

* Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, vol. viii, part I, p. 275. 



457] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 33 

with a pretext, and by the end of 171 5 the Turks had recon- 
quered the whole of the Morea. Their rapid success alarmed 
Austria. Moreover, the influence of Prince Eugene was then 
paramount at Vienna, and he maintained that a war with the 
Turks would not only afford an opportunity for territorial 
aggrandizement, but would enable the army to be kept intact 
without arousing the suspicions of the other Christian powers; 
and it was deemed necessary to keep the army in a state of 
readiness, as it was suspected that Alberoni would attempt to 
recover the possessions lost by Spain to Austria by the Treaty 
of Utrecht. 1 For these reasons the Emperor, Charles VI., 
decided to aid the Venetians, and on April 13, 17 16, formed 
with them an offensive and defensive alliance. Prince Eugene 
was everywhere successful against the Turks, ending the war 
by the capture of Belgrade. He would fain have followed up 
these successes, but news arrived that Alberoni had landed 
his Spaniards in Sardinia, and that another European war was 
imminent. England and Holland again offered their media- 
tion, and negotiations were opened at Passarowitz on the 
Danube, July, 171 8, on the basis of the Uti Possidetis. The 
treaty of Passarowitz 2 was the most glorious ever signed by 
Austria with Turkey. Not only did the Turks lose the Banat 
of Temesvar, their last possession in Hungary, but they were 
forced to surrender to Austria Little Wallachia, and Belgrade 
and other important towns in Servia. The Turk was forever 
removed from Hungary, which had hitherto been the cause of 
most of the wars between Austria and Turkey. The Porte 
had always found it easy to incite revolt against the Emperor 
among the Hungarians, and the latter often preferred 
the comparatively lenient rule of the Porte to the bigoted 
tyranny of many of the Hapsburgs. Austria followed her 
usual policy of caring only for her own territorial interests, 
and left Venice, for whom she had professedly entered into the 

1 Schlosser, History of the Eighteenth Century, vol. iii, pages 250 et seq. 

2 De Testa, Recueil des Traitis de la Porte Ottomane, vol. ix, p. 73. 



34 THE EASTERN QUESTION [45 S 

war, to her fate. The Porte had no longer to fear Venice or 
Poland ; in the eighteenth century its wars were carried on 
against Austria and Russia; in the nineteenth against Russia 
alone. 

During the eighteenth century, three European states were 
in danger of dismemberment, viz., Sweden, Poland and Turkey. 
After the death of Charles XIL, in 171 8, the oligarchic party 
succeeded in gaining control of the government in Sweden, 1 
and for fifty years the resulting dissensions left Sweden en- 
feebled and a prey to her neighbors. The oligarchic party was 
supported by Prussia and Russia, especially under Frederick 
the Great and Catherine II., for the same reason that they 
upheld the anarchic constitution of Poland ; and it was under 
the oligarchic regime that Sweden lost all her Baltic posses- 
sions except Finland to Russia, and to Prussia most of her 
German possessions. The anarchic condition in which the 
Polish nobility consented to keep their country, by maintain- 
ing its oligarchic institutions, its elective kingship and its 
liberum veto, 2 made Poland an easy prey to her covetous 
neighbors, particularly Frederick and Catherine, who, with a 
view to the ultimate dismemberment of the country, obtained 
by treaty with the Poles the right to intervene to maintain their 
ruinous constitutions That Turkey was enabled to survive 
the eighteenth century, was probably due to the fact that the 
attention of her ill-wishers was so constantly diverted to Swe- 
den and Poland, and to the jealousy of Austria and Russia 
over the possession of the Danubian provinces. 

The attitudes of the various European states towards the 
threatened countries were interesting. France, as stated above, 

1 Dumont, supplement 2, part 2, p. 149. ** Convocation des Etats du Royaume 
de Suede par la reine Ulrique Eleonore avec declaration expresse qu'elle renonce 
au pouvoir absolu, communement nomme la souverainete," December 26th, 17 18. 

' The right of an individual member of the Diet to prevent legislation by his 
single vote. 

3 Wenck, Codex Juris Gtfttium, vol. iii, p. 486, article secret. 



459] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 35 

supported all three. Since the capitulations of 1535, she had 
been the ally of the Ottoman Porte, and her influence was 
thrown constantly in favor of Turkey as against her enemies. 
During the greater part of the eighteenth century, the Swedish 
court was in the pay of the French. And French statesmen 
always believed the preservation of Poland to be necessary to 
the balance of power in the East. The attitude of England 
towards the three states was dictated by her opposition to 
France and her commercial interests. The dismemberment of 
Poland would affect those interests little, but would please 
Russia, whereas the dismemberment of the other two states 
would injure English interests considerably. So that, although 
England was friendly to Russia during the eighteenth century, 
even at one time (1742) having a treaty of alliance with her, 1 
her influence was thrown at times in favor of Sweden ; and 
neither England nor Holland wished to lose so good a cus- 
tomer as the Turk, or to see a Russian commerce grow up in 
the Levant. The course of Austria and Prussia was governed 
entirely by the desire for territorial aggrandizement. Prussia, 
especially under Frederick the Great, was bent upon extending 
her boundaries in whatever way and at whatsoever cost might 
be necessary, and she gained her object by war and contriv- 
ance and at the expense of Austria, Poland and Sweden. Not 
being able to profit by the dismemberment of Turkey, Fred- 
erick was interested in her fate only to the extent of using her 
to create dissension between Russia and Austria. Austria 
profited largely by the Polish dismemberment, and she also 
regarded the Turkish dominions as a legitimate field of exploi- 
tation, but grew cautious and anxious when Russia became 
her competitor. The three threatened states, perceiving 
their danger, saw the need of co-operation against their com- 
mon enemy — Russia. A treaty of alliance was, therefore, made 
between Turkey and Sweden in 1739. 2 ^ was a war with 

1 Wenck, Codex Juris Gentium, vol. i, p. 645. 
3 Ibid., vol. i, p. 504. 



36 THE EASTERN QUESTION [460 

Sweden which prevented Russia from taking part against Tur- 
key in the conflict which ended at Passarowitz. It was a war 
with Turkey which prevented Russia from interfering in Swe- 
den, as Catherine wished to do in 1772, when Gustavus III. 
overthrew the oligarchy and once more restored Sweden to 
strength. 1 Poland might have allied herself with Turkey in 
the eighteenth century, but for Russian domination. The 
diplomacy of the eighteenth century was undoubtedly selfish 
and corrupt, but it was the diplomacy of the eighteenth century 
which prevented the dismemberment of Turkey. 

The decade after the Treaty of Passarowitz saw Russia at 
war with both Sweden and Poland, and she was successful 
against both. In 1733 she found herself at peace with her 
enemies, but with a splendid army of veterans under an able 
commander, Marshal Munnich, and the time was deemed ex- 
pedient to retrieve the disgrace of the Peace of the Pruth. 
Moreover, the Turks had greatly weakened themselves in a 
war with Persia, and besides had given offense to Russia by 
calling her attention to that provision of the Peace of the 
Pruth by which she had agreed not to interfere in Poland. 
An excuse was easily found for beginning hostilities, since the 
Turks never were able to restrain the Tartars of the Crimea 
and Kuban from committing depredations. The Russians 
began the war without a declaration. Marshal Munnich was 
altogether successful, and the Turks were driven to accept 
the proffered mediation of Austria, with whom by the Peace 
of Passarowitz they were bound to maintain a twenty-five 
years' truce. But by the Treaty of Vienna of 1726, 2 between 
Austria and Russia, it was agreed that each power should 
help the other with thirty thousand men in case either should 
be at war with a third power. Russia now demanded the ful- 
filment of this engagement. The Austrian government long 
debated whether it should merely fulfil the terms of the treaty, 

1 Rambaud, Histoire de la Russzt, chap. xxx. 
1 Dumont, vol. viii, part 2, p. 131. 



46 1 ] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 37 

or take advantage of the situation of the Turks to make war 
upon them and seize their territory. The war party pre- 
vailed, and a new treaty of alliance was made with Russia in 
January, 1737, whereby the two states agreed to carry on the 
war according to a stipulated plan and not to make peace 
separately. 1 During these negotiations, Austria kept up the 
pretense of mediation between Russia and Turkey at the con- 
ference of NimirofT, and used the time thus gained to put her 
army in readiness. Finally, Austria notified the Turks that 
she would require as the price of peace the cession of Moldavia 
and Wallachia. 2 The conference then came to an end and 
hostilities were renewed. But the conditions under which 
Austria went to war in 1737 were very different from those of 
1 7 16. She no longer had a Prince Eugene to command her 
armies. The Emperor, Charles VI, was infirm and was a 
victim of intrigues ; the finances were deplorably confused ; 
the army was in a wretched condition, and the council was 
divided. The result was that the Austrians were everywhere 
defeated ; and the Emperor requested Villeneuve, the French 
Ambassador at Constantinople, to open negotiations for peace. 3 
French diplomacy was never more skillful than in the months 
preceding the signing of the Treaty of Belgrade. It roused 
Sweden to preparations for war against Russia, and caused the 
Poles to renew their struggle, thereby compelling Russia to 
come to terms with the Turks. Villeneuve used his position 
as mediator, to which he had been appointed by Anne of 
Russia, as well as by the Emperor, to sow dissensions between 
the allies, to magnify the preparations and strength of the 

1 Martens, Recueil des Traites conclus par la Russia, vol. i, p. 69. 

1 Flassan, Diplomatic Frangaise, vol. v, p. 102. 

8 The Austrians showed an intense avidity for peace. Charles VI. was very 
infirm and might die at any time, and Maria Theresa and her husband were anx- 
ious to have the war off their hands in case of his demise. The generals in the 
field, Wallis and Neipperg, who hated each other and were both incompetent, 
showed an equally great desire to end the war. 



38 THE EASTERN QUESTION [462 

Turks, and finally, to obtain for the latter a most favorable 
peace. By the treaty of Belgrade, September 12, 1739," 
Austria relinquished nearly all her acquisitions made during 
the previous war, Little Wallachia and the places, including 
Belgrade, which she had obtained in Servia and in Bosnia. 
The Russians gained nothing by their great victories, except 
a slight increase of territory in the Ukraine, the basis of their 
settlement being practically the status quo ante bellum. 

Though French influence was never so high at Constanti- 
nople as after 1740, the Ottoman Porte could not be tempted 
to engage in the war of the Austrian Succession. At the 
outbreak of the war France urged the Porte to join the allies 
in the spoliation of the Austrian dominions, but the Sultan 
refused to do so and offered his mediation to the Christian 
powers. Similarly, during the Seven Years' War, Turkey 
remained at peace externally, although the rapacity of the 
provincial pashas and the laxness which everywhere prevailed 
were preparing the way for the great fall which was soon to 
take place. In 1762 the greatest enemy that the Porte has 
ever known, Catherine II., ascended the Russian throne, and 
the next year there occurred an event which was specially 
fraught with misfortune to Turkey, viz., the death of Augustus 
III. of Saxony, King of Poland, which gave rise to the 
struggle for the Polish succession. 

Immediately on the demise of Augustus III. France put 
forward another Saxon prince as her candidate for the Polish 
throne, and Austria, whose traditional attitude toward France 
had been reversed by Kaunitz by the treaty of 1756, gave him 
her support. Catherine put forth Stanislaus Poniatowski, one of 
her old lovers, and she was supported by Frederick the Great. 
Under the auspices of the Russian army the Polish diet 
elected Stanislaus, but he was able to retain his throne only 
by the aid of Russian bayonets, the Polish Confederates, as 

1 Wenck, Codex Juris Gentium, vol. i, p. 326. See also the French guarantee 
in De Testa's Recueil des Traitis de la Porte Ottomane, vol. i, pp. 178 et sea. 



463] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 39 

those who opposed Russian intervention were called, having 
taken up arms against him. France dared not openly support 
her candidate, as she had just emerged from the humiliating 
Seven Years' War and was menaced by the attitude of Eng- 
land, who favored Russia. But Choiseul, the French minister, 
while giving secret assistance to the Confederates, began the 
series of intrigues at Constantinople which finally terminated 
in the war of 1768- 1774, so full of disaster to Turkey. The 
able ambassador of France at Constantinople at this time was 
the Count de Vergennes. He did not hesitate to lay before 
the court of Versailles the wretchedly disorganized condition 
of Turkey ; x but Choiseul, bent on a diversion in favor of the 
Poles, instructed Vergennes to redouble his efforts, to assure 
the Porte of the neutrality of Austria, and to send to the 
Crimea Baron de la Totte, who had much influence with the 
Tartars there. The peace party, however, was in power at 
Constantinople, and had the Russians acted prudently war 
might have been averted. The Confederate Poles, when de- 
feated on their own territory, took refuge in Turkey, and after 
the manner of the Tartars made predatory excursions there- 
from. The Russians retaliated ; and when General Weissman 
pursued the Poles across the Turkish border and laid the town 
of Balta in ashes, the indignation of the Turks became violent 
and the Sheikh-ul-Islam granted the necessary Fetva to com- 
mence war. 2 But the Turks were wholly unprepared, without 
money, artillery, fortifications or discipline, and the six weeks 
which elapsed before they actively began hostilities were used 

1 Memoire de M. de Vergennes sur la Porte Ottomane, Segur's Politique, vol. 
iii, pp. 1 15-142 passim. 

2 The Sheikh ul-Islam, or Mufti, is the head of the Ulema, a body both religious 
and judicial, learned in the law, which is at the same time civil and ecclesiastical. 
No decree emanating from the sovereign is valid without the Fetva, a kind of Bulj 
of the Mufti. This was once formidable, but has become a mere judicial formal- 
ity. Schlosser, History of Europe in the Eighteenth Century, vol. iv, p. 404, 
says : " The delay in granting the Fetva in this case was the result of the inferior 
size of Russian as against French bribes." 



40 THE EASTERN QUESTION [464 

by the Russians in reducing Cracow, the last of the Con- 
federate strongholds, and thenceforward Turkey had to face 
the Russians unaided. The war was one-sided. By the end 
of 1769 the Russians were in control of Moldavia, Wallachia 
and the Crimea. And a large fleet, manned and guided by 
English sailors and officers, though nominally under the 
command of Gregory OrlofT, entered the Aegean, destroyed 
the Turkish fleet at Tchesme and incited an insurrection in 
Greece. 

The rapid success of the Russians along the Danube roused 
the court of Austria and even caused Russia's ally, Fred- 
erick, to grow anxious at the extension of Muscovite power. 
Joseph II. and Frederick met in conference at Neustadt in 
Moravia in 1770, and Kaunitz pressed the King of Prussia 
to join Austria in opposing Russian ambition by force of 
arms if necessary. Frederick had long been meditating the 
annexation of Polish Prussia, which divided his dominions, 
but he knew that he could not accomplish it without the 
concurrence of Austria and Russia. The jealousies of the 
European states during the eighteenth century, and espe- 
cially those of Austria, Russia and Prussia, forbade that any 
of them should expand unless the others should be indemni- 
fied, lest the balance of power might be destroyed. As they 
could not expand separately, they must expand together ; and 
this situation explains the various treaties of alliance and par- 
tition of that century. It was at the Neustadt meeting x that 
Frederick suggested to Kaunitz the dismemberment of Poland 
and the plan of compelling Russia to seek indemnity in Poland 
instead of retaining Moldavia and Wallachia. While the 
conference was in session messengers arrived from Constanti- 
nople begging the two monarchs to mediate between Russia 
and Turkey, and the conference broke up with the under- 
standing that Frederick was to use his good offices with 
Catherine. 

1 Coxe, History of the House of Austria, chap. cxix. 



465] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 4! 

Austria never had a more able or more devoted servant than 
Count, afterwards Prince Kaunitz, and he was not likely to 
leave anything undone that would redound to the glory of the 
House of Hapsburg. When therefore the Turks proposed to 
Austria in 1771 an alliance against Russia, and offered most 
advantageous terms, Kaunitz accepted the overture in spite of 
his conversations with Frederick of the previous summer ; and 
on July 6, 1771, a defensive and offensive alliance was made 1 
whereby, in return for the restoration to the Porte of all the 
territory that had been conquered by Russia, Turkey was to 
cede Little Wallachia to Austria, to free Austrian commerce 
from all taxes and to pay Austria an annual subsidy of ten 
thousand florins in four installments, the first of which was 
actually paid. Murray, the English ambassador at Constanti- 
nople, obtained a copy of the treaty, and communicated it to 
Berlin and St. Petersburg. By this time Frederick had 
matured his plan for Polish dismemberment, and he sent his 
brother, Prince Henry, to St. Petersburg to persuade Catharine 
to relinquish her designs on Turkey and seek compensation 
in Poland. Frederick enlarged upon the dangers to Russia 
of the alliance of the Porte with Austria, and assured Catha- 
rine that France would certainly aid the latter country. He 
pointed out that the indemnification which Catherine could 
justly claim for the expenses of the existing war might readily 
be obtained in Poland, but that in order to maintain the bal- 
ance of power in eastern Europe it would be necessary for 
both Austria and Prussia to enlarge their boundaries. The 
plan was not at all relished by Count Panin and the Russian 
court, for the simple reason that knowing their influence was 
supreme in Poland, they were averse to sharing with others 
what they desired to obtain for themselves alone. But 
Catherine was frightened at the Austro-Turkish alliance and 
proposed to Frederick a counter-alliance, by which they 

1 According to Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traitis, vol. vi, p. 134, the 
treaty was not ratified. 



42 THE EASTERN QUESTION [466 

should reciprocally guarantee their possessions and pledge 
themselves to assist each other against Austria in case of war. 
Frederick agreed to this proposal on the promise of Russia 
that she would relinquish Moldavia and Wallachia, and thus 
avoid giving to Austria a cause for quarrel. 1 At the same 
time Catherine entered into an armistice with Turkey, and the 
most of 1772 was spent in negotiations at Fokschani and 
Bucharest. 

Having succeeded at St. Petersburg, Frederick again turned 
to Vienna, where he encountered much difficulty. Kaunitz 
set great store by the Turkish alliance, provided Prussia would 
remain neutral ; and Maria Theresa, of whom Frederick said 
that she was always weeping and always grabbing, had 
scruples about the Polish spoliation. Frederick, who was 
anxious to settle the matter, refused to promise neutrality \ 
on the contrary, he began to mobilize his troops. This 
alarmed Kaunitz, who soon convinced Maria Theresa that 
there would be less effusion of blood in accepting territory in 
Poland than in fighting for it along the Danube. 2 The three 
courts, therefore, came to an agreement as to their shares of 
the spoil by the first Treaty of Partition, July 25, 1772, 3 and 
Turkey, who had refused to come to terms, was once more 
left to her fate. Early in 1773 the Russian ultimatum was 
delivered at the conference of Bucharest. It required that 
the Crimea should be an independent Tartar state under the 
protection of Russia, and that the two principal fortresses of 
Kertsh and Yenikalie should remain in Russian hands ; that 
Russian ships, naval as well as merchant, should enjoy the 
free navigation of the Black Sea and the Archipelago ; that 
Russia should have a permanent resident at Constantinople, 
and that the sovereign of Russia should receive the title of 

1 Scholl, Histoire des Traitks de Paix, vol. xiv, p. 36. 

* For a history of the Polish dismemberment see Von Hammer, vol. viii, books 
61 and 62 passim. 

8 Martens, Recueil des Traitis, voL ii, p. 89. 



467] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 43 

Padishah ; and that Russia should have the right to protect 
the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire who pro- 
fessed the Greek religion. Severe as these demands were, the 
Sultan, his councillors and his generals, advised their accept- 
ance, so weakened had Turkey become. France also advised 
the Turks to end the war, it being evident that she could not 
help them without incurring the hostility of most of Europe. 
But the Ulema and Softas z were obdurate, and the Sultan felt 
that to act contrary to their wishes would produce an insur- 
rection and probably lead to his own deposition. Negotiations 
consequently were broken off and hostilities were resumed 
early in 1773. 

Though at first successful, the Turks soon met with repeated 
defeats, and again became anxious for peace. Nor were the 
Russians less anxious. Their losses during the war had been 
tremendous ; it was evident that the Poles intended to rise 
against the Partition Treaty; but above all, in 1773, the im- 
postor Pugatcheff, who impersonated the murdered Peter III., 
raised a formidable insurrection which spread desolation 
through southern and eastern Russia. When, therefore, Su- 
warrow surrounded the Turks at Shumla, the Russians, al- 
though they denied a request for an armistice, urged the grand 
vizier to send plenipotentiaries to treat for peace. The confer- 
ence took place at Kutchonc-Kainardji, in the tent of the Rus- 
sian General, July 17, 1774, and resulted in the famous com- 
pact known as the Treaty of Kainardji. The text of the 
treaty * is in Italian. 3 The negotiations were conducted with 
military celerity. The basis of the peace was the Russian 
ultimatum presented at Bucharest in 1772, and an agreement 

1 The Softas are the theological students. With the Ulema they form a bulwark 
against all reforms or innovations. 

1 Martens, Recueil des Traitis, vol. ii, p. 286. 

3 Negotiations with the Ottoman Porte were frequently in Italian. As late as 
1 76 1 the treaty of commerce with Prussia was in that language. In the Egyp- 
tian mixed judicial tribunals of to-day Italian is one of the official languages. 



44 THE EASTERN QUESTION [468 

was reached in seven hours ; but the Russians, with a view to 
vaunt their triumph, delayed the signature four days till July 
2 1st, the anniversary of the peace of the Pruth. The advan- 
tages which Russia gained by the treaty were far-reaching. 
" The two empires have agreed to annihilate and leave in an 
eternal oblivion all the treaties and conventions heretofore 
made between the two states . . . and never to put forward 
any claim grounded upon the said conventions." z The Otto- 
man Porte agreed that the Tartars of the Crimea, Kuban and 
adjacent regions, between the rivers Berda and Dneiper, and 
also the inhabitants of territories lying between the Bug and 
Dniester, as far as the frontier of Poland, should form an inde- 
pendent state, and that " Neither the court of Russia nor the 
Ottoman shall interfere under any pretext whatever with the 
election of the said Khan, or in the domestic, political, civil 
and internal affairs of the said state." But within the bound- 
aries of this newly organized Tartar state, Russia retained for 
herself the fortresses of Kertsch and Yenikalie in the Crimea, 
the city of Azof and its district, and the castle of Kilburn at 
the mouth of the Dneiper, with a district along the left bank 
of the Dneiper. 3 Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia were 
given back to the Ottoman Porte on condition of " a grant of 
an amnesty for all offenses during the war ; free exercise of 
the Christian religion and permission from the Porte that ac- 
cording as the circumstances of those two principalities may 
require, the ministers of the imperial court of Russia resident 
at Constantinople may remonstrate in their favor." 3 A very 
important clause of the treaty (article 7) respecting the Chris- 
tian subjects of the Sultan declared : " The sublime Porte 

1 It is for this reason that the Turkish question of the nineteenth century dates 
from the Treaty of Kainardji, all the Russian claims being founded upon it and 
almost every treaty thereafter confirming it. 

2 All this was merely a step in the direction of incorporation into Russia. 

3 All of which would tend to cause the Christian population of these territories 
to look to Russia in the future as their sovereign, instead of Turkey. 



469] THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 45 

promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its 
churches, and it also allows the imperial court of Russia to 
make upon all occasions representations as well in favor of the 
new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made 
in article 14, as on behalf of its officiating ministers." x The 
words referred to in the fourteenth article were: "After the 
manner of the other powers permission is given to the high 
court of Russia in addition to the chapel built in the minister's 
residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street 
called Bey Oglu, a public church in which the Christians may 
worship according to the Greek ritual, which shall always be 
under the protection of the ministers of that empire and secure 
from coercion and outrage." The straits were to be opened 
to the merchant ships of both parties, and Russian merchant- 
men were to be treated in the same way as the French, who 
were then the most favored nation. Russia also obtained the 
right to have resident consuls in all parts of the Turkish Em- 
pire. Turkey agreed to permit the residence of a Russian 
minister at Constantinople, and to give the Russian sovereign 
the title of Padishah, " which had hitherto been refused." Not 
a word was said about Poland, although the Russian treat- 
ment of Poland had been one of the causes of the war. The 
general opinion in the European chancelleries, as well as 
among the learned of Europe, was that the Ottoman Empire 
had received a blow from which it would never be able to re- 
cover. Even many French statesmen believed that it would 
be impossible for France to support the Ottoman Empire any 
longer, and that it behooved France to consider its early de- 
mise, and prepare to share in its effects. The treaty gave a 
great blow to French prestige in the East. Russia had the 
advantage of position, race and religion, and gradually sup- 
planted France in the exercise of special privileges of protec- 

1 It is upon this clause that Russia, in 1853, founded their claim to the general 
protection of all the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire who were members of the 
Orthodox Church. 



46 THE EASTERN QUESTION \ajq 

tion. The treaty was acclaimed by the Voltaireans and En- 
cyclopedists, who were addicted to magnifying the word and 
worth of Catherine II., and who dreamed of the re-establish- 
ment of the Greek Empire. Immediately after the signing of 
the treaty, Austria occupied the Bukovina, which Turkey was 
compelled to cede to her by the Treaty of Constantinople of 
May 7, 1775. 1 

1 Neumann, Recueil des Trait&s conclus par VAutriche, vol. i, p. 173. This 
causes the friction between Austro -Hungary and Roumania to-day. The Buko- 
vina is inhabited almost entirely by a Roumanian people, who are anxious to unite 
with Roumania. 



CHAPTER III 

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 

During the second part of her reign Catharine II. aban- 
doned the System of the North, i. e. t the alliance with Prussia 
and England against France and Austria, and became recon- 
ciled with the two latter countries, and especially with Austria. 
Catherine and her counsellors had decided on their plan for 
Ottoman dismemberment, but needed an ally in central 
Europe for its fulfillment; and the character of Joseph II. in- 
dicated him as the proper one. Panin was gradually sup- 
planted in power by Potemkin, and in the latter the Ottoman 
Empire found an implacable enemy. He had never intended 
that the provisions of the Treaty of Kainardji relating to the 
new Tartar State should be carried into effect, and as soon as 
the Pugatcheff rebellion was suppressed, he inaugurated in the 
Crimea the policy which had proved to be so successful in 
Poland. Russian intrigues secured the election of Sahim 
Gherai as the new Khan, and at the same time instigated his 
subjects to revolt against him beeause of his partiality to 
Russian customs. 1 In 1777 he found it necessary to call in 
the aid of his creator, and the Russian army penetrated into 
the Crimea and suppressed the rebellion. The Ottoman Porte 
was indignant at this violation of the Treaty of Kainardji, but 
Potemkin had selected a most opportune moment. War was 
about to break out between France and England over the 
American question. Joseph II. had been completely won 
over to Catherine's views with regard to the Ottoman Empire 
and Frederick the Great did not dare oppose Russia unsup- 

1 Annual Register for 1778. 
47 1 ] 47 



48 THE EASTERN QUESTION V^y 2 

ported. Upon the advice of France, therefore, the Ottoman 
Porte remained passive, and in 1779 a convention was signed 
between Russia and Turkey by which not only the provisions 
of the Treaty of Kainardji were confirmed, but by which 
Russia obtained substantial privileges in the navigation of the 
Black Sea, while the authority of the Ottoman Porte in the 
principalities was much diminished and Potemkin's tool, 
Sahim Gherai, was recognized as Khan of the Crimea. 1 

In 1782 the rebellion instigated by Potemkin's agents broke 
out again; and Catherine and Potemkin determined to take 
advantage of the opportunity to carry out their long cherished 
scheme. The Crimea was again invaded, the Khan deposed 
and the world notified that the independent Tartar State had 
been annexed to Russia. A manifesto 2 was published April 
3, 1783, professing the same ground of intervention as in the 
case of Poland, viz., the benefits to be conferred on the Tartar 
people by the suppression of civil war and anarchy. The 
Turks were indignant and threatened war, but Vergennes, who 
was then Louis XVTs chief minister, restrained them. He 
could obtain support against Russia nowhere. 3 Joseph II. 
was altogether committed to the Russian programme by the 
Treaty of 178 1. 4 Frederick was hoping to get the Polish 
cities of Thorn and Dantzig, and therefore could not afford to 
alienate Russia ; besides, he objected to the treaty of alliance 
between France and Austria of 1756. Even before the 
definitive Treaty of Paris of 1783 was signed, Vergennes 
turned to England, but Fox, who was then secretary of state 
for foreign affairs, distinctly avowed his preference for Russia, 5 

1 Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traitts, vol iii, p. 349. 

2 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 444. 

8 Flassan, Diplomatie Fran^aise, vol. vii, book 8, containing the memoire of 
Vergennes to Louis XVI. suggesting measures to be taken in agreement with other 
courts to prevent the Russian aggression. 

* Martens, Recueil des Traitts conclus par la Russie, vol. ii, p. 96. 

6 See Fox's admission in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxix, p. 63. 



473] RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 40 

and England could hardly be expected to support France in 
anything after the latter's assistance to her revolted colonies. 
The only sovereign apparently in a position to help Turkey 
was Gustavus III. of Sweden, but in the very year 1783 he 
was obliged to come to terms with Catherine. The Turks 
could do nothing but follow the advice of France and submit 
to the humiliation. On January 8, 1784, through the medi- 
ation of M. St. Priest, the French ambassador, there was 
signed the Treaty of Constantinople, 1 by which the Ottoman 
Porte, although confirmed in the possession of Oczakof and 
its territory, acknowledged the annexation both of the Crimea 
and Kuban to Russia. 

After the annexation of the Crimea, Catherine made little 
secret of her intentions with reference to the Ottoman Empire, 
and she subordinated everything else to her policy in regard 
to that state. In her triumphal progress to her new territor- 
ies, in 1787, she was met at Cherson by Joseph II., and con- 
ferences took place as to the fate of the Turk. Catherine II.'s 
grandson, who had just been born, was named Constantine; a 
triumphal arch was erected at Cherson, with the inscription, 
"This is the way to Byzantium;" and there was open talk of 
the re-establishment of the Greek Empire under a Russian 
Prince, with compensation to Austria in Servia and Dalmatian 
All this was sufficiently irritating to the Turk, but evidence 
soon accumulated that the Russian consuls at Jassy, Buchar- 
est, Smyrna, Alexandria and elsewhere, who had been forced 
upon the Ottoman Porte by the Treaty of Kainardji, were in- 
citing rebellion. In the face of all these provocations, the 
Porte, unable to withstand the indignation of the populace of 
Constantinople, declared war against Russia, August 15, 1787. 

1 Martens, Recueil des Principaux 7rait£s, vol. ii, p. 505. 

2 Arneth's Joseph II. und Katharina von Russland, containing the letter of 
Catherine to Joseph of September 10, 1782, and the answer of Joseph of Novem- 
ber 13, in which the views of the two monarchs as to the partition of the Otto- 
man Empire are set forth in full. 



30 THE EASTERN QUESTION [474 

This was what Catherine desired, for by the Treaty of 178 1, 
Russia and Austria were bound to aid each other only in case 
they were attacked, and Catherine hoped, by making the Porte 
appear to be the aggressor, to induce Joseph II. to form an 
offensive as well as defensive alliance. The Turks made a 
dignified appeal to Joseph, reminding him that when they had 
been invited to participate in the dismemberment of the Aus- 
trian possessions, at the accession of Maria Theresa, they had 
refused. 1 But Joseph was anxious to share in the conquest, 
and war was declared by Austria and Russia against Turkey, 
in February, 1788. 

Although Frederick the Great was dead, his anti Austrian 
policy was continued by his old minister, Count Herzberg, who 
was retained by Frederick William II. in the early days of his 
reign; and in 1788* an alliance was formed between Prussia and 
England, 3 which, although immediately directed against French 
intervention in the Netherlands, was also designed to thwart 
the schemes of Austria and Russia with reference to the Otto- 
man Empire. 4 The allies roused the enemies of Russia and 
Austria to activity. They supported the Belgian revolt against 
Joseph in the Netherlands ; they assisted Sweden in the war 
which she began against Russia, and compelled Denmark to 
withhold from the latter the aid which she intended to give ; 
they encouraged Poland in reforms antagonistic to Russia. 
Nevertheless, although at first unsuccessful, the Austrians 
penetrated into Servia and the Russians into the principalities, 
so that it looked once more as if the Ottoman Empire were 
doomed. Prussia then concluded, January 31, 1790, a treaty 5 

1 Coxe, History of the House of Austria, vol. iii, p. 516. 

2 For evidence of the intense hatred which existed between the courts of Vienna 
and Berlin, Malmesbury 's Diaries, vol. iii, p. 34. Though this refers to 1793, 
the feeling was a survival of that engendered by Frederick the Great. 

5 Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traites, vol. iii, p. 146. 

4 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxix, p. 79. 

* Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traitis, vol. iv, p. 560. 



47 5 ] R USSIAN A G GRESSION 5 r 

with the Porte, by which she agreed to guarantee to the Sul- 
tan the full and unimpaired possession of his dominions as 
against Austria. This treaty, however, was not destined to be 
executed, for on February 20, 1790, Joseph II. died. The 
radical reforms which he had instituted in his dominions had 
produced wide-spread revolt, especially among those whom 
they were intended to benefit, and he was compelled to call 
many of his best troops from the front. At the time of his 
decease, Prussia was seeking to obtain the Polish seaports of 
Thorn and Dantzig, in return for which she offered to recover 
Galicia from Austria and restore it to Poland ; and with this 
in view, she stationed troops along the frontiers of Siberia and 
Galicia. Under these circumstances, the new Emperor, Leo- 
pold II., decided to come to terms with the Turks. It was his 
policy to placate England, and to prepare to fight Prussia if 
necessary. He also alarmed England by threatening to cede 
the Austrian Netherlands to France. England, therefore, 
agreed to the Congress of Reichenbach. Leopold understood 
better than Joseph had done the danger of having a Russian 
at Constantinople ; and at the Congress " he agreed to lend no 
further aid to Russia against the Turks and to restore to the 
Belgians their hereditary rights and privileges. England was 
thereby satisfied, while Herzberg was thwarted. In conse- 
quence of this arrangement, an armistice was declared between 
Austria and Turkey, and after long discussion, the Treaty of 
Sistova 2 was signed between the two countries, August 4, 1791. 
By it Turkey lost only the town of Old Orsova and the terri- 
tory of the Unna. 

Russia, who had then concluded peace with Sweden, re- 
mained unmoved by the threats made at Reichenbach, and 
continued at war with the Turks, repeatedly defeating them in 
battle. A Russian fleet was also got ready in the Baltic to 

1 Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traites, vol. iii, p. 170. 

2 Neumann, Recueil des Traitts conclus par PAutricke, vol. i, p. 454. 



5 2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [^6 

renew the enterprise of Gregory Orloff, namely, to sail to 
Greece and rouse the inhabitants. But the younger Pitt was 
now prime minister of England, and he inaugurated the policy 
which afterwards became traditional in English diplomacy, of 
maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a neces- 
sary condition of the preservation of the balance of power. 
An English fleet was prepared for service in the Baltic, though 
the idea of a war with Russia at that time was rendered un- 
popular by the exertions of Fox and Burke and the opposition 
of the mercantile class who feared the loss of the Baltic trade- 1 
Prussia placed a large army on foot and also offered media- 
tion, but Catherine was incensed and declined it. It was the 
changed condition of Poland that impelled Catherine to agree 
to a peace, the conclusion of which was facilitated by the death 
of Potemkin, who had opposed it. Kosciusko and his com- 
patriots had made excellent reforms, both political and mili- 
tary, and it was evident to Catherine that she would need 
Suwarrow and his veterans in Poland, if she was to carry out 
her schemes of further Polish dismemberment. Once more 
Poland was to be the ransom of Turkey. Catherine accepted 
the mediation of Denmark, who was friendly to Russia, and on 
January 9, 1792, the Treaty of Jassy 2 was signed. By it the 
western boundary of Russia was extended to the Dniester; 
and all the coast of the Black Sea between the Bug and the 
Dniester, with the fortress of Oczakof, became Russian. Stipu- 
lations in favor of the Danubian principalities were also made, 
requiring the Ottoman Porte to lighten the burdens of their 
inhabitants in various ways. 

The condition of the Ottoman Empire in the years succeed- 
ing the Peace of Jassy was truly deplorable. Anarchy reigned 
everywhere, and the pashas made themselves practically inde- 

1 The attitude of the various English statesmen on the Eastern question at this 
time is fully shown in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxix passim. 

2 Martens, Reeueil des Principaux Traitis, vol. v, p. 67. 



477] R USSIAN A G GRESSION 5 3 

pendent. 1 Even before the Revolution a party in France had 
maintained that French interests would be better served in 
agreeing to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire than 
in maintaining its integrity. 2 The series of unsuccessful wars 
fought by Turkey and the resulting confusion in internal ad- 
ministration led many French statesmen to believe that disso- 
lution was inevitable, and that France should look to receiv- 
ing her share. It was a cherished tradition of the French 
foreign office that if the Ottoman Empire should ever be dis- 
membered Egypt should fall to the lot of France. 3 This view 
was retained by the French Directory, which besides was 
anxious to get rid of a too successful general ; and it was also 
shared by that general himself, who believed that one of the 
surest ways of striking at England was by way of India- 
Negotiations were therefore opened with Tippoo Tib and the 
other Indian princes opposed to England, and great prepara- 
tions were made for a naval expedition, the destination of 
which was kept secret. The French set sail from Toulon 
May 19, 1798, took Malta on the way from the Knights of St 
John, landed in Egypt and defeated the Mamelukes in the 
Battle of the Pyramids. The news of the expedition was re- 
ceived in Constantinople with stupefaction. The ally, whom 
the Ottoman Porte had been accustomed to consult for more 
than two hundred years, had betrayed it. The astonishment, 
however, was equalled by the indignation. Nor could the 
French explanation that they were making war only upon the 
rebellious Mamelukes, who had interfered with French com- 

1 The opportunity for ending the contest with the Ottoman Empire was not open 
to either Austria or Russia. The former was engaged with Bonaparte in Italy ; 
the latter was trying to pacify and assimilate Poland. Catherine was, however, 
on the eve of beginning hostilities in 1796 when she died. Eton, Survey of the 
Turkish Empire, p. 45 1 et seq. 

2 Annual Register for ijg8, p. 135. 

5 Memoire addressed by Leibnitz to Louis XIV, January, 1672, in De Testa, 
Recueil des Traitis de la Porte Ottomane, vol. i, p. 525. 



54 THE EASTERN QUESTION [473 

merce, and that they were fighting for the Sultan and not 
against him, blind the Turks to the true significance of the in- 
vasion. The Russian and English ambassadors were there to 
enlighten them. A Djihad, or Holy War, was proclaimed 
against the French. Ruffm, the French charge d'affaires, was 
thrown into the Seven Towers, the French mercantile estab- 
lishments were destroyed and the religious orders dispersed. 
War was declared September 12, 1798, and an alliance was 
concluded with Russia December 23, 1 to which England 
acceded January 5, 1799. The French, though at first suc- 
cessful in Egypt, were eventually compelled to surrender to 
the English, and a combined Russian and Turkish fleet took 
from them the Ionian Islands, which had been given to them 
under the Treaty of Campo Formio.* 

On the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens between France 
and England, a treaty of peace was also signed between France 
and Turkey, January 25, 1802. 3 By this treaty the Ottoman 
Porte was confirmed in its possession of Egypt and all its 
territories. In return the property confiscated by the Porte 
from the French mercantile and religious establishments was 
restored, and the capitulations of 1740 were renewed with 
new stipulations, giving French ships the right to enter the 
Black Sea and navigate there without restriction. The Ionian 
Islands were erected into an independent republic, and the 
Greek inhabitants were permitted to choose their own pro- 
tector. They naturally chose the Emperor of Russia. Im- 
mediately after the conclusion of peace Napoleon resumed the 
old policy of courting the friendship of the Porte, and so skill- 
ful were the French ambassadors, especially General Sebasti- 
ani, that in a few years France had regained all her old influ- 
ence over the Divan. 

1 Martens, Recueil des Principaux Iraitis, vol. vii, p. 256. 

1 De Clerq, Recueil des Traitis de la France, vol. i, p. 335, art. 5. 

8 For documents relating to the French expedition to Egypt, Correspotiderce de 
Napoleon I, nos. 2500-4400. Also De Testa, Recueil des Traitis de la Porte 
Ottomatie, vol. i, pp. 495 et sea. 



479] R USSIAN A G G RE SSI ON 5 5 

For some time, however, the Porte continued to lean on its 
allies of the late war, England and Russia. By a convention 
concluded with Russia, September 24, 1802, the Sultan agreed 
not to remove the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia 
without the consent of Russia, nor to allow any Turks, except 
merchants, to enter either principality. A naval station was 
also conceded to Russia on the southern shore of the Black 
Sea, and the Russian fleets were allowed to pass and repass 
the Dardanelles. In 1803 the Servians rose under Kara 
George, and massacred the Janissaries, who had nowhere been 
so tyrannical as in Servia, where they plundered and murdered 
the rayahs without restraint. The rising took place with the 
permission, and even at the instigation, of the Sultan ; but 
later, when he ordered the Servians to return to their homes, 
they refused to do so until reforms had been granted. 1 Fol- 
lowing the example of the Roumanians they sent a deputation 
in August, 1804, to St. Petersburg. The deputation was well 
received. The Russian emperor advised the Servians to pre- 
sent their request to the Porte, and promised to support it. 
In the summer of 1805, therefore, a Servian deputation went 
to Constantinople and demanded that in future all Servian 
fortresses should be garrisoned by Servian troops, and that in 
consideration of the unsettled condition of the country, the 
arrears of taxes and tribute should not be exacted. This 
demand was made at a crisis in the history of Turkey. 2 
Sultan Selim was making every effort to reorganize his empire 
and introduce reforms, but the Janissaries were in a dangerous 
mood because of the treatment of their brethren in Servia ; nor 
could he rely upon the aid of the Divan, whose members were 
little more than pensioners either of France or of Russia. 
The French ambassador, Marshal Brune, demanded that the 
Sultan recognize the new French Empire, and give Napoleon 
the title of Padishah ; the British and Russian ambassadors 

1 Ranke, History of Servia, chaps, vi-xviii. 
3 Annual Register for 1806, pp. 21 et sea. 



36 THE EASTERN QUESTION [480 

threatened to leave Constantinople if he did. Finally, when 
the coalition of 1805 was about to attack Napoleon, the 
Russian ambassador, Italinzki, demanded that the Porte form 
an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia against France- 
This demand was made at the same time that the Servian 
delegation presented its petition at Constantinople. The 
Sultan deemed it necessary to temporize with Russia, who 
had one army along the Danube, another in the Ionian 
Islands, and a third in the Crimea; and he entered into 
negotiations with Italinzki ; but he determined to act promptly 
against the Servians. Their demands were rejected and their 
deputation thrown into the Seven Towers, while two Ottoman 
armies were sent against Kara George. But the Servians had 
learned to fight in the armies of Joseph II., and a national 
spirit had been developed in their struggles with the Janis- 
saries. The Ottoman forces were defeated, the Turkish 
fortresses in Servia were captured, and the Servians by their 
own efforts and without foreign assistance won their inde- 
pendence in 1806. In the mean time Napoleon had captured 
the Austrian army at Ulm and had defeated the combined 
Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz. This necessitated the 
withdrawal of the Russian forces along the Danube and in the 
Crimea, and relieved Turkey from pressure in that quarter. 
The French ambassador placed the Treaty of Pressbourg, 
which Napoleon had concluded with Austria, before the 
Divan. By this treaty France obtained Dalmatia and Illyria, 
and thus became a neighbor of Turkey. This circumstance 
was by no means pleasing to the Porte, but the Sultan, 
desirous of retaining the friendship of France, bestowed upon 
Napoleon by a Hatti-sheriff the title of Padishah, and sent an 
extraordinary embassy to Paris. Sebastiani was sent to Con- 
stantinople in return, to reorganize the Turkish army. 

Sebastiani soon acquired great influence with the Divan, 
and he used it to excellent purpose for his master. Russia 
and Prussia had declared war against Napoleon in September, 



48 1 ] &■ USSIAN A G GRESSION 5 y 

1806, and it was important that a diversion should be made 
along the Danube in order to prevent the entire Russian 
strength from being concentrated in Poland. Sebastiani 
journeyed through the principalities, and on his return con- 
vinced the Sultan that Ypsilanti and Morouzi, the hospodars 
of Wallachia and Moldavia, were really agents of Russia and 
traitors to Turkey. The Sultan dismissed them both, in defi- 
ance of the convention of 1802 ; but upon the demand of the 
British and Russian ambassadors, backed by a threat of force, 
reinstated them. The Russians nevertheless crossed the Pruth 
and occupied the principalities. This act excited the jealousy 
of Austria, and was one of the principal reasons why Austria 
did not join the coalition of 1806 against Napoleon, who on 
more than one occasion employed the differences among the 
various European powers as to the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire for the purpose of dividing his enemies. 1 The Otto- 
man Porte declared war against Russia December 30, 1806, 
notwithstanding the menaces of Arbuthnot, the British minis- 
ter. The British fleet was ordered to sail against Constanti- 
nople, and on February 19, 1807, favored by a strong wind, 
it passed through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora 
and anchored off Princess' Island near Constantinople. The 
Divan was terrified, and was disposed to yield to Arbuthnot's 
ultimatum that Sebastiani be immediately sent away from 
Constantinople, that the alliance with Russia and England be 
renewed, and that the Straits be opened to the Russian fleets. 
But Sebastiani animated the Turks with his own courage, and 
while the Divan trifled with Arbuthnot through notes dictated 
by the French ambassador, the latter displayed the greatest 
activity in repairing the fortifications of the city, so that when 
the Divan gave its refusal to the ultimatum, Admiral Duck- 
worth found the defenses too strong to be taken and sailed 
back through the Dardanelles with considerable loss. He 
afterwards landed an expedition in Egypt, which was unsuc- 

1 Vandal, NapoUon et Alexandre /, vol. i, chap, prelirainaire. 



58 THE EASTERN QUESTION [482 

cessful, so that in the South during 1807 the Turks did not 
fare so badly. In the North very little was done by either 
side. The Russians were obliged to give their attention to 
their more formidable enemy, Napoleon, and could oppose to 
the Turks only such troops as they could spare. The Turks 
on the other hand were distracted by revolts in the army and 
by uprisings among the people. Early in May, 1807, Sultan 
Selim was deposed by the Janissaries, and Mustapha IV was 
placed upon the throne. Napoleon used this as a pretext for 
abandoning Turkey to Russia in the Treaty of Tilsit, July 7, 
1807. 1 The public articles referring to Turkey provided that 
the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, but 
that the Turks should not enter the principalities until a treaty 
of peace should be made between the two countries. 2 General 
Guillemont, the French agent, negotiated a cessation of hos- 
tilities between Russia and Turkey at Slobosia in August, 
1807. It was agreed between Alexander and Napoleon, how- 
ever, that the stipulations of Tilsit with reference to the evacu- 
ation of the principalities, should be practically disregarded, 
and article 8 of the secret alliance provided that if the Porte 
should not comply with the recommendations of France and 
Russia, her European possessions, except Constantinople and 
Roumelia, " should be withdrawn from the vexation of the 
Turkish government." The Turks knew nothing of the secret 
articles, but they were sufficiently astonished by the public 
articles. They had been led to expect the recovery of the 
Crimea; instead they saw the principalities remain in the 
hands of the enemy. General Sebastiani's position became so 
embarrassing in Constantinople after the signature of the 
treaty that he obtained his recall. 

The retention of the principalities by Russia caused the 
greatest uneasiness at Vienna, and the Austrian government 
used its best efforts to bring about a reconciliation between 

1 Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I> vol. i, chap. I. 

' De Clercq, Rccueil des Traitks de la France, vol. ii, p. 207, arts. 22 and 23. 



483] RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 59 

Turkey and England, so that the latter might act as a protec- 
tress of Turkey against the designs which were believed to 
have been formed at Tilsit and Erfurt. At the conference of 
Erfurt, Napoleon, who foresaw trouble with Austria and was 
thus doubly anxious to retain the alliance with Russia, made 
greater concessions to Alexander than at Tilsit. 1 By a treaty 
which was to remain a "plus profond secret," October 12, 
1808, he recognized the Czar's possession of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, and also of Finland, which the Russians had just 
torn from Sweden ; and the two monarchs agreed not to treat 
with England unless " she should agree to recognize Moldavia, 
Wallachia and Finland as part of the Russian Empire." The 
English ministry obtained knowledge of the treaty and 
accepted the good offices of Austria in bringing about a 
reconciliation with Turkey. January 15, 1809, Sir Robt. Adair 
concluded the Peace of the Dardanelles. 2 This was highly 
displeasing both to France and to Russia. Napoleon was 
especially incensed at Austria. He ascribed the treaty to 
Austrian intrigues, and it was one of the causes of the war be- 
tween France and Austria a few months later. 3 The menaces 
of France and Russia and the continued occupation of the 
principalities by the Russians brought about in March, 1809, 
the renewal of the hostilities, which had been suspended since 
the armistice of Slobosia. During 1809 and 18 10 the Rus- 
sians were almost completely successful ; but in the mean time 
Napoleon and Alexander had become estranged and were pre- 
paring for the conflict which seemed inevitable. The Russians, 
therefore, in 181 1, withdrew a large part of their forces from 
the Danube to strengthen the army which was to operate 
against Napoleon, and in the war with Turkey acted entirely 
on the defensive. The English minister zealously encouraged 

1 De Clercq, Recueil des Traitis de la France, vol. ii, p. 284, arts. 8 and 9. 
'Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Principaux Traitis, vol. i, p. 160. 
8 As to difficulties attending the conclusion of the Peace of the Dardanelles, 
see Adair, Mission to Constantinople. 



60 THE EASTERN QUESTION [484 

the reconciliation of Russia and Turkey in order to give a free 
hand to Alexander against Napoleon, and persuaded the 
former to abate his demands. Napoleon, on the other hand, 
made desperate efforts to regain the confidence of the Turks, 
and urged them to commence active operations along the 
Danube, promising them that he would make no treaty with 
Russia which did not provide for the restoration of Moldavia, 
Wallachia and the Crimea. But his secret agreement at Tilsit 
for the dismemberment of Turkey was laid before the Divan ; 
and the resentment and distrust thus aroused, together with 
the liberal use of money, induced the Ottoman Porte to agree, 
May 28, 1 8 12, to the Treaty of Bucharest 1 The Russian 
army, which was thereby released, hurried towards Moscow 
and materially assisted in the destruction of the French. By 
the treaty of Bucharest, Moldavia and Wallachia were restored 
to the Porte, but Bessarabia was given to Russia. The 
Russian boundary was thus moved westward to the Pruth, 
and the Sulina mouth of the Danube became Russian. The 
Porte moreover bound itself to maintain and respect forever 
certain stipulations in favor of the inhabitants of the princi- 
palities ; to demand no taxes for the period of the war and for 
two years afterwards ; and to allow four months for any of the 
inhabitants to emigrate. Article 8 returned Servia to the 
Porte, with the reservation that there was to be a general 
amnesty. The administration of their internal affairs was to 
be left to the Servians, but the fortresses were to be occupied 
by Turkish garrisons. It is significant that this treaty was 
concluded through the instrumentality of Stratford Canning, 
who was afterward to occupy so large a place in Ottoman 
history. 2 

1 Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites, vol. iii, p. 397. 

2 Lane Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, chap. iv. 



CHAPTER IV 



: HE GREEK REVOLUTION 



No representative of the Ottoman Porte was admitted to the 
Congress of Vienna, and in the proceedings of the Congress 
the Sultan found grave cause for apprehension. The engage- 
ments of the allies extended to practically all Europe except 
the Ottoman Empire ; and when the question of its territorial 
integrity was brought up for discussion, the Emperor Alexan- 
der refused to allow it to be considered. 1 The Porte also 
looked with much suspicion upon the Holy Alliance. This 
alliance, which was formed at the instance of Alexander, pur- 
ported to regard the various states of Europe as members of 
one "Christian natio?i, to be governed according to the teach- 
ings of Christ ; " and the Sultan was not invited to adhere, as 
were all other European monarchs. Moreover, Alexander 
surrounded himself with avowed enemies of Turkey. One of 
his ministers of foreign affairs was the Greek Capodistrias ; the 
Ypsilanti brothers, sons of the former hospodar of Moldavia 
were officers in the Russian army and friends of the Czar. The 
Hetairia, the Greek revolutionary society, was founded in 
Russia, whence it was permitted to carry on its propagandism . 
Nor were these the only ways in which Alexander exhibited 
his enmity to Turkey. In 1816, he proposed to the powers 
that if the Ottoman Porte could not suppress the Barbary 
pirates, all Europe should make a crusade against them. By 
the advice of England and Austria, who were determined to 
uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Porte en- 
deavored in every way to avoid giving offense. This circum- 

1 Seignobos, Political History of Europe since 1814, chap. xxv. 
485] 61 



62 THE EASTERN QUESTION [486 

stance chiefly explains the favorable terms granted to the Ser- 
vians, who again revolted under Miloch Obrenovitch, in 181$. 
By the compact of 18 17, Miloch was recognized as knes or 
prince superior of Servia ; and although Turkish garrisons 
were retained in the fortresses, a large measure of local auton- 
omy was granted to the Servians. 

Indeed, the avoidance of trouble with foreign powers was 
then essential to the safety of Turkey. Never was the country 
in a worse state of anarchy. Mehemet Ali had made himself 
practically independent in Egypt ; the fanatic Wahabites were 
in possession of the Holy Places in Arabia; Ali Pasha of 
Janina ruled as a sovereign prince in Epirus and defiantly 
contemned the commands of the Sultan, while his example 
was, to some extent, imitated by the provincial pashas ; the 
rayahs were in revolt in several provinces, and the Janissaries 
were rebellious. Few monarchs faced, in the decade succeed- 
ing the Congress of Vienna, conditions more untoward than 
those that surrounded Mahmoud II ; but he was a man of 
resolute energy, and set about systematically to recover his 
lost authority throughout the empire. The most serious ob- 
stacle to this was Ali Pasha of Janina, and his destruction was 
determined upon. For some years Ali treated lightly the 
attacks made upon him, but when, in 1820, Mahmoud made 
immense preparations for his destruction, he sought to obtain 
the support of the Christian rayahs of Greece, and incited 
them to revolt. 1 

The Greeks had made remarkable progress in wealth, in- 
telligence and national spirit since the Peace of Kainardji. 
That peace had compelled the Ottoman Porte to receive 
Russian consuls in the various cities and ports, and these were 
nearly ali Greeks. During the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic struggles almost the entire trade of the Levant 

1 For the condition of the Ottoman Empire previous to the Greek Revolution 
consult the Annuaire Lesnr for 1818, chap, iv ; 1819, chap, vi ; 1820, chap, xi, 
and 1 82 1, chaps, vi-viii. 



a$j1 THE GREEK REVOLUTION 63 

and a large part of the trade of the Mediterranean fell into the 
hands of the Greeks, sailing as they did under the neutral flag 
of Turkey. Few Turks engaged in commerce. It is esti- 
mated that the maritime population of Greece in 181 5 num- 
bered twenty-five thousand men, and that more than five hun- 
dred ships were owned by Greeks. The new class of merchants 
and traders sent their sons to be educated in France, England 
and Germany, and these young men, when they returned to 
their homes, were not only unwilling to exhibit in their atti- 
tude toward the Ottoman Porte the servility displayed by the 
Greek clergy, but they began to dispute with the latter for 
supremacy in the nation. It was principally from their ranks 
that the Hetairia was recruited, an association which developed 
from a literary into a political society, whose object was the 
emancipation of Hellas. Uprisings took place simultaneously 
in the Morea, in the archipelago and in the Danubian princi- 
palities. The revolt in the principalities was a failure. The 
Roumanians in reality felt little interest in the fate of Greece. 
Ypsilanti was driven by the Turkish troops into Austria, 
where he was interned by Metternich as a revolutionist. But 
the insurrection in Greece was everywhere successful, and the 
massacres of Christians which took place all over Turkey, be- 
ginning with the hanging of the patriarch in his robes from the 
gate of his own church at Constantinople, aroused the indigna- 
tion of Europe and created an intense sympathy with the 
Greek cause. 1 

The Greeks naturally looked to Alexander for encourage- 
ment and support, but Alexander had gone through a peculiar 
evolution since 1815. For three years after the Peace of 
Vienna he had been the champion of liberalism in Europe and 
the competitor of Metternich for political supremacy. But 
from the Congress of Aix-la Chapelle in 18 18 he gradually 
fell more and more under the influence ot Metternich, and 
with him saw only one enemy in Europe to oppose, viz., Revo- 
1 Tennent, History of Modern Greece, vol. ii, chap, xviii. 



64 THE EASTERN QUESTION [488 

lution. To combat it he had applauded Austrian intervention 
in Italy in 1820, and in 1822 he suggested French intervention 
in Spain, and now he did not hesitate to condemn the Greeks 
in unmeasured terms. But Russian official opinion was favor- 
able to the Greeks, and Alexander's policy on the Greek ques- 
tion until his death was a vacillating one. On July 6, 1 82 1, 
he instructed Strogonoff, his ambassador at Constantinople, to 
demand, first, that the Porte re-erect the churches destroyed 
by the Turkish mobs in the recent outbreaks; second, that it 
guarantee the protection of the Christian religion in the Otto- 
man Empire, and third, that it re-establish in the Danubian 
principalities the legal regime existing before the outbreaks, 
and remove the Turkish troops. 1 These demands the Porte 
peremptorily refused; Strogonoff left Constantinople August 
8, 1 82 1, and diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey 
were severed. Alexander massed his troops along the Pruth, 
but he hesitated to take the initiative in hostilities. There 
were at least two powers in Europe which were not disposed 
to stand idly by and permit Russia to work her will in the 
Balkans. These powers were Austria and England; and 
Alexander, besides hesitating to incur their opposition in a 
contest with Turkey, did not desire to face the dissolution of 
the system, based on the Holy Alliance, of which he was the 
author and Austria the mainstay. Metternich and Castlereagh 
both were opposed to the Greeks, the former seeing in their 
revolt only another symptom of the Revolution which was 
raising its head all over Europe, and the latter only the pos- 
sible fruition of Russian schemes. Both wrote to Alexander 
that this was a splendid opportunity for him to stand by his 
principles and give an example to Europe; 2 and as neither 
the French nor the Prussian government exhibited any en- 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. viii, pp. 125 1 et sea. For the Turkish 
reply, ibid., p. 1260. 

' Metternich's Memorandum for the Emperor Alexander, in AfetternieA's 
Memoirs, vol. iii, p. 61 1. 



489] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 65 

thusiasm in his behalf, and as on January 13, 1822, the Greek 
national assembly adopted a democratic constitution and de- 
clared the complete independence of Hellas, Alexander decided 
to yield. 1 He accepted the mediation of Austria and England, 
who urged the Porte to grant the demands which he made on 
the strength of the treaties, and especially that which con- 
cerned the Danubian principalities. In May the Porte prom- 
ised to nominate two new hospodars for Moldavia and Walla- 
chia, and asked Russia to resume diplomatic relations.* 
Alexander expressed his willingness to comply with this re- 
quest, on condition that the Porte should notify him officially 
of the nomination of the two hospodars, should renew the 
commercial privileges of Russia in the Ottoman Empire, and 
should re-establish the rights and privileges of the Christians, 
the violations of which had caused the uprising of the Greeks. 3 
Three months later the Congress of Verona assembled, and 
Alexander completed his submission to the policy of Metter- 
nich. 4 The Congress declined to admit the Greek delegation, 
and condemned the revolution ; and the Greek delegates, after 
lingering several weeks at Ancona, were invited by the police 
of the Holy See to depart. 

August 12, 1822, Castlereagh committed suicide, and the 
" malevolent meteor," s George Canning, soon became the 
head of the foreign office in London. Not only did Canning 

1 For the Greek Declaration of Independence and Constitution, see British 
Foreign and State Papers, vol. ix, pp. 620-629. 

9 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. x, pp. 850 et seq. 

• Annuaire Lesur for 1823, p. 521. 

4 MetternicKs Memoirs, vol. Hi, p. 523. "In this fresh emergency the Em- 
peror Alexander has given proof of his noble and loyal courage .... The two 
monarchs, i. /., of Russia and Austria, have simultaneously declared at Constan- 
tinople that faithful to the principles which they have publicly announced, they 
will never support the enemies of public order ; that they will never lend any help 
to the Greek insurgents ; that they leave to the Porte itself the task of watching 
over its own safety." 

5 Metternich's Memoirs, vol. Hi, p. 392. 



56 THE EASTERN QUESTION [490 

take the keenest pleasure in defying Metternich openly, and 
ridiculing him in the eyes of Europe, but as the friend of 
liberalism, he was a strong partisan of the Greek cause. 
From the beginning of 1823 the friendly attitude of England 
towards the Greeks was shown in many ways. The English 
government of the Ionian Islands gave them passive assist- 
ance; 1 the blockade established by the Greeks at various 
ports along the coast was recognized by the English govern- 
ment, 2 which also issued a proclamation of neutrality, thus 
recognizing the Greeks as belligerents ; and a loan of eight 
hundred thousand pounds was raised in London for the Greek 
government. The Greeks indeed began to consider England 
as their only friend in Europe, and English influence naturally 
became predominant with them. Towards the end of 1823, 
Alexander, who was greatly disturbed by these developments, 
invited the four great powers to send delegates to a conference 
at St. Petersburg to consider the pacification of Greece. 
Canning demanded that previously to the opening of the con- 
ference, Russia should make known her views as to the 
reorganization of the country. In a memoir to the four courts 
Alexander proposed that Greece should be divided into three 
parts — Morea, East Hellas and West Hellas — each of which 
should be a vassal principality to the Porte on substantially 
the same basis as the Danubian principalities. 3 

The object of this was evident. The Ottoman Empire was to 
be dismembered, but no new state was to be founded which 
would be strong enough to stand by itself. On the contrary, the 
Greeks were to be dissevered, and were to be placed in a situation 
in which they would, like the Danubian principalities, be obliged 
to look to Russia for support. The Sultan, it is needless to say, 
was indignant at the proposal of a conference for the dismem- 
berment of his empire and the settlement of the relations which 

1 British and Foreign State Pafers, vol. xii, p. 903. 

1 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, new series, vol. ix, p. 441. 

• Menzies, Turkey, Old and New, p. 365. 



4 9I ] THE GREEK REVOLUTION ty 

should exist between him and rebellious subjects from whom 
he demanded unconditional surrender. The Greeks, on the 
other hand, who up to this time had been uniformly successful 
against the Turks, were equally incensed at what they 
denounced as Alexander's betrayal of them, and refused to be 
divided or to become a vassal state. They turned naturally 
to the power which had befriended them, and in August, 
1824, addressed a note to Canning, in which they rejected the 
proposals of Alexander, and besought Canning to defend their 
independence. 1 In November Canning made a temperate 
reply. He declared that mediation was at the time impossible 
because the views of the two belligerents were so diverse, and 
because England was united to Turkey by ancient treaties 
which the Sultan had not violated. Meanwhile, Great Britain 
would observe a strict neutrality, 2 and if at a future time 
Greece should demand her mediation, and the Ottoman Porte 
should accept it, it would be at their service. At the same 
time Canning notified Alexander that Stratford Canning, who 
had been designated as the English representative at the pro- 
posed conference at St. Petersburg, would not take part in its 
deliberations, but would confine his negotiations with Russia 
to the question of the boundary between the two states in 
North America. 3 In reality Canning was convinced that the 
conference could accomplish nothing, for he was assured both 
at Constantinople and at Nauplie, the seat of the Greek gov- 
ernment, that the collective mediation of the powers would be 
rejected by both Turkey and Greece, and he was unwilling to 
support any plan to compel them to accept it. 

Alexander deeply resented Canning's refusal to take part in 
the conference. But Canning had reasoned correctly. At the 
conference, which was in session from February to April, 1825, 
Russia kept to the front the plan of demanding of the belliger- 

1 British Foreign and State Papers, vol. xii, p. 899. 
8 Hertzlet's Map of Europe by Treaty ', vol. i, p. 731. 
* Lane Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, chap. x. 



68 THE EASTERN QUESTION [492 

ents an armistice, of offering them a collective mediation, and 
if they refused, of compelling them to accept. It was evidently 
Alexander's design that the Holy Alliance should perform in 
the Balkans a duty similar to that which it had discharged in 
Italy and Spain, and that on the present occasion Russia should 
be delegated to execute the task. But the other members of 
the Holy Alliance also had their individual interests to consult. 
France feared to lose her influence with Mehemet Ali, who had 
been called by Mahmoud from Egypt to take part in the Greek 
struggle. Austria would never agree that Russia should lead 
an army through the Balkans, and Prussia would not go 
counter to anything suggested by Metternich. At length 
Metternich took a definite stand. He refused any compromise. 
There must be on the part of the Greeks either entire submis- 
sion or entire independence ; and he knew that Alexander 
would not agree to the latter. 1 The result of the long sessions 
of the conference was that the powers engaged to ask the Porte 
to grant the just demands of its subjects, and in case of re- 
fusal, to offer it their mediation. 

The ingratitude of Austria, as Alexander considered it, 
impelled him to approach Canning, and this inclination was 
strengthened by the reply given at Constantinople to the note 
of the conference. The Sultan declared that he would confirm 
his revolted subjects in their privileges and guarantees after 
they had unconditionally surrendered, and that in the mean 
time he would not recognize the intervention either of one 
power or of a group of powers. Ibrahim Pasha, the son of 
Mehemet Ali, who had been sent by the latter to command 
the Ottoman forces, had turned the tide of war in Greece, and 
the Sultan looked for a speedy termination of the struggle, as 
in fact did all Europe, unless the powers should soon intervene. 
But from the moment of the Sultan's reply, the attitude of 
Russia towards Turkey resumed all its old severity. The Czar 
renewed his complaints at the non-performance of the promises 

1 Metternich to Lebzelten, in MetternicK's Memoirs, vol. iv, p. 309. 



493] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 69 

of the Porte. He demanded that the last of the Turkish troops 
should be removed from the principalities, that the liberties 
guaranteed to the Serbs by the Treaty of Bucharest should be 
conceded to them, and that their deputies to Constantinople, 
who had been imprisoned since the revolt began, in 182 1, 
should be released. These demands were emphasized by in- 
creasing the Russian forces along the Pruth. August 25, 
1825, the Greeks once more voted to place themselves under 
the protection of England, and so notified Canning. 1 The 
latter answered, that while England could not at that moment 
accede to their wishes, she would, nevertheless, watch over 
them and not permit any other power to impose a solution 
contrary to their interests. Strangely enough, it was with the 
full knowledge of this answer, which evidently was leveled at 
Russia, that Alexander began his approach to England. But 
on December 1, 1825, before anything could be accomplished, 
he died. 

His successor, Nicholas, on ascending the throne declared 
that it was his purpose to follow the plans of Alexander, and 
that, as the latter had intended to compel the Porte to accede 
to his demands, it therefore behooved him to continue in that 
path. 3 On April 5, 1826, he accordingly addressed to the 
Porte an ultimatum, in which he demanded that the Sultan, 
besides restoring the Danubian principalities to their position 
previous to the insurrection of 182 1, and fulfilling the stipula- 
tions of the Treaty of Bucharest, should send commissioners 
to the frontier to negotiate with Russian commissioners con- 
cerning the disputes arising out of that treaty. 3 Six weeks 
were allowed to the Porte to yield. Nothing was said in the 
ultimatum as to the fate of the Greeks, but Nicholas frequently 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xii, p. 904. 

2 See his interview with Count Zicky, the Austrian envoy, Metternichfs 
Memoirs, vol. iv, p. 486. 

8 For the full text of the ultimatum, see British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. xiii, p. 1056. 



y THE EASTERN QUESTION [494 

spoke of them as rebels who deserved no help in their revolt 
against their sovereign. 1 Canning resolved to prevent a rup- 
ture between Russia and Turkey by all means. A victorious 
Russian army in Turkey would mean that Nicholas would lay 
down the law for the entire Balkan peninsula, and settle the 
Greek question to suit himself. This Canning determined to 
prevent. He therefore sent the Duke of Wellington, for whom 
Nicholas had a great admiration, on a mission to St. Peters- 
burg, ostensibly to congratulate the Czar on his accession to 
the throne, but in reality to come to terms on the Eastern 
question. Wellington was to tender the good offices of Eng- 
land in the disputes between Russia and Turkey, and to re- 
quest Nicholas' adhesion to the British mediation between the 
Greeks and the Turks. Nicholas flatly refused any interfer- 
ence between himself and the Porte in what concerned his 
particular grievances ; but Wellington made it clear to him 
that England could remain neutral in a war between Russia 
and Turkey only in case he should agree to British mediation 
between the Greeks and the Turks; and Nicholas, disclaiming 
any particular interest in the fate of the rebels, signed the pro- 
tocol of April 4, 1826. 2 By this protocol it was provided that 
Russia should accept the mediation of Great Britain between 
the Greeks and the Turks; that autonomy should be demanded 
for Greece, but that she should remain tributary to the Porte; 
that the agreement should hold good whatever might be the 
relations between Russia and Turkey; that each of the con- 
tracting parties should renounce in advance all advantages 
which would not be common to all the states of Europe as a 

1 See the Zicky interview, MetternicWs Memoirs, vol, iv, p. 489. "I repeat 
that I detest and abhor the Greeks, although they are my co-religionists; they 
have behaved in a shocking, blamable and even criminal manner. I look upon 
them as subjects in revolt against their legitimate sovereign. I do not desire their 
enfranchisement. They do not deserve it; and it would be a very bad example 
for all other countries if they succeeded in establishing it." 

* Hertslet's Map 0/ Europe by Treaty, vol. i, p. 741. 



495] THE GREEK REVOLUTION yi 

consequence of the definitive pacification of Greece ; and finally , 
that a guarantee of the future state of things should be solicited 
of all the great powers of Europe. 

Canning at the same time sent Stratford Canning to 
the Levant to make known to both the Greeks and the 
Turks the plan of pacification which was desired by Great 
Britain. This plan, conformably to the Tory policy of pre- 
serving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, did not con- 
template the erection of a new free maritime state, but 
merely proposed that Greece, while receiving a grant of auton- 
omy, should remain tributary to the Porte. Nevertheless, it 
was gladly accepted by the Greeks, who were now driven to 
their last extremity ; but, when Stratford Canning reached 
Constantinople, he was received by the Sultan with reproaches. 1 
The Divan was encouraged by Austria to resist the English 
plan. Metternich, who desired above all things to prevent a 
war in the Balkans, which might spread to central Europe, 
advised the Porte to yield to the demands of the Czar's ulti- 
matum, but to reject the British proposal of compromise with 
the rebels. The Porte followed this advice. The Reis EfTendi 
again declared to Stratford Canning that the Sultan would 
never admit the intervention of a third party between himself 
and his rebellious subjects, but on May 12, 1826, notified the 
Russian charge d'affaires that the Sultan accepted the pro- 
posals of the Czar. The last Turkish troops were withdrawn 
from the principalities; the Servian deputies were released; 
and two negotiators were sent to meet the representatives of 
the Czar in Bessarabia. Mahmoud was all the more willing 
to agree to the Russian ultimatum, since he had just destroyed 
the Janissaries and had not had time to form a new army on 
the European basis, so that in case of war he would have been 
at the mercy of the Czar. October 7, 1827, there was signed 
the Treaty of Ackerman. 2 The Treaty of Bucharest was ex- 

1 Annuaire Lesur for 1826, p. 375. 

2 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty ', vol. i, p. 747. 



j 2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [496 

pressly confirmed. The privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia 
were assured by a renewal of the Hatti-sherifT of 1802 ; Servia 
was to receive the constitution which had been so long de- 
layed ; the Czar was to retain all the places in Asia that were 
in his possession; the Ottoman Porte was to recompense 
Russian subjects for all losses due to the Barbary pirates \ 
finally, the Russians were to enjoy in all Ottoman seas and 
ports full liberty of commerce. Two annexed conventions re- 
lated to the principalities and Servia respectively. The first 
provided that the hospodars should be elected for seven years 
from the native Boyards with the approval of the Ottoman 
Porte, and that they should not be removed except with the 
consent of the Czar; that taxes should be regulated by the 
authorities of the country, and that a remission of two years' 
tribute should be accorded. The second additional conven- 
tion provided that the Porte and the Servian deputies should 
agree on measures to secure to Servia liberty of worship, the 
choice of local rulers, the consolidation of the different taxes 
into one, and liberty of commerce. 

Meanwhile, the protocol of April 4, as agreed to by Wel- 
lington and Nicholas, had been officially communicated to the 
other great powers. Austria promptly rejected it. True to 
the principles of the Holy Alliance, Metternich declared that 
the only proper pacification would be for the Sultan freely to 
grant the desired privileges. 1 At Metternich's dictation the 
protocol was also rejected at Berlin. But it received different 
treatment at Paris. Nicholas urged the French government 
to accede to it in order to checkmate British influence in 
Greece. Canning urged it with equal energy in order to 
counterbalance Russia in the Balkan Peninsula. The French 
government, anxious to recover its lost prestige in the East, 
not only accepted it, but demanded that it be converted into a 
formal alliance between France, England and Russia for the 

1 The Austrian answer to the protocol of April 4th is given in Metternich 's 
Memoirs, vol. iv, p. 339. 



497] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 73 

pacification of the Levant. This was agreed to in principle 
by the three powers in January, 1827, and there remained 
for discussion only the details for the common execution of the 
project. In February the protocol of April 4 was communi- 
cated to the Porte, but the Turkish ministers, encouraged by 
the sinister policy of Metternich, who urged delay until Ibra- 
him should complete his conquest of the Morea, deferred their 
answer till Athens was taken in June, and then curtly replied 
that the Sultan would repel all interference of another state in 
his relations with his subjects. 1 The almost immediate result 
of this refusal was the signing of the Treaty of London of July 
7, 1827, between England, France and Russia. 2 The preamble 
recited that the allied powers were impelled by the necessity 
of putting an end to a condition of affairs so disastrous to their 
commerce, by humanity and by the appeals of the Greek 
government to two of them, France and England. The 
general conditions of the treaty were the same as those of the 
protocol of April 4 ; but for its execution an additional article 
was added which provided that the collective mediation of the 
three powers should be offered to the Porte in a note; that, if 
the offer was refused, the Porte should, after not more than a 
month's delay, be notified in a second note that the allies 
would accredit consuls to the principal cities of Greece and 
receive consuls from them, and would impose an armistice by 
force of arms if necessary upon the two belligerents, it being 
understood that by so doing they did not intend to place 
themselves in a state of war with either belligerent. 

In the beginning of August, 1827, the Greek government 
was notified of the Treaty of London and hastened to accept 
it, but the Ottoman Porte summarily rejected it. On August 
30th notice was given to the Porte that the allies intended to 
begin coercive measures, but it still refused to grant any con- 
cession. The allies then proceeded to the preliminaries of 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xiv, p. 1042. 
1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty ', vol. i, p. 769. 



74 THE EASTERN QUESTION [^98 

execution, and their ambassadors at Constantinople ordered 
the admirals of the three fleets to prevent all transport or em- 
ployment of Ottoman forces on the coast of what would prob- 
ably be the new Greek state. 1 On the other hand, the Greek 
forces were ordered to remove themselves from all place sout- 
side its limits. In conformity with their orders the allied 
fleets under Admiral Codrington entered the Bay of Navarino 
October 20, 1827, and notified Ibrahim to quit Greece. 3 A 
conflict ensued, in which the Turco-Egyptian fleet was de- 
stroyed ; and Ibrahim agreed to cease hostilities against the 
Greeks. The news of Navarino produced different effects 
upon the two belligerents. The Greeks naturally were over- 
joyed, and no longer having to fear the enemy, became very 
active, extending their operations beyond the boundaries 
allotted to them, in the hope that the great powers would ac- 
cept accomplished facts. Sultan Mahmoud, on the contrary, 
was infuriated, and was less disposed than ever to treat with 
his revolted subjects, or to submit to the mediation of the 
powers which had now destroyed his fleet; and he demanded 
of the three powers an open disavowal of and a full indemnity 
for the outrage which had been committed. This was refused 
by the ambassadors of those powers November 10th, 3 and for 
the next month they vainly endeavored to induce the Sultan 
to agree to the conditions of the treaty of London. All they 
could obtain was a promise that if the Greeks would as re- 
volted subjects unconditionally submit, he would grant an 
armistice, restore the condition of things existing in Greece 
previous to 1821, and give to the country an administration 
which should be both mild and just. In despair, the ambassa- 
dors of the three powers demanded their passports, and quitted 
Constantinople December 8, 1827. 

1 Instruction addressed to the Admirals, British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. xvii, p. 20. 

• This is shown by the protocol of the admirals drawn up previously to their 
entrance in Navarino, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xiv, p. 1050. 

• British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xv, p. 1 103. 



499] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 75 

Immediately there began all over Turkey a massacre of 
Christians, especially of Russians, and on December 20th 
Mahmoud called together the ayans, or heads of the Mussul- 
man districts, and issued to them a violent manifesto, 1 accus- 
ing Russia of having incessantly incited revolt in his domin- 
ions since 1821, and of having cheated him at Ackerman, 
where her envoys had promised no longer to interfere in the 
Greek question. He added that the time had come to uphold 
the honor of outraged Islam, and he appealed to the faithful 
for support. Nicholas resolved not to allow Mahmoud to 
outstrip him. On January 6, 1828, he. proposed to the allies 
a plan of coercion much more drastic than that already 
adopted. 2 The principalities were to be occupied by Russian 
troops ; the allied fleets were to blockade Alexandria and 
Constantinople so as to deliver and defend the Morea; and 
the allies were to support Capodistrias, the president of the 
Greek state, by supplying him with money ; while they were 
also to order their ambassadors, who had left Constantinople, 
to assemble at Corfu to confer on means of pacification. In 
the meantime, on August 8, 1827, George Canning had died. 
He was succeeded by the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 
a ministry of Old Tories, who, in accordance with their tra- 
ditional policy, discountenanced all measures looking to Greek 
independence. For the definite and strenuous system of 
Canning, the new cabinet substituted tentative and desultory 
expedients intended to oppose and neutralize the influence of 
Russia. It turned to France, but France, besides being Phil- 
Hellene, wished to take some action, which, while serving to 
check the Czar, would also increase her own prestige. She 
therefore asked to be deputed to send an army of occupation 
into the Morea. This was not pleasing to the Wellington 
ministry, but as it was averse to assuming itself a directly 

1 British and Eoreign State Papers, vol. xiv, p. 1052. 

2 Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, British and Foreign State Fapers, vol. 
xvii, p. 30. 



76 THE EASTERN QUESTION [500 

hostile attitude toward Turkey, and desired to establish a 
counterpoise to the Czar, it reluctantly yielded to the French 
proposal. 1 

At the end of February, Nicholas notified the powers that 
he considered Mahmoud's manifesto of December 20th as 
equivalent to a declaration of war, and that he was determined 
to answer it by force ; that he would be glad to carry out the 
terms of the Treaty of London in union with his allies, but 
that he must, in any event, obtain redress for his own particular 
grievances. 2 The Wellington cabinet, disappointed by its fail- 
ure to obtain the full co-operation of France against the Czar, 
made a virtue of necessity, and, in order to prevent any inde- 
pendent action on his part in the Mediterranean, demanded 
that the allied fleets should operate only in conformity with 
the Treaty of London and the collective decisions of the 
contracting parties. 3 Nicholas agreed to this and to the French 
occupation of the Morea, and on April 26, 1828, declared war 
against Turkey. 4 On July 2d, the conferences of the allies 
were resumed at London, and on August 7th, the three ambas- 
sadors assembled at Corfu to concert a plan for the pacification 
of Greece. The Sultan, after the Russians had occupied the 
principalities, assumed a more moderate position, and hoping 
to disrupt the triple alliance, invited France and England to 
send back their ambassadors to treat on the Greek question 
at Constantinople. Wellington, however, fearing if that were 
done Nicholas would consider himself absolved from the en- 
gagements of the Treaty of London and would, at the head of 
a victorious army, overthrow the entire established order in 

1 The proposal and agreement may be seen in British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol xvi, p. 1083 ; also in Parliamentary Debates, Hansard's, new series, vol. xxh, 
pp. 345 et seq. 

' British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xvii, p. 50. 

* The Earl of Aberdeen to Prince Lieven, British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. xvii, p. 1 14. 

4 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 777. 



jjOl] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 77 

the East, rejected the proposal ; and the alliance was main- 
tained. 1 

The campaign of 1828 proved disastrous to the Russians, 
much to the joy of Metternich, 2 who encouraged the Turks 
and sounded the other courts as to a coalition against Russia. 
This suggestion was everywhere rejected. 3 But Wellington, 
encouraged by the Russian reverses, prevailed upon France to 
agree to a protocol, November 16, 1828, by which it was agreed 
that the two powers should send their ambassadors to Con- 
stantinople to urge upon the Porte the necessity of pacifica- 
tion ; but the protocol was accepted by France only on condi- 
tion that it should not be carried into effect unless Nicholas 
should acquiesce in it. The Czar gave his consent with the 
proviso that, before the British and French ambassadors should 
proceed to Constantinople, the London conference should 
adopt a definite plan of pacification. Such a plan was adopted, 
March 22, 1829. 4 By its principal clauses, which had been 
agreed to by Capodistrias and the ambassadors at Corfu, 5 the 
new Greek state was to include the Morea, the Cyclades and 
continental Greece as far as the Gulfs of Orta and Volo. This 
state was to have a monarchical government with a Christian 
prince, who was to be selected by the three powers and ap- 
proved by the Porte, but was not to be a member of the reign- 
ing family of any of the three allies ; and it was to pay an 
annual tribute to the Porte of one million five hundred thou- 
sand piastres and recompense Ottoman proprietors, who were 

1 British and Eoreign State Papers, vol. xvii, p. 91. 

'The work of Prokesch-Osten, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom 
Osmanischen Reiche, is largely devoted to defending the attitude of Metternich 
during the Greek Revolution. The last four volumes are valuable for the collec- 
tion of documents relating to the Revolution. 

8 For an excellent description of the diplomatic aspect of Europe at the time, see 
dispatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode in Martens, Nouveau Sup- 
pliment aux Recueil des Trattis, vol. iii, p. 347. 

* Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 804. 

5 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 798. 



78 THE EASTERN QUESTION [502 

to be required to leave Greece. The Turkish government 
received the French and English ambassadors with respect, 
but refused to accept the new plan. 1 It was evident that the 
Porte would yield only to superior force. 

The campaign of 1829 proved to be decisive. Diebitsch 
made his extraordinary march across the Balkans and 
appeared before Adrianople August 20th. As long as the 
Russians were at a distance, Mahmoud was unyielding; but 
now all Constantinople was in terror. The Prussian agent, 
de Royer, was sent in haste to conclude a peace in the name 
of Turkey, and it was by his mediation that there was signed, 
September 14, 1829, the Peace of Adrianople. 9 By this treaty 
the Czar restored to Turkey all his conquests in Europe 
except the islands at the mouth of the Danube, but retained 
most of the cities and fortresses taken in Asia. All the rights 
and privileges of Moldavia, Wallachia and Servia were con- 
firmed and guaranteed. The free navigation of the Dar- 
danelles and Bosporous was secured to the ships of all powers 
with whom the Porte was at peace. Russian subjects were to 
have full liberty of commerce in the entire Ottoman Empire. 
The Sultan was to reimburse the Czar for the full expenses ol 
the war, and satisfy his particular grievances to the extent of 
eleven and a half millions of Dutch ducats (137,000,000 
francs), as a guarantee of which Moldavia, Wallachia and 
Bulgaria were to remain in the occupation of the Russians. 
Finally, the Ottoman Porte agreed, purely and simply, in all 
that concerned Greece, to the Treaty of London of July 6, 
1827, and the protocol of March 22, 1829. Two supple- 
mentary conventions were added to the treaty of peace — one 
relative to the payment of the indemnity, the other to the 
status of Moldavia and Wallachia. The latter introduced an 
innovation to the effect that the hospodars should be appointed 
lor life, instead of for seven years, and that the fortresses be- 

1 See Annuaire Lesur for 1829, p. 419. 

1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty ■, vol. ii, p. 813. 



503] THE GREEK REVOLUTION 79 

longing to Turkey on the left bank of the Danube should be 
dismantled. The Treaty of Adrianople was undoubtedly a 
brilliant triumph for Russian policy. By the autonomy 
granted to Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia and Greece, all of 
whom felt that they owed their privileges to Russia, and all of 
whom were subject to her domination, and by the indemnities 
which the Sultan was unable to pay, the Ottoman Empire 
was exposed on all sides to Russian intrigue, and was placed 
at the mercy of the Czar. 

The Turkish government proceeded to carry out the stipu- 
lations of the treaty, endeavoring to evade only those that 
related to the Greek question, and to the payment of the 
indemnities. On the latter point it obtained a substantial con- 
cession. After a long negotiation the Czar reduced the 
indemnity by three millions of ducats, and evacuated all terri- 
tory south of the Danube. He knew that it would be a long 
while before Turkey could free herself from the debts, and in 
consequence of the destruction of the fortresses in the princi- 
palities, the Russians could reach the Balkans at will. More- 
over, in return for this concession, the Sultan yielded his 
objections to the arrangement concerning Greece. 1 The 
Greek government, however, protested vigorously against any 
form of vassalage to Turkey, and in so doing was supported 
by France, and strangely enough, still more by England. 
The British government felt that it would not do to subject 
Greece to a regime similar to that of the principalities, where 
Russia could provoke new conflicts and create occasions for 
intervention at will. The London conference, which had re- 
sumed its labors in October, 1829, decided, therefore, that no 
tie should bind Greece to Turkey. 3 Russia did not object, 
since she expected that, as the result of recent events, her 
influence in Greece would be preserved ; but in order still 

1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. 2, p. 812. 

3 The protocol of Feb. 3d, 1830, in Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. 
ii, p. 841. 



So THE EASTERN QUESTION [504 

further to enfeeble Turkey, and at the same time to create 
vexations for England in the possession of the Ionian Islands, 
she proposed to extend the boundaries of Greece. This 
England refused to do. The provisions of the protocol of 
March 22nd were carried out, and Greece was launched as a 
full-fledged state. But the Greek Revolution had not resulted 
in merely bringing forth a new state and making a rent in the 
Ottoman Empire. It had also disrupted the Holy Alliance, 
having set two members of it, France and Russia, against the 
other two members, Austria and Prussia. 1 

1 Metternich to the Emperor Francis, October 9th, 1829, in Metternick 's 
Memoirs, vol. iv, p. 635. 



CHAPTER V 



THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION. 



Despite the disasters of the recent war, disasters which his 
subjects laid wholly to the western innovations that he had 
introduced, Sultan Mahmoud continued with his reforms. 
Whether he could have successfully carried them out is more 
than doubtful, but his energies were soon diverted to another 
object. 1 The rebellions which broke out in Albania and Bos- 
nia he quickly suppressed ; 2 but he soon came into conflict, 
though not on account of reforms, with one of his subjects 
whom he found to be stronger than himself. This subject was 
Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt. Mehemet had quickly recov- 
ered from the catastrophe at Navarino, had formed a splendid 
army, officered principally by Frenchmen, had rebuilt his fleet 
and had acquired a full treasury, the result of taxes wrung 
from his subjects, whom he governed as a despot, but to whom 
he gave peace. Mehemet, as a reward for his services in the 
Morea, had received the pashalik of Crete ; but he felt ill re- 
paid for his exertions, and decided to seek compensation in 
Syria. Conscious of his strength, he resolved to enlarge the 
boundaries of Egypt, and also to make the possession of it 
hereditary in his family. The governor of Syria at this time 
was Abdallah Pasha, his personal enemy, who gave a refuge 
to all Egyptians who fled from Mehemet's despotism. An ex- 
cuse for a conflict, therefore, was not wanting, when, early in 
1832, a war broke out between these two servants of the Sul- 

1 For a description of Mahmoud and his reforms, see Von Moltke's Gesamtnelte 
Schriften, vol. viii, particularly Letter 66, p. 428. 

1 Annuaire Lesur, 1830, p. 669. 

505] « ; ' 



8 2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [506 

tan. Mahmoud ordered Mehemet to cease hostilities and to 
submit the quarrel to him, but Mehemet paid no attention to 
his commands. His adopted son, Ibrahim, a man of great 
ability, soon overran the whole of Syria; and on May 27, 1832, 
St. Jean d'Acre, the key to the country, fell into the hands of 
Ibrahim. Mahmoud proclaimed Mehemet an outlaw, but Ib- 
rahim continued on his victorious career, successively defeat- 
ing the three armies sent against him by the Sultan. He then 
crossed the Taurus, overran Asia Minor, and began his march 
towards Constantinople, always protesting that it was not his 
intention to overthrow the dynasty of the Osmanlis, but to 
consolidate it. Mahmoud, whose last army had been de- 
stroyed, turned to the European powers for help. 1 

The diplomatic situation in Europe at this time was peculiar. 
Nicholas, who had been very friendly to France under the 
Restoration, was decidedly inimical to the July Monarchy and 
thwarted it at every opportunity, though he had been unable 
actively to show his hostility since 1830 because of the Polish 
rebellion. The reactionary powers, Austria and Prussia, were 
also unfriendly to Louis Philippe, the " King of the Barri- 
cades," but were well disposed towards Russia for maintain- 
ing the principles of the Holy Alliance. To establish an equi- 
librium against these three powers in favor of Liberalism, 
England had formed an entente cordiale with the July Mon- 
archy, but the two governments soon grew mutually distrust- 
ful, and frequently worked at cross purposes. 2 On the East- 
ern question, which had once more come up for settlement, 
each power took its stand according to its interests. With 
England, and especially with Palmerston, who controlled her 
foreign affairs during a great part of this period, the mainten- 
ance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was a dogma,* 
and Palmerston looked upon Mehemet as a menace to that 

1 Annual Register, 1832, pp. 400 et seq. 

3 This is evident in the memoirs of statesmen of the period. 

■ Bulwer's Life of Palmerston, vol. iii, book 12 passim. 



507] THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION 83 

integrity. 1 But the attention of Englishmen was engrossed 
with home affairs in 1832, and the great desire of the govern- 
ment with reference to the Eastern question was that it might 
be promptly closed, before Russia could take advantage of the 
situation. Nicholas, on the other hand, was the most pro- 
nounced enemy the Ottoman Empire then had, but, strangely 
enough, he determined to oppose Mehemet in the belief that 
the latter would prove to be its regenerator, and postpone in- 
definitely the success of Russian designs. Austria, who feared 
Russian ascendancy in the Balkans, supported the English 
position, looking upon Mehemet as a rebel against legitimate 
authority, and upholding the Sultan against his vassal. 2 Only 
France supported Mehemet. The Pasha of Egypt was looked 
upon by Frenchmen as a sort of client of France. His army 
and civil service were officered principally by Frenchmen, and 
French influence in Egypt predominated over that of any other 
power. Frenchmen would not have forgiven the July Mon- 
archy had it abandoned Mehemet. But it was, besides, a rule 
of French foreign policy to maintain the integrity of the Otto- 
man Empire against Russian aggression, and it was doubly so 
now, when Russia was unfriendly. And the supporters of the 
July Monarchy believed that the best way to uphold the sov- 
ereignty of Turkey against Russian designs was to make of 
Egypt a strong rear guard. Louis Philippe, however, did not 
venture to support Mehemet openly, because of England's 
jealousy of French influence in Egypt; and the thing most 
necessary to Louis Philippe at this time was the English alli- 
ance. So the July Monarchy adopted a policy which was not 
only deceitful, but which also eventually brought it into dis- 
credit and danger. 3 

Mahmoud naturally turned first to those powers whom he 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxvi, p. 269, no. 4. 

2 Aus MetternicA's Nachgelassenen Papier en y vol. v, no. 1128. 

8 For the position of the various powers as to Mehemet Aii, see Debidour, His- 
toire Diplomatique, vol. i, chap. 9. 



84 THE EASTERN QUESTION [jog 

considered friendly and requested their assistance. 1 England, 
however, was too much engrossed in home affairs to take an 
active part in settling the new complications. 2 M. de Varennes, 
the French charge d'affaires, tendered his good offices to the 
Ottoman Porte, and when they were accepted, he requested 
Ibrahim, in the name of France, not to continue his march, 
and advised Mehemet to accept the southern half of Syria, 
Unfortunately, France had as consul-general at Alexandria. 
M. Mimaut, who was devoted to the interests of Mehemet and 
who professed to believe that the advice of de Verennes was 
designed to meet diplomatic exigencies and was not to be 
taken seriously. He therefore counseled Mehemet to refuse 
it. This course was taken, and Ibrahim resumed his march 
and encamped within a few miles of Scutari. Mahmoud, in 
terror, immediately invoked, January 31, 1833, tne assistance 
of the Russian fleet, and on the 20th of February it anchored 
under the palace of the Sultan. At this moment Admiral 
Roussin, the French ambassador, arrived. Roussin was a 
fiery old soldier, who was very zealous for his country's honor, 
and to whom the Russian flag was hateful. He demanded 
that the Russian fleet be sent away at onoe. Mahmoud 
answered that he would gladly accede to his request if he 
would persuade Mehemet to agree to the terms recommended 
by de Varennes. Roussin took it upon himself to see that 
this should be done. But Mehemet, who was still acting upon 
the counsels of Mimaut, rejected the terms again, and de- 
manded not only the whole of Syria, but also the district of 
Adana, the possession of which would open to him the whole 
of Asia Minor ; and he ordered Ibrahim to recommence oper- 
ations. 3 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxii, p. 140 et seq. 

2 The reform bill excitement was prevalent. See Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, third series, vol. xix, p. 578, for Palmerston's admission that England 
had refused assistance to the Ottoman Porte. 

• Annual Register, 1833, p. 288. 



509] THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION 85 

The result of Roussin's negotiations was that Mahmoud, 
instead of sending away the Russian fleet, asked, March 20, 
1833, that it be reinforced by a Russian army. Fifteen days 
later twelve thousand Russian troops encamped at Scutari, and 
a Russian army began to form in the Danubian principalities. 
Both England and Austria now became alarmed and ordered 
their ambassadors at Constantinople to support the French 
proposals ; and the ambassadors of the three powers made 
upon Mahmoud an energetic demand that he come to terms 
with Mehemet, at whatever sacrifice might be necessary, so as 
to do away with the need of Russian assistance. Nor was 
Russia greatly opposed to the Porte's yielding to the demands 
of Mehemet ; for Nicholas had now discovered that the aim of 
Mehemet was territorial aggrandizement and not the regenera- 
tion of the Ottoman Empire. The more the Sultan was en- 
feebled the more he would need the assistance of the Czar. 
Mahmoud therefore succumbed, and on May 1st issued a 
Hatti-sherifif relieving Mehemet from his outlawry and conced- 
ing everything that he required. 1 

Russia no longer had any pretext for occupying the Bos- 
phorus, and when asked to remove her troops and fleet, she did 
so, July 10, 1833. But it soon transpired that for her prompt 
compliance there was a special cause. On July 8th, only two 
days previously, she had concluded with the Sultan the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi, which practically made Turkey a feudatory 
of the Czar.* It bound the two powers to a defensive alliance 
for eight years against all others, each placing itself at the dis- 
posal of the other for defense against both external and inter- 
nal dangers. Considering the internal disorders which con- 
stantly disturbed the Ottoman Empire, and the ease with which 
the Czar could foment such disorders, the alliance held out to 
Nicholas untold possibilities of intervention in Ottoman affairs. 
He took good care, however, to guard against these possibili- 

1 Annuaire Lesur, 1833, p. 445 et seq. 

1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 925. 



86 '* HE MA S TERN Q UES TION \^0 

ties becoming reciprocal. By a separate article it was pro- 
vided that, in case the Czar should stand in need of the assist- 
ance of his ally, the latter should be excused from furnishing 
active aid, but should be considered as fulfilling all his engage- 
ments by simply closing the Dardanelles to the enemies of the 
Czar. This would make Russia practically invulnerable to the 
states from which she had most to fear. An attack from either 
France or England by way of the Mediterranean would then 
be impossible. They could not cross Germany, and the Baltic 
admitted of active operations for but a few months in the year. 
The French and English governments were greatly exercised, 
and demanded explanations of both St. Petersburg and Con- 
stantinople. The explanations which they obtained were very 
unsatisfactory, 1 and both governments sent powerful fleets to 
the Aegean. For a time a war with Russia seemed to be prob- 
able, but the excitement, after venting itself in vigorous pro- 
tests, soon subsided. 

Though Sultan Mahmoud yielded to his vassal in 1833, he 
cherished an intention to recover his lost provinces, and the 
events of the year following the settlement tended to disturb 
his peaceful relations with Mehemet. The latter's attempt to 
establish stable government among the wild tribes of Syria 
was constantly thwarted by the revolts which Mahmoud 
secretly instigated. And Mehemet made no secret of his in- 
tention to found a dynasty and transmit to his heirs the pos- 
session of his dominions. 2 In conformity with this design he 
withheld payment of the tribute due to his sovereign; and 
their relations became more and more strained till an open 
conflict took place early in 1839. The Turkish army, which 
Mahmoud had been gathering for some years, crossed the 
Euphrates April 21st. This event naturally increased the 
anxiety which the powers had already exhibited with regard 

1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 428. 

1 See his notification to the French and English consuls general, May 25th, 
1838, in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 26, p. 696. 



5 1 1] THE EG YPTIAN REBELLION 87 

to the situation. 1 The eight years during which the Treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi was to last had not yet expired, and under its 
provisions Russia could send an army to Constantinople.* 
Palmerston made approaches to Louis Philippe, who was glad 
to act in accord with him in order to strengthen the English 
alliance, which showed signs of weakness. The two govern- 
ments sent fleets to the Aegean, with instructions to force the 
Dardanelles if the Russian fleet should enter the Bosphorus. 
In May, Metternich revived his old plan of a European con- 
ference at Vienna, but France and Russia objected to it. 
France was anxious to prevent the Russian occupation of the 
Bosphorus, but she was equally anxious that her protege, 
Mehemet Ali, should not be interfered with, and she feared 
that if a conference should be convoked it would not confine 
itself to the question of the Straits. Nicholas, on the other 
hand, although he would have been glad to strike a blow at 
the July Monarchy through Mehemet Ali, declined Metter- 
nich's proposal because he knew that the question of the 
Straits would be the most important one to be considered. 

Such was the condition of affairs when the startling news 
reached the European courts that on June 24, 1839, Ibrahim 
had routed the Turkish army, that a week later Sultan 
Mahmoud had died, and that immediately afterwards the 
Capudan Pasha with the entire Turkish fleet had gone over to 
Mehemet. The Ottoman Porte was now without either army 
or navy, and the assistance of a great power was absolutely 
necessary to its safety. The Divan, stricken with consterna- 
tion, was about to yield unconditionally to Mehemet's demand 
for the hereditary possession of all his dominions, when a note 
was received from the powers. This note, which bears date 
July 27, 1839, informed the Porte that the five great powers — 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxvi, p. 694 et sea. 

2 As to the anxiety caused by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi before the trouble 
of 1839, see Palmerston's letter to Ponsonby, Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii» 
p. 247. 



88 THE EASTERN QUESTION [5 Y 2 

Austria, England, France, Prussia, and Russia — had agreed to 
act in concert on the Eastern question, and requested the 
Turkish government not to come to any definite conclusion 
without their advice. 1 The Porte replied that it would await 
the action of Europe, and gratefully accepted the proffered 
mediation. But the five great powers were not in accord as 
to the terms of settlement, and the divergence of views was 
especially wide between France and England. Palmerston, 
determined to keep the Ottoman Empire intact, suggested in 
August, 1839, ^ at a ^ * ne provinces which Mehemet had 
sought to annex to Egypt be restored to their former condi- 
tion, and that if Mehemet refused he should be coerced into 
submission. But France, on whose co-operation Palmerston 
had at first counted, rejected his proposal. Not only would 
she not accept it, but she made Mehemet's cause her own, and 
demanded for him the hereditary possession of Egypt and of 
all the provinces which he had conquered. The correspond- 
ence between the two governments became daily more bitter, 
the people and the newspapers more and more hostile, and 
the alliance which had maintained the peace of Europe since 
1830 appeared to be on the verge of disruption*. 

Nicholas regarded with grim satisfaction the clash between 
France and England, and determined to seize the opportunity 
to humiliate the July Monarchy, and to isolate France from 
the European concert. On September 15th Baron Brunnow 
arrived at London with a plan of co-operation from the Czar." 
The latter was ready to ally himself with the other powers in 
the settlement of the Eastern question, 3 and to that end was 
willing to renounce the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, but he pre- 
ferred that France should be excluded from participation in 
the settlement. 4 France in the mean time continued to main- 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxviii, p. 408. 

1 For the contents of plan, see Annuaire Lesur, 1840, p. 442. 

8 See Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 262. 

4 Seignobos, Political History of Europe since 18 14, chap, xxvi, p. 774. 



513] TEE EGYP TIAN RESELL ION 8 9 

tain the position which she had taken. Thiers, the avowed 
champion of French honor, became president of the council, 
and ordered Guizot, then French ambassador at London, to 
uphold more energetically than ever the French position. 
Though Thiers did not formally withdraw the adhesion of the 
French government to the note of July 27, 1839, everybody 
knew that he disapproved of it, 1 and the French nation 
enthusiastically supported him in his resolution to protect its 
protege. The English Cabinet, assured of Russian support, 
early in 1840 invited the powers to send representatives to a 
conference at London. The conference opened early in April. 
Guizot played an important part in it, but his design was not 
to accelerate a settlement, but to retard it. He was instructed 
by Thiers to stave off a final decision until the negotiations 
which had been secretly opened at Constantinople between 
the Sultan and Mehemet, under the auspices of the French 
ambassador, and which were expected to terminate favorably 
to Mehemet, should have been concluded. 3 Unfortunately, 
Thiers' scheme was well known to Palmerston, and the suc- 
cess of the negotiation at Constantinople was rendered null by 
the activities of Ponsonby, the British ambassador. 3 After 
two months of fruitless discussion at London, on January 1st 
Palmerston offered to France terms of settlement which were 
to be final. These were to concede to Mehemet the hereditary 
dominion of Egypt, and the life possession of the pashalik of 
Acre. Palmerston demanded a categorical reply, but was 
answered with new dilatory measures. 4 

Palmerston now entered upon negotiations with the other 

1 Guizot, Embassy to the Court 0/ St. James, chap, ii, p. 59. 

2 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James in 1840, chap, ii, p. 60. 

s French writers are almost unanimous on the anti-French attitude of Ponsonby 
at Constantinople. The charge was also made against him in Parliament. Han- 
sard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. lxi, p. 627. 

* For the attitude of the French government on this settlement, see Guizot's 
Embassy to the Court of St. James in 184.0, chap, v, pp. 188 et sea. 



90 THE EASTERN QUESTION [^4 

three powers for a settlement of the eastern question without 
France, and if necessary against France. He was already 
assured of Russia's co-operation, and the concurrence of Austria 
and Prussia was also practically assured as the result of the 
refusal of the French government to accept terms of settle- 
ment which they had themselves suggested. 1 Palmerston had 
more difficulty in persuading some of his colleagues in the 
British cabinet, who feared a collision with France ; a but he 
convinced them that Louis Philippe would avoid war at any 
cost, 3 and that Mehemet would yield without conflict. On 
July 15, 1840, a treaty was concluded at London between 
Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the Sultan. It 
declared that the four powers first named, M animated by the 
desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the 
Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe," would 
compel Mehemet Ali, if necessary by force, to accept the con- 
ditions which the Sultan had agreed to grant him ; and it 
placed under their collective safeguard the Bosphorus and 
the Dardanelles and Constantinople itself. The conditions 
agreed upon were to be notified to Mehemet by the Sultan, 
who was to offer him the hereditary administration of Egypt 
and the life administration of the pashalik of Acre, provided 
that he accepted within ten days, and at the same time ordered 
the withdrawal of his forces from Crete, the Holy Cities, 
Adana, and the northern part of Syria. Should he fail to 
accept within that time, the offer of the Sultan was to be re- 
duced to the hereditary governorship of Egypt ; and in case 
Mehemet should not within another ten days accept this con- 

1 For the plan suggested by Prussia and Austria to France, see Guizot's Embassy 
to the Court of St. James in 1840, chap, ii, p. 74 et seq. 

3 The British Cabinet was very divided as to the wisdom of supporting Palmer- 
ston on the Eastern question. See his letter to Melbourne in Bulwer, Life 
of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 309; Galso uizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, 
chap, v, p. 180. 

9 Letter to Granville at Paris in Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 269. 



515] THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION gi 

cession, the Sultan was to be bound by nothing. Finally, 
contrary to diplomatic usage, it was agreed in an additional 
protocol that the powers should proceed to carry out the 
treaty without awaiting the exchange of ratifications. 1 

The treaty of the 15th of July was signed without Guizot's 
knowledge, and even when two days later Palmerston informed 
him of its contents a he did not give him the text, and con- 
cealed altogether the additional protocol. 3 On receiving the 
news of the treaty Thiers was angry, but he was no more 
angry than his countrymen. France found herself isolated 
once more as in 18 15, with Europe arrayed against her. 4 The 
Chambers became excited; the most conservative journals 
called upon the nation to maintain its honor; men talked of 
taking up again the struggle against Europe and of regaining 
the natural frontiers of the country — the Rhine and the Alps. 
Immense war preparations were begun, a credit of a hundred 
million francs being voted solely to put Paris in a state of 
proper defense. 5 Nevertheless, Louis Philippe was resolved 
not to go to war, and he used every means to obtain some con- 
cession from the allies by which he could honorably re-enter 
the European concert. He worked particularly through his 
son-in-law, Leopold of Belgium, who was also an uncle of 
Queen Victoria and had great influence with her. 6 Palmerston, 
however, declared to Guizot that, while the French govern- 
ment might re-enter the European concert, the treaty would 
be literally carried out. 7 This reply was, at the moment, all 
the more provoking, because Thiers' agent in Egypt, Count 

1 Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty ,vol. ii, p. 1008. 
■ Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, p. 208. 
3 See Palmerston's defense of his action in his letter to Hobhouse in Bulwer, 
Life of Palmerston, vol. iii, p. 426. 

* Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, pp. 235 et seq. 

6 Annual Register, 1840, p. 171 et seq. 

• Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, pp. 263 et seq. 

7 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, pp. 272 et seq. 



^2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [5^ 

Walewski, had just returned with a concession from Mehemet, 
who had promised him to accept the hereditary possession of 
Egypt and the life possession of Syria. 1 Thiers immediately 
sent Walewski to Constantinople to obtain the assent of the 
Porte to this arrangement, and on September 18, 1840, an- 
nounced that France would make no further concessions, and 
was ready to sustain her position. 2 

These declarations alarmed the more yielding members of 
the British Cabinet, 3 but Palmerston persisted in his calm 
assurance that Louis Philippe would not go to war and that 
Mehemet would not resist the allies. At this conjuncture news 
arrived from the East which tended to defeat any attempt at 
conciliation. Whilst a Turkish agent carried the ultimatum 
of the treaty to Mehemet, and before the latter's reply had 
arrived at Constantinople, an Anglo-Austrian fleet blockaded 
the coast of Syria and bombarded Beyrouth, which was evac- 
uated by Ibrahim September nth. Three days later, the 
Divan, instead of accepting the proposition of Walewski, out- 
lawed Mehemet. When the news from the East arrived at 
Paris, there occurred another outburst of indignation, and talk 
of fighting Europe and regaining the Rhine frontier was again 
indulged in. 4 This was met by a patriotic outburst all over 
Germany, where demands were on all sides heard for a cam- 
paign against the hereditary enemy, such as had been made in 
181 3. Prussia and Austria consulted as to the best measures 
of defense, and the situation became very critical. 5 

Several circumstances, however, combined to prevent an 
outbreak, the principal one being the determination of Louis 

1 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, p. 295 et seq. 

1 Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 283. 

1 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. liii, p. 182 et seq., and vol. lvi, p. 50 
et seq. 

4 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, v, p. 322 et seq. 

8 As to the war alarm in Germany, see Aus MetternicK 1 s Nachgelassenen 
Papieren, vol. vi, p. 465 et seq. 



5 ! y-j THE E G YPT1AN REBELLION 93 

Philippe to avoid war. When, therefore, early in October, 
Thiers submitted a warlike declaration to the Chambers, 
Louis Philippe refused to support it. Thiers resigned, but he 
was prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation when shown 
that in the excited state of public feeling it might prove fatal 
to the monarchy. He recalled the French fleet from the East 
in order to prevent a collision with the British, and limited 
the casus belli to the contingency of the quadruple alliance 
depriving Mehemet of Egypt. 1 Metternich, who did not want 
war any more than Louis Philippe, worked on Palmerston, who, 
under the pressure of his colleagues as well as of Metternich, 
gave an assurance that the outlawry of Mehemet should have 
no effect. 2 Metternich at the same time interceded with Louis 
Philippe to get rid of Thiers, whom he regarded as the incar- 
nation of the Revolution and whom Louis Philippe himself 
was anxious to dismiss as soon as he safely could do so. An 
attempt on Louis Philippe's life having momentarily revived 
his popularity, he seized the opportunity to dismiss Thiers, 
because of the latter's refusal to moderate the address to the 
Chambers and accept a colorless one proposed by the king 
himself. 3 Marshal Soult became president of the new ministry, 
but Guizot, who became minister of foreign affairs, was the 
real head. 4 

The new ministry set before itself the task of reconciling 
France with Europe without suffering a loss of dignity. 
Guizot hoped that the European courts would be willing to 
concede to him what they had refused to Thiers, because of 
his known conservative views. Leopold of Belgium was 
again employed as an intermediary to obtain some conces- 
sions from the terms of the treaty of the 15th of July, but 

1 Annual Register, 1840, p. 177; also Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. 
James, chap, vi, p. 321. 

7 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, vi, p. 32 1. 

3 Guizot, Embassy to the Court of St. James, chap, vii, p. 381. 

4 Annual Register, 1840, p. 178. 



94 THE EASTERN QUESTION Xt\% 

Palmerston answered that the interests of Europe could not be 
sacrificed to those of Louis Philippe, and that France in any 
event had nothing to do with a treaty to which she was not a 
party. 1 At about the same time word arrived from the East 
that nearly all the coast of Syria had surrendered to the 
English fleet, St. Jean d' Acre having done so on November 
2d, and that Ibrahim had been compelled to evacuate most of 
Syria. In such a crisis it was felt that no French ministry, 
however desirous of peace, could yield without sacrificing 
French dignity. In the parliamentary discussions of Novem- 
ber 25th to 28th Guizot declared that France would not suffer 
Mehemet to be dispossessed of Egypt, and the armaments 
begun by the preceding ministry were continued with feverish 
haste. 

And the reports which continued to come from the East 
were such as to prevent the French government from assum- 
ing any other position. After the taking of St. Jean d'Acre, 
Admiral Napier had sailed to Alexandria and threatened it 
with bombardment if Mehemet did not make an immediate 
submission. Mehemet, deserted by France, agreed to the 
convention of November 25th, which stipulated that, in con- 
sideration of the complete evacuation of Syria by Ibrahim, and 
the restitution of the Turkish fleet, the quadruple alliance 
would cease all warlike operations against Mehemet and 
induce the Ottoman Porte to concede to him the hereditary 
possession of Egypt. The effect of this action, which was 
consistent with the view now held by the French government, 
was entirely nullified by the course of the Porte, which, under 
the influence of Ponsonby, the English ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, rejected the convention and refused to grant to 
Mehemet more than the life possession of Egypt. 2 The 
Eastern question became more acute than ever. However 
desirous the French government might be to avoid a conflict, 

1 Letter to Granville in Bulwer, Lije of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 301. 
Annual Register, 1840, p. 193. 



r i g\ THE EGYP TIA N REBEL LION 95 

it could not disarm without dishonor. The troops were kept 
on a war footing, and on February 1, 184 1, the Chambers 
passed a law relative to the fortification of Paris. 

The resolute attitude of France alarmed Austria and Prussia. 
Metternich was more anxious than ever to prevent war and 
maintain the status quo in Europe, and Prussia was fearful for 
her Rhine provinces. 1 The danger would not be removed 
until France disarmed, and that would be impossible until the 
Eastern question was solved. Austria and Prussia therefore 
labored together during January, 1 841, to bring France once 
more into the European concert ; and in spite of the under- 
handed opposition of Nicholas and the indifference of Pal- 
merston, the quadruple alliance was persuaded to come to an 
agreement acceptable to France. The allies adopted on Janu- 
ary 31, 1 84 1, a note inviting the Porte not only to revoke the 
outlawry pronounced against Mehemet, but also to accord to 
him the promise that his descendants in the direct line should 
be successively named by the Sultan to the pashalik of Egypt. 
This was far removed from the demands of France a year be- 
fore, but it was at least a concession, and Guizot eagerly em- 
braced it. He therefore authorized Bourqueney, the French 
ambassador at London, to accept the terms embodied in the 
note of the 31st of January, but only on the following condi- 
tions : That the initiative in the negotiations should be taken 
not by France but by the allies ; that the hereditary possession 
of Egypt should be assured to Mehemet Ali ; that the treaty 
of the 15th of July should be considered as entirely executed, 
and should not again be brought into discussion ; that its ful- 
filment should be evidenced by an official notice to the French 
government ; and that the question of disarmament should not 
be raised. These points admitted, the French government 
would gladly conclude a convention relative to the East with 
the allies.* 

1 Aus Metternich 's Nachgelassenen Papierev % vol. vi, pp. 513^/ seq. 
% Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, vol. i, p. 



96 THE EASTERN QUESTION r^ 2 

The preliminary conditions demanded by Guizot were 
accepted, and in the first week of March a protocol was drawn 
up. The treaty of the 15th of July was declared to be ful- 
filled, and a project of a quintuple convention was submitted. 
This project was far from what Guizot desired. It consisted 
simply in a declaration that the Straits should rest under the 
absolute sovereignty of Turkey and should be closed to the 
naval forces of all the other powers. Guizot wished to include 
in it a guarantee of the integrity and independence of the Otto- 
man Empire, but to this Russia now refused to accede. He 
also desired to insert a provision for the protection of the 
Christians in Syria, but this point England was unwilling to 
discuss. Nevertheless, Guizot was about to accept the pro- 
tocol when grave news arrived from the East. The Sultan by 
a Hatti-sheriff of February 13th had accorded to Mehemet the 
hereditary possession of Egypt, but at the instigation of 
Ponsonby had imposed restrictions which Mehemet would not 
accept. The Sultan was to have the right on each vacancy to 
designate among the heirs of Mehemet the new titulary of the 
pashalik ; the Pasha was to reduce his army to eighteen thou- 
sand men, and was not to name any officer above the rank of 
adjutant; the mode of collecting the taxes was to be prescribed 
by the Sultan, who was to receive one-fourth of the proceeds. 1 
Mehemet refused these conditions, and Guizot declared that 
France could not sign the projected convention. None of the 
powers, however, was desirous to uphold the Porte in its posi- 
tion. Metternich interposed with energy at Constantinople, 
and on April 19th another Hatti-sheriff was issued satisfactory 
to Mehemet. 2 The hereditary possession of Egypt was to be 
according to primogeniture ; the Pasha was to be permitted to 
name the officers of the army up to the grade of colonel, in- 
clusive; and finally he was to pay a tribute, the amount of 
which was to be fixed from time to time. On June 10th, 

1 Annual Register, 1 84 1, p. 286. 
1 Annuaire Lesur, 1841, p. 516. 



521] THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION ^ 

Mehemet solemnly accepted the conditions of the Hatti-sheriff, 
and on July 13, 1841, there was concluded at London a treaty 
which guaranteed the neutrality of the Straits. 1 It did not by 
any means solve the Eastern question. In his effort to abase 
France, Nicholas had lost the ground which he gained by the 
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and he set to work to recover it; 
but he was to find in the future that no one state would be 
allowed to settle the Eastern question alone. 

Sultan Abdul-Medjid, who succeeded Mahmoud in 1839, 
placed himself to a great extent under the influence of Reschid 
Pasha, the leader of the Turkish reform party. Reschid, in 
turn, was largely controlled by Stratford Canning, who from 
this time down to the Crimean War was to exercise so great 
an influence on the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Reschid 
and his friends believed that the only way to prevent the de- 
struction of their country was by carrying out the reforms in- 
augurated by Mahmoud and developing them. In 1839 there 
was published the Hatti-sheriff of Gulhane,3 which proposed 
many reforms in administration, education and taxation, and 
in the relations between the Turks and the Rayahs. Reschid 
exerted himself, as far as possible, in the face of Turkish fan- 
atacism and Rayah ignorance, to put it into force; but he was 
obliged to combat an enemy who was quite as difficult to deal 
with as either of the other two. This enemy was Nicholas of 
Russia. The Czar did not desire to see the Ottoman Empire 
regenerated, and he used all his influence with the subject 
peoples to prevent it. In 1844, he paid a visit to England, 
ostensibly to congratulate Victoria on her accession to the 
throne, but incidentally to destroy the entente between Eng- 
land and France, and to come to some agreement with Great 
Britain on the Turkish question. It was during this visit that 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 1024. 

* Lane Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, chaps, xvii. to xxiii. 

3 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxxi, p. 1239. 



gg THE EASTERN QUESTION [522 

he made his first suggestion for the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was received very coldly by the British 
foreign orifice. 1 Whatever the immediate plans which he may 
have had against the integrity of Turkey, he was obliged to 
postpone them. Soon afterwards there came the Revolution 
of 1848 ; and the attitude of the Porte during that struggle was 
not such as to conciliate him. The Porte witnessed with satis- 
faction the rebellions in its neighbors' dominions, and seized 
the opportunity of an uprising in the Danubian principalities 
to send an army thither, ostensibly to keep the peace, but in 
reality to counterbalance the Russian army which had also 
occupied the territory. And when, after the revolution was 
over, Russia and Austria demanded the extradition of the 
Polish and Hungarian refugees, who had found asylum in the 
Turkish dominions, the Porte, strongly backed by France and 
England, refused either their extradition or their immediate 
expulsion. 2 It was galling to Nicholas to 'submit to such a 
denial by his weak neighbor, but he was only biding his time. 
By 1852, the European situation appearing to be favorable, he 
determined to carry out the scheme which he had never re- 
linquished since his accession to the throne — the despoilment 
of the Ottoman Empire. 

1 Nesselrode's memorandum, containing the views of Nicholas and delivered to 
the British government, is printed in Parliamentary Papers for 1854, vol. lxxi, 
part vi. 

2 See the voluminous correspondence on this question in British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. xxxviii, p. 1266 et seq. 



CHAPTER VI 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 



The special privileges enjoyed by the Latin monks in the 
Holy Places in the East, under the protection of France, dated 
back to the sixteenth century. These privileges were solemnly 
confirmed by the Capitulations of 1740. But since 1 701, when 
Peter the Great became not only the temporal but also the 
spiritual head of Russia, the encroachments of the Greek monks 
on the privileges of the Latins had been steady and persistent. 
After the death of Louis XV., the attention of French states- 
men was turned chiefly to internal affairs, and from the French 
Revolution to the accession of Napoleon III., the governmental 
changes were so violent and numerous that the Latin monks 
could rely but little on the support of the chief Catholic power, 
while the Greeks were always sure of the aid of Russia. When 
Louis Napoleon became President of France, the chief of the 
Holy Places, the Holy Sepulchre, as well as the great church 
of Bethlehem, the grotto of the Nativity, and the tomb of the 
Virgin at Gethsemane, had fallen into the hands of the Greeks. 
Louis Napoleon desired to gain the support of the Church. To 
this end he overthrew the Roman Republic, and he now de- 
cided to intervene in the dispute as to the Holy Places. After 
having vainly invoked the Capitulations of 1740, he demanded 
the appointment of a commission to inquire into the relative 
claims of the Greeks and Latins. The Sultan appointed such 
a commission, July 15, 1851. After several months of investi- 
gation, the commission reported in favor of the claims of 
France, and this report was confirmed by the firman of Febru- 
ary 9, 1852. But, profiting by the absence of the French am- 
523] 99 

:L.0fC. 



I00 THE EASTERN QUESTION [524 

bassador, Russia intimidated the Porte into granting demands 
irreconcilable with the firman. At the same time, official 
Russia began to claim that the Treaty of Kainardji not only 
made the Czar the legal protector of the Greek monks, but 
also of all subjects of the Ottoman Porte belonging to the 
Greek Church. 1 

In his efforts to give effect to this claim, Nicholas counted 
on the benevolent neutrality of Austria, because of her grati- 
tude for his suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, and also 
on that of Prussia, because of the firm friendship of Frederick 
William IV. Hating France as the source of all revolutionary 
movements, he despised Napoleon III., and if it were necessary 
to fight France in order to carry out his projects, he would 
not hesitate to do so, provided he could placate England. 2 His 
efforts were, therefore, directed to that end, and in January, 
1853, he held the celebrated conversations with Sir Hamilton 
Seymour. Likening Turkey to a "sick man" — a man in a 
dying condition — he suggested that it behooved Russia and 
England to consider his demise and arrange for the distribu- 
tion of his effects. The thing could be done quietly and easily, 
provided Russia and England could agree. * He was willing 
that England should have Egypt and Crete, and, although he 
disclaimed any desire to retain Constantinople permanently, he 
would occupy it temporarily as a gage for the future. 3 The 
Czar's proposals were rejected by the English ministry; but it 
seems quite certain that, almost until war actually broke out, 
Nicholas labored under the impression that England was not 

1 See Parliamentary Papers for 1854, vol. lxxi, nos. 1-84. See also in Philli- 
more's International Law, third edition, vol. i, page 618 et sea., a thorough dis- 
cussion of the Russian claim to a protectorate over the Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire. 

2 For an account of Nicholas' feelings toward France, see Rambaud, Histoire de 
la Russie, vol. ii, chap. xvi. 

3 " Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade — un homme gravement malade ; 
ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait 
nous echapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions necessaires fussent prises." 



525] THE CRIMEAN WAR IOI 

opposed to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and that 
she had declined his overtures probably because she had some 
scheme of partition of her own. 

On February 10, 1853, Prince MentschikofT, one of the 
highest dignitaries of Russia, set out for Constantinople on a 
special embassy. On the way south he visited the Russian 
fleet and inspected the army along the Pruth, and with the 
commander of the forces and the vice-admiral of the fleet he 
entered Constantinople February 28th. In response to in- 
quiries as to the object of the special embassy, Nesselrode 
assured foreign representatives that it was to discuss the two 
questions that had recently arisen in consequence of the dis- 
pute as to the Holy Places in Palestine and of the rebellion in 
Montenegro. 1 No one could have been selected more fit to 
carry out an arrogant mission than Prince MentschikofT, than 
whom there was no more arrogant man. Neither France nor 
England had at the moment an ambassador in Constantinople; 
but towards the end of March the Turkish ministers informed 
the charges d'affaires of the western powers that MentschikofT 
had made a proposal under threat of evil consequences if it 
were divulged. In exchange for a permanent alliance which 
he offered the Sultan, he demanded that the Sultan should 
conclude a treaty recognizing the Czar as the legal protector 
of the Greek church in the Ottoman Empire. 2 As the heads 
of that church exercised numerous and important temporal 
functions over the 12,000,000 Christian subjects of the Otto- 
man Porte, the submission of the Sultan to this demand would 
have been practically equivalent to an abdication of all 
sovereignty. 

The English and French ambassadors, Sir Stratford Canning 
and M. de la Cour, soon reached Constantinople. Their gov- 
ernments had been advised of the situation and had instructed 
them to act in unison. Canning and de la Cour affected to 

1 Seymour to Russell, Parliamentary J-apers, vol. lxxi, nos. 87, 124, 171. 

2 For details of negotiations, see Parliamentary Papers^ vol. lxxi, nos. 108-140. 



102 THE EASTERN QUESTION [526 

believe what Mentschikoff continued to assert, that the object 
of the latter's mission was the settlement of questions as to 
the Holy Places and Montenegro ; and they hoped by peace- 
ably settling these questions to deprive Russia of any pretext 
for further interference in Turkey. Thanks to Austrian pres- 
sure at Constantinople, the Montenegrin question was already 
in a fair way to be settled, 1 and Canning had no great difficulty 
in obtaining from France such concessions in the Holy Places 
dispute as necessarily satisfied Russia. 2 An agreement was 
signed May 4th, and there was now nothing left to Mentschi- 
koff but either to withdraw or to unmask. Nicholas did not 
hesitate. By his order Mentschikoff on the 5th of May ad- 
dressed an ultimatum to the Porte drawn up in most concise 
terms, demanding that the Porte conclude within five days a 
convention with Russia guaranteeing to the Greek church not 
only its religious liberties, but also its temporal privileges. 
If the answer were in the negative, he should immediately quit 
Constantinople and his master would take the necessary 
measures. 3 

Encouraged by the French and English ambassadors the 
Porte replied, on May 10th, that it could not «agree to a con- 
vention which would destroy its independence by placing its 
internal administration under the surveillance and control of a 
foreign power. It was willing to guarantee by a public act 
full religious liberty to all its subjects. But that would be as 
an act of sovereignty ; it would not engage itself in that re- 
spect with any foreign power. Still less would it bind itself 
by contract in anything that concerned the temporal privileges 
of the Greek church. 4 The Sultan at the same time confirmed 
his refusal by putting Rechid Pasha, the reformer and enemy 
of Russia, in charge of foreign affairs. Mentschikoff professed 

1 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. cxxvi, p. 371 et sea. 

2 Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, vol. ii, chap. xxv. 
8 Parliamentary Papers, vol. Ixxi, no. 179. 

4 Ibid., vol. Ixxi, no. 193. 



527] THE CRIMEAN WAR \ ^ 

to reduce his pretensions by suggesting that instead of a 
formal convention, a simple note should be addressed to the 
Russian government, in which the Porte should make the 
concessions demanded. 1 Rechid, on the same day, May 20, 
1853, sent a note drawn in a sense directly the opposite of that 
which Mentschikoff suggested, carefully reserving the inde- 
pendence and sovereignty of the Sultan. Mentschikoff left 
Constantinople the next day. A few days later Nesselrode 
sent an ultimatum to the Porte demanding that it accept 
MentschikofT's last proposal within eight days, after which, if it 
persisted in its refusal, the Czar " would take his guarantee " 
and immediately occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. On June 
1 ith, Nesselrode addressed a circular to all Russian diplomatic 
agents abroad, in which he explained the " irresistible " 
reasons which had driven Nicholas to that extreme. 2 

Europe was greatly stirred, and was almost a unit against 
the Czar ; but the provocation to England and France was 
especially great, for Nicholas had given his word to the 
English Government that he would not act in the East with- 
out first coming to an agreement with it. 3 The two western 
powers daily drew closer together, and on June 1st they 
ordered their fleets to Besika Bay, just outside the Dar- 
danelles. By so doing they still observed the Treaty of the 
Straits of 1 84 1, and yet were within call of the Sultan. This 
enraged the Czar, who was already incensed at the rejection 
of Nesselrode's ultimatum, and at the issuance by the Porte 
on June 6th of a hatti-sherirT, which secured full religious 
liberty to all the subjects of the Sultan. 4 On June 26th, 
Nicholas issued a manifesto to the Russian nation, justifying 
his action as the performance of a sacred duty. 5 On July 3d, 

1 Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, no. 210. 

2 Ibid., vol. lxxi, no. 236. 

8 For repeated assurances, see Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, no. 195. 
* Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, no. 323. 
5 Ibid., vol. lxxi, no. 316. 



I0 4 THE EASTERN QUESTION [528 

the Russian troops occupied the principalities, though Nessel- 
rode assured the foreign representatives that the Czar did not 
consider himself in a state of war with Turkey, but sought 
merely to take his guarantees. 1 

The statesmen and diplomatists of Europe who had striven 
so hard since the Revolution of 1848 to prevent a breach of 
the peace, now set to work to modify the situation by the usual 
methods of diplomacy. Austria, who had more at stake than 
other powers, and whose sympathies moreover were divided 
by her interests, labored with particular energy. Besides 
being deeply indebted to Nicholas for his assistance against 
the Hungarians, she approved of his system of government. 
On the other hand, she feared a Napoleon in France ; and she 
was alienated both from England and from France by their 
sympathy with Hungary and their support of Turkey in her 
refusal to deliver up the Hungarian refugees. But Russian 
control of the Danube would greatly endanger her interests, 
and the Czar could easily arouse a Pan-Slavic agitation at any 
time in the Hapsburg dominions. In order not to irritate the 
Czar, who despite the treaty of 1841 did not recognize any 
right of Europe to interfere between him and Turkey, Count 
Buol, the Austrian chancellor, offered to him simply a semi- 
official mediation, which the Czar, always hopeful of retaining 
Austrian friendship, accepted. Buol also persuaded the Porte 
to reply to the Russian occupation of the principalities by a 
simple protest, instead of by a declaration of war. 2 Then, in 
order to bring England and France into the negotiations, he 
called together the ambassadors at Vienna, of England, 
France and Prussia, into an unofficial conference. Nearly 
every European statesman had a solution of the difficulty, and 
at least eleven different plans were seriously considered, but 
on August 1st the conference finally agreed to what is known 
as the Vienna note, which was forthwith transmitted to the 

1 Parliamentary Papers, vol. Ixxi, no. 325. 
■ Ibid., vol. Ixxi, no. 368. 



529] THE CRIMEAN WAR I0 5 

Czar and to the Sultan. The note was vague and equivocal, 
and the Czar immediately accepted it. 1 But when it reached 
Constantinople it was closely scrutinized by both Rechid and 
Stratford Canning, who thought that they discerned in it a 
fatal defect, in that it omitted all mention of the essential point 
of the controversy, the maintenance of the sovereignty of the 
Ottoman Porte. The Turkish government therefore refused 
to accept the note, unless it were amended. 2 

For a moment, the sympathy of Europe was withdrawn 
from the Turk, but on September 7th Nicholas published an 
interpretation of the Vienna note which fully justified the 
Turkish action.3 The conferring diplomatists at Vienna were 
compelled to admit that the Czar's interpretation was not what 
had been intended, and France and England a few weeks later 
ordered their fleets to pass the Dardanelles. During all these 
months Turkey had been preparing for war. Mussulman 
fanaticism had been aroused by the crusading tone of Nicholas' 
manifesto, and the Porte could no longer withstand the popu- 
lar outcry. When the Anglo-French fleet appeared before 
Constantinople a great Council was held, and ten days later, 
on October 4th, war was solemnly declared by the Porte 
against Russia. 4 October 8th, Omar Pasha summoned Prince 
GortchakofT to evacuate the principalities, on pain of beginning 
hostilities, in fifteen days. 

Nicholas was not moved by the warlike attitude of Turkey. 
He believed that the financial bankruptcy of the country 
would render it incapable of maintaining a war for six months. 
Moreover, he still counted on the neutrality of Austria and 
Prussia, and the fancied impossibility of an alliance between 
England and France. Accordingly he was in no hurry to 
begin operations, and Nesselrode informed Europe October 

1 Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 54. 

* Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, nos. 66-79 passim, especially enclosure in no. 71. 
8 Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 94. 

* See the declaration in Hertslet, Map 0/ Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 1171. 



io 6 THE EASTERN QUESTION ' [530 

30th that Russia, although she accepted the war which had 
been forced upon her, would prove the -purity of her intentions 
by confining herself to the defensive. 1 His pacific language 
encouraged the Vienna conferrees, who resumed their consul- 
tations, and on December 5th adopted a protocol as a point of 
departure for securing peace. It specified two conditions as 
being essential to the European equilibrium: (1) The integ- 
rity of the Ottoman empire, and (2) the governmental inde- 
pendence of the Sultan ; but the Sultan was to be asked to 
ameliorate the condition of his Christian subjects. A note was 
added to the protocol by which the Porte was requested to 
make known the conditions on which it would treat with 
Russia. 2 

Just at this moment, when everything looked propitious, 
events occurred which destroyed all hope of peace. Contrary 
to the Czar's expectations, the Turks were generally success- 
ful in their military operations and defeated the Russians in 
both Europe and Asia. This so angered Nicholas that he 
abandoned his pacific declaration of October 30th and ordered 
his fleet to sea. It found the Turkish fleet in the harbor of 
Sinope, on the coast of Asia Minor, and utterly destroyed it. 3 
The Sultan, being thus disabled from defending himself in the 
Black Sea, begged the French and English admirals to pass 
the Bosphorus. 4 The French government was ready to grant 
this petition, since it had already determined upon war; 5 but 
the peace cabinet of Aberdeen tried, though in vain, to stem 
the tide of English public feeling. 6 Palmerston's resignation 

1 Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 226, inclosure I. 

2 Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 315, inclosure "2. 

3 Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 317. 

4 Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 337. 

5 Napoleon III. wished to divert the attention of the French from home affairs, 
and hoped by a successful foreign war to strengthen his hold on the throne. 

6 "The public here is furiously Turkish and anti-Russian," the Prince Consort 
wrote to Baron Stockmar September 21st, 1853. Martin, Life of the Prince Con- 
sort, vol. ii, p. 416. 



53l] * THE CRIMEAN WAR IO7 

from the cabinet was accepted, but a few days later Aberdeen 
was forced to re-admit him and to adopt his program. 1 On 
December 27th the, two western courts informed Russia that 
their fleets would enter the Black Sea and that the Russian 
fleet would not be permitted to sail there. 1 On the 30th of 
the same month Turkey informed Buol that the conditions 
upon which she was willing to re-establish peace were (1) the 
maintenance and guarantee of the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire ; (2) the evacuation of the principalities by- 
Russia; (3) the renewal of the guarantees given to the Porte 
in 1 84 1, and (4) respect for the governmental independence of 
the Sultan, who should not refuse new concessions to his 
Christian subjects, but should grant them as an act of 
sovereignty. On these conditions Turkey was willing to open 
negotiations under the mediation of the Vienna conference.3 
The conference immediately acted upon the Turkish program, 
and on January 13, 1854, charged Buol to submit it to the 
Czar. Everybody anxiously awaited his decision, but the 
Czar was now desirous of gaining time. Relieved of all illu- 
sions as to the position of England, 4 he was all the more 
anxious to be assured as to the attitude of Austria and Prus- 
sia. He sent Count OrlofY to Vienna and Baron Budberg to 
Berlin to secure the benevolent neutrality of those two courts, 
promising in return that he would consult with them and with 
them only as to the re-establishment of the political equilibrium 
in the East. 5 Both envoys were unsuccessful, and the Czar 
refused the Turkish proposals. Napoleon III. on January 
29th wrote an autograph letter to Nicholas, inviting him to 
evacuate the principalities and to submit the future treaty of 

1 Ashley, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, chap. ii. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 345. 

3 Ibid., vol. lxxi, part 2, no. 396. 

* Nicholas had really thought that England had joined the Peace Society. 
Chap, xxvi, McCarthy, History of Our Own Times. 
5 Parliamentary Papers, vol. lxxi, part 7, no. 31. 



108 1HE EASTERN QUESTION [532 

peace to the guarantee of Europe. Nicholas, who declined to 
call Napoleon III. " mon frere," answered his "bon ami" with 
a refusal, coupled with the assurance that Russia would be 
able to take care of herself in 1854, as she had been in 1812. 1 
This pointed reference to the Moscow campaign did much to 
rouse the French, with whom the prospect of war was as yet 
unpopular. 

England and France now addressed themselves with re- 
doubled energy to the task of converting the coalition into a 
quadruple alliance, if possible. It was deemed especially im- 
portant to gain Austria, for without her co-operation they 
could attack Russia only by way of the Baltic and the Black 
Sea, and that would mean a long and costly war before Russia 
could be exhausted. But Buol was unwilling to sign any- 
thing till France and England had gone too far to withdraw. 
So he suggested that they address an ultimatum to the Czar 
requiring the immediate evacuation of the principalities and 
threatening war in case of refusal. 2 He also considered it nec- 
essary for Austria, in case she should take part in the war, to 
secure the safety of her dominions by an alliance with Prussia ; 
and with this aim he approached the Prussian»court. He was 
in reality playing a double game. He hoped to push France 
and England to the front to do the fighting, and then to ap- 
pear as an armed mediator between the belligerents and lay 
down the law for Europe. To the success of this design, also, 
the concurrence of Prussia was essential. Frederick Wil- 
liam IV., however, was subject to contradictory influences. 
The Liberals of Prussia united with the Liberals of all Europe 
in detesting Nicholas for his part in the Hungarian Revolu- 
tion ; and many of the king's warmest friends, and the heir- 

1 The letter of Napoleon III. to Nicholas and the latter's answer are found in 
the Annual Register for 1854, p. 242 et seq. 

' Clarendon to Westmoreland at Vienna, no. 103, and answer of Westmoreland, 
No. 106 of part 7, Parliamentary Papers. Also the British demand for the 
evacuation of the principalities, no. 101. 



5331 THE CRIMEAN WAR i0 g 

apparent, Prince William, were strong for an English alliance. 
On the other hand, the reactionaries led by the Queen were 
favorable to Russia ; while a third party, led by Bismarck, de- 
manded a strict neutrality, contending that German interests 
were not involved, and that it should be the duty of Prussia to 
stand as the protector of German interests, while Austria 
looked after her selfish concerns. 1 The King himself sym- 
pathized more with the Czar than with the allies. A strongly 
religious man, he looked upon the Czar as the defender of the 
Cross against the Crescent, and he hated and feared Napo- 
leon III. But at the same time Nicholas was the disturber of 
the peace, and Frederick William did not desire to offend the 
other Protestant power, England. His actions, therefore, dur- 
ing the period of negotiations, were vacillating, the result of 
the opposing influences to which he was subject. In March, he 
declared he would never go to war with the Czar. Then he 
hastened to send agents to London and Paris to explain his 
position and to give assurances that he was willing to sign a 
protocol with France, Austria and England which should af- 
ford a basis for re-establishing peace between Russia and 
Turkey. 2 

France and England meanwhile had completed their prepar- 
ations, and could no longer delay to enter upon their campaign. 
March 12th they concluded an offensive and defensive alliance 
with Turkey .3 March 27th they declared war against Russia; 4 
and on April 10th they formally united in a treaty by which 
they engaged that neither of them would treat separately with 

1 The positions of the various Prussian parties on the question of alliance with 
the Western Powers are well stated in Von Sybel, Founding of the German Em- 
pire, book vi, chap. ii. 

2 As to the irritation felt in the West at the vacillating policy of Prussia during 
the war, a policy of great advantage to Russia, see Debates in Parliament for 
1854.-1856, especially that of March 20, 1855, in Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, vol. cxxxvii, p. 858 et sea. 

3 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1181. 
* Jbid.y vol. ii, p. 1185. 



II0 THE EASTERN QUESTION [534 

Russia or seek in the war any individual advantage. 1 On April 
9th, the conference of Vienna accepted the suggestion of the 
King of Prussia and adopted a protocol which seemed to estab- 
lish a strict solidarity between the four states in all that con- 
cerned the East. 2 Each engaged not to separate itself from the 
other three for the settlement of the pending difficulties, and 
they adopted as an invariable basis for such a settlement the 
four following conditions: (1) The integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire; (2) the evacuation of the principalities by Russia; 
(3) the independence of the Sultan and the free gift by him of 
liberties and privileges to his Christian subjects, and (4) an 
agreement on the guarantees necessary to regulate the politi- 
cal relations of Turkey in such a manner as to safeguard the 
European equilibrium. Nicholas in the meantime had not 
been idle. He had endeavored to obtain the alliance of either 
Sweden or Denmark, but having failed in the attempt, was 
exposed to an attack from the Baltic. He had also been un- 
successful in inciting Persia to a war with the Sultan. He was 
more fortunate with Greece, who directly aided the Christian 
insurrection in Thessaly and Epirus. But this eventually 
proved to be of little value, for France and England sent ships 
and troops to the Piraeus and easily restrained Greece. 

Frederick William meanwhile became alarmed at Prussia's 
isolation in Europe and lent a willing ear to the Austrian pro- 
posal for an alliance, and on April 20, 1854, a treaty was signed, 3 
by which Austria and Prussia agreed both to repel any hostile 
attack on the territory of either. Bismarck, however, deprived 
the treaty of its effect by obtaining a stipulation for its submis- 
sion to the German Confederation. Bismarck sought to gain 
the gratitude of Russia without compromising Prussia with the 
western powers. He knew how slowly the German Diet acted, 
and he also knew that many of the princes of the smaller Ger- 

1 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1193. 
1 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 1 19 1. 
1 laid., vol. ii, p. 120 1. 



t35] THE CRIMEAN WAR m 

man states were bound by matrimony and other ties to Russia. 
The treaty, instead of benefiting Austria, would really injure 
her. For if Austria should answer the English and French 
demands for action with the statement that she could not act 
without Prussia, Prussia could answer that she could not act 
without the approval of the Confederation, and this it was an 
easy matter to prevent. Austria would thus have repaid the 
Czar with ingratitude for past services, and, having also failed 
to aid France and England, would become an object of dislike 
to everybody. This was shrewd diplomacy, nor did it fail in 
its object. 1 An additional article to the treaty stipulated: (i) 
That Austria should summon the Czar to arrest his march 
and to fix the terms of his occupation of the principalities, and 
(2) that the two contracting parties should take the offensive 
only in case the Russians crossed the Balkans or proclaimed 
the annexation of the principalities. There was little danger 
of Prussia's having to undertake war under those conditions, 
for the Anglo-French forces had already arrived in Turkey, 
and Nicholas, instead of taking the offensive, was preparing to 
defend himself. 

The slight value of the Austro-Prussian treaty was soon to 
be demonstrated. After six weeks' delay, due largely to 
Prussian procrastination, Buol sent the summons to Russia 
June 3d. June 29th Nicholas sent his reply. He had decided 
to prevent Austria from joining his enemies, but he answered 
that he could not formally comply with the summons unless 
Austria would guarantee him against attack by way of the 
principalities. As a matter of fact his troops had almost com- 
pleted the evacuation of them ; and on June 14th Austria had 
contracted an alliance with Turkey 2 to the effect that to the 
end of the war Austria should occupy and defend if necessary, 
against all attack, Moldavia and Wallachia, but in so doing 
should not hinder the operations of the allies against Russia. 

Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de r Europe, vol. ii. chap. iv. 
3 Hertslet, vol ii, p. 121 3. 



II2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [536 

Austria sent her troops into the principalities and called 
upon Prussia and the Confederation to prepare their contin- 
gents, but both Prussia and the Confederation, which had 
finally acceded to the Austro-Prussian Treaty on July 24th, 
answered that the Russian reply to the summons was per- 
fectly satisfactory, and that, if Russia should be compelled to 
evacuate the principalities, the allies also should be obliged to 
stay out of them. Moreover, Prussia declared that as the 
Czar had not crossed the Balkans or announced the annexa- 
tion of the principalities, she was exempt from the engagement 
to undertake war against him. Buol was finally left stranded. 
He could neither demand of the allies what Prussia and the 
Confederation desired, nor could he join the allies without 
Prussia's support. But as the Russians had evacuated the 
principalities, and as it was too late in the summer to begin 
without Austria's cooperation a campaign in Russia, France 
and England decided not to cross the Danube. The expedi- 
tion to the Crimea was, however, agreed upon, and it was 
hoped that Sebastopol could be taken by a coup de main. 

Despite the determination of the allies to continue the war 
and abase Russia, the diplomats did not relinquish their efforts 
to bring about a peace ; and when Buol reopened the Vienna 
conference in July, France and England took part in it, 
though Prussia declined to do so. August 8, 1854, the repre- 
sentatives of the three powers — Austria, England, and France 
— adopted the propositions which soon became known as the 
Four Points, along the lines of which the Treaty of Peace was 
eventually effected. 1 These were (1) that the protectorate 
exercised by Russia up to that time over Moldavia, Wallachia 
and Servia should cease, and that the privileges accorded by 
the Sultans to these provinces, as dependencies of the Otto- 
man Empire, should be put under the collective guarantee of 
the powers by a treaty concluded with the Porte ; (2) that the 
navigation of the Danube at its mouths should be freed from 

1 Hertslet, vol. ii, page 121 6. 



537] THE CRIMEAN WAR H3 

all obstacles, and made subject to the application of the prin- 
ciples of the Congress of Vienna ; (3) that the Treaty of the 
Straits of 1841 should be revised by the high contracting 
powers in the interests of the balance of power of Europe; 
and (4) that Russia should abandon her claim to exercise an 
official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, no 
matter to what religion they belonged, and that the five great 
powers should obtain from the Porte the confirmation and ob- 
servance of the religious privileges of the different Christian 
communities, without prejudicing the dignity and independ- 
ence of the Ottoman crown. The three courts declared that 
they would not take into consideration any proposition of 
Russia which did not imply a full and entire adhesion to these 
conditions, although Austria reserved a certain liberty of judg- 
ment in case she should be forced to take part in the war. 

The four points were received with disfavor at Berlin and at 
Frankfort, whither they were sent by Buol, who asked that, 
as Austria had occupied the principalities and might be at- 
tacked there by Russia, Prussia and the confederation should, 
conformably to the treaty of April 20th, mobilize their troops 
for her protection. The Prussian and German statesmen 
answered that that treaty extended only to a defense of Austria 
in her own territory ; that if she occupied the principalities 
she did do so at her own risk ; and that German interests were 
in no way involved in the last two of the four points. 1 France 
and England now assumed an insistent attitude towards 
Austria, and for a third time asked her to join them and put 
an end to the war. By a convention signed November 26, 
1854, which was approved at Frankfort December 9th, 
Prussia and the Confederation agreed to support Austria in 
the principalities ; but it was expressly stated that the con- 
vention was not an application of the treaty of April 20th, and 
that the contracting parties engaged to support only the first 
and second of the four points. This convention, however, did 

1 See Von Sybel, Founding of the German Empire, book 6, chap. iii. 



!I4 THE EASTERN QUESTION [538 

not relieve Austria of her predicament; and as she had 
hitherto refused to enter into the war without the support of 
Prussia, and Prussia declined to aid her without the concur- 
rence of the Confederation, it is likely that the third request of 
the allies upon Austria would have been futile, had not a new 
actor appeared upon the scene. 

Since the Revolution of 1848, Sardinia was the only state in 
Italy that had avoided the adoption of a reactionary policy and 
repelled the advances of Austria. It had become the abode 
of all the Italian patriots who hoped for national unity. It 
had also prospered greatly under its liberal constitution, had 
multiplied its industries, and had developed its commerce. In 
1852, Victor Emanuel called to his aid as prime minister one 
of the greatest statesmen of the century, Count Cavour. Cavour 
saw that the overshadowing influence of Austria upon Italy 
could never be removed except by foreign aid, and he deter- 
mined to gain the friendship if not the assistance of the west- 
ern powers, by lending them for service in the Crimea the 
small but brave and well-equipped army which he had gath- 
ered together. Sardinia had no pressing individual grievances 
against Russia and was little interested in the Eastern ques- 
tion, but if she participated in the war she would have a seat 
in the Congress which would probably be called to end it. 
Then, with the aid of France and England, she would bring 
up the Italian question. In this she would hardly be opposed 
by Russia, who was incensed at Austria's ingratitude, nor by 
Prussia, who desired to substitute her own supremacy for that 
of Austria in Germany. Cavour in November, 1854, opened 
negotiations with England and France, looking towards an 
alliance. 1 Buol now saw that he must take decisive action, or 
at least must appear to do so. On December 2, 1854, he con- 
cluded a treaty" with France and England, by which it was 
agreed that Austria should not depart from the Four Points 

1 Godkin, Life of Victor Emanuel, chap. viii. 
1 Ilertslet, vol. ii, p. 1221. 



539] THE CRIMEAN WAR ujj 

nor negotiate separately with Russia, but should defend the 
principalities if necessary; and that, if peace was not made 
between the allies and Russia by January 1st, "the high con- 
tracting powers will deliberate without delay upon effectual 
means for obtaining the object of their alliance." 

Buol had no intention of fighting. By signing the treaty he 
had sought to satisfy France and England and to intimidate 
Russia, and on the strength of the convention of November 
26th with Prussia, he still hoped to appear as an armed medi- 
ator. Prussia, now concerned at her own isolation, prevailed 
upon Nicholas to allow Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian repre- 
sentative to Austria, to participate in the Vienna conference on 
the basis of the Four Points. Gortchakoff suggested the open- 
ing of a conference in which Russia and Turkey should be 
represented, as well as the other powers. France and England 
agreed to this, but insisted that, in order to preclude any mis- 
understanding as to the meaning of the Four Points, Austria 
should join in an explanation of them. Austria assented, and 
on December 28th the three powers made known to Gortcha- 
koff their interpretation of the four conditions, and demanded 
that, as a preliminary to the opening of any negotiation, he 
should accede to them. 1 January 7th he refused to do so, at 
the same time presenting a memoir wherein the Russian view 
of the conditions was set forth. An entire month was thus 
lost, and during that time Austria had given no evidence of an 
intention to carry out the treaty of December 2d. The allies 
were indignant at the excuses which she offered from time to 
time, and the negotiations with Sardinia, which had been prac- 
tically dropped during December, were reopened in January. 
On January 26, 1853, a treaty of alliance between Sardinia and 
the allied belligerents was concluded. 2 By this treaty Sardinia 
entered into the war not as an auxiliary, but as an equal, and 
agreed to send to the Crimea an army of 1 5,000 men, which was 

1 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1225. 
* Jbid., vol. ii, p. 1228. 



H6 THE EASTERN QUESTION V^ 

to remain under the orders of its own general. The army was 
sent, and it did valiant service with the French and the English. 

Austria now pretended to act zealously in the direction of 
carrying out the treaty of December 2nd, and once more 
called upon Prussia and the confederation to mobilize their 
troops. But she was answered with reproaches for having con- 
cluded the treaty of December 2nd without having consulted 
Germany. Moreover Bismarck, who represented Prussia in 
the Diet, maintained that, instead of Germany being menaced 
from the East, she was really endangered from the West, and 
at his instigation the Diet not only categorically refused on 
January 30th the request of Austria, but on February 8th 
adopted a resolution for placing the Federal contingents on a 
war footing within their respective military divisions. This 
was in reality an answer to Napoleon III.'s known desire to 
carry the war into Russia by crossing Germany, and it 
effectually forestalled any such movement. 1 

During the winter of 1854-1855, the sufferings of the allies 
were very great and the siege of Sebastopol advanced but 
little. 2 At the rate of progress made so far, the war would 
last for years. Fortunately for Europe, Nicholas died March 
2nd, a disappointed and grief-stricken man, and was succeeded 
by Alexander II. Though the latter issued a manifesto on 
the day of his accession in which he declared that he would 
preserve the integrity of his Empire and follow the tradi- 
tions of his ancestors, he was nevertheless anxious for peace; 
and on March 10th Nesselrode addressed a circular to the 
courts of Europe expressing the sincere desire of the Czar to 
end the war. 3 The western powers, and especially France, 
which was tired of the ruinous struggle in the Crimea, were as 
desirous of peace as Russia; and on March 15th the con- 
ference of Vienna was re-opened with the Four Points as a 
basis of negotiation. 

1 See Von Sybel, book 6, chap. iii. 

1 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, vol. vii, chap, viii, sixth edition. 

• Annual Register, 1855, p. 199. 



54 1] THE CRIMEAN WAR nj 

Prussia, who had previously held aloof from the conference, 
now expressed a desire to enter it. Her request was granted, 
but only on condition that she accept the treaty of December 
2d as a preliminary, and agree to share with the other powers 
the consequences of a failure of the conference to effect a 
peace. 1 As she was unwilling to do this, the conference 
opened without her. At first it looked as if there would be 
smooth sailing. The representatives of Austria, Russia, 
France, England and Turkey found no difficulty in agreeing on 
the first and second points, as to the future status of the prin- 
cipalities and the freedom of the Danube. But when they 
came to the third point — the revision of the Straits Treaty so 
as to insure the balance of power in Europe — they were 
unable to reach a decision ; and so important was it thought 
to be that this point should be well settled, that France sent 
Drouyn de Lhuys, and England Lord John Russell, as special 
representatives to the conference. 

The western representatives found that Austria would not 
consent to submit to the conference a proposal for the neu- 
tralization of the Black Sea because she was sure that Russia 
would not accept it. On the other hand, Drouyn de Lhuys, 
who always wished to ally France with Austria, suggested a 
scheme which he felt sure would be acceptable to the latter, 
and the refusal of which she would be willing to make a casus 
belli. He proposed — and Russell supported him — that the 
number of vessels which Russia could maintain in the Black 
Sea should be limited. Buol expressed approval of the prin- 
ciple of limitation, but declined to make its refusal by Russia 
a casus belli. Gortchakoff was aware of this, and when the 
plan was proposed in conference he promptly rejected it as 
dishonoring to Russia. He also declared that, although 
Russia was willing to respect the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, she was not willing to guarantee it. Buol gave the 

1 Speech of Lord Clarendon in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. cxxxvii, 
p. 876. 



H8 THE EASTERN QUESTION [542 

representatives of France and England to understand that he 
was willing to sign with them an ultimatum to Russia based 
on the principle of counter-weights, i, e., that Russia should be 
allowed to maintain whatever fleet she pleased in the Black 
Sea, and that Austria, England and France should have the 
right to keep there an equal force. Although this seemed to 
involve no humiliation to Russia, and to leave the question of 
Ottoman integrity unsettled, Drouyn de Lhuys and Russell, 
despairing of obtaining anything better, accepted it. Both 
were promptly disavowed by their governments. 1 Napo- 
leon III. felt that his throne would be in danger by such an 
inglorious ending of the war, and Palmerston refused to con- 
sider any such compromise. 2 Austria then declared that she 
was no longer bound by the treaty of December 2d. Her 
troops were withdrawn from the Russian frontier and reduced 
to a peace footing, and she definitely assumed a position of 
neutrality. The conference was declared closed early in June, 
and it was evident that only war and not diplomacy would 
settle the question.3 

France and England were exceedingly irritated by the atti- 
tude of Austria, and were determined to push the war with the 
greatest energy. The forces besieging Sebastopol were in- 
creased, and on September 8th a general assault was made by 
the allies. It was successful. The effect produced on Europe 
was profound. The people of the West rejoiced that the auto- 
crat of the East, the enemy of liberalism, had been humbled. 
Nevertheless, they wished for peace. All the belligerent gov- 
ernments except France appeared to be otherwise disposed. 
Naturally, the Ottoman Porte saw that the continuance of the 

1 Lord John Russell's explanation, Parliamentary Debates, vol. cxxxix, p. 559 
// sea. 

a For Palmerston's keen insight into Buol's game, see his letter to Lord John 
Russell in Ashley, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 84. 

1 The various protocols of the conference from March to June are found in 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xlv, pp. 54-1 18-124. 



543] THE CRIMEAN WAR Yl g 

war would be beneficial to its interests. Sardinia also hoped 
by its prolongation to create new claims to the friendship of 
England and France. England especially seemed little dis- 
posed to peace. Having begun the war unprepared, her 
losses had been enormous. But she had gradually repaired 
her defects of organization and was anxious now for another 
campaign, which she believed would be decisive, and in which 
she hoped to satisfy the national pride, for most of the glory 
in the taking of Sebastopol had gone to the French. 1 Public 
opinion in France was strong for peace. The war had been 
undertaken by the French without any feeling of hate. There 
was more real friendship among the people for Russia than 
for England, and Napoleon III had come out of the struggle 
in a much stronger position both at home and abroad than he 
had previously occupied. He, therefore, sought by every 
means to bring the war to a close. He lent a friendly ear to 
the advances of the Russian agents at Paris, but at the same 
time concluded with England a defensive alliance with Sweden, 
who hoped to recover Finland if the war should be prolonged.* 
Though the Czar talked of upholding the honor of his country, 
he was in reality more anxious for peace than any other of the 
combatants. The distress in Russia was really terrible, and 
the government dreaded another campaign in the coming 
spring, in which it was sure to be worsted. 

But, of all the European powers, Austria, though not a 
party to the war, was the one most anxious for peace. Her 
apprehensions were not confined to Turkey, but extended 
equally to Italy, in whose political fate Napoleon III was ex- 
hibiting an active and increasing interest. Shortly after the 
fall of Sebastopol, Buol proposed to Napoleon the sending of 
an ultimatum to Russia, the non-acceptance of which should 
be regarded by Austria as a casus belli. He asked in return 

1 For British feeling on the war, see Annual Register ■, 1856, p. I, and for French 
feeling on the war, see Annuaire Zesur, 1855, p. 7. 

2 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1241. 



I2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [544 

for this action only that France and England should conclude 
with Austria a treaty for the maintenance of the integrity and 
independence of the Ottoman Empire, hoping thereby to ren- 
der any further union of Russia with France and England 
impossible. 1 The ultimatum was so drawn as to secure Aus- 
tria's own interests, but to leave the status of the Black Sea to 
be settled by a convention between Turkey and Russia. On 
the other hand, it required that Russia should accept the first 
and second of the Four Points, and, in order that she might be 
removed as far as possible from the mouth of the Danube, 
should give up Bessarabia. Palmerston was indignant ; in the 
first place, because he was not consulted, and in the second 
place, because the conditions which England considered most 
important were omitted. He declared he did not intend to 
allow Austria to dictate terms of peace which England was to 
agree to without discussion. 2 Louis Napoleon accepted Aus- 
tria's project of an ultimatum, but early in December he re- 
ceived Victor Emanuel and Cavour with demonstrations of 
friendship, assuring them that he intended to see if something 
could not be done for Italy. In the midst of these complica- 
tions, peace became all the more necessary to Austria, and 
towards the middle of December she presented to England and 
France a draft of an ultimatum to be sent to Russia. Should 
Russia fail to accept it by January 17th, Austria was to break 
off diplomatic relations with her and unite with the Western 
powers. The ultimatum consisted of the Four Points with 
slight modifications, the principal one of which was the cession 
of Bessarabia by Russia to Moldavia; and a fifth point was 
added, to the effect that other matters of European interest 
might be discussed at a congress. Alexander II., who, besides 
resenting the demand for the cession of territory, feared the 
introduction of unwelcome proposals under the fifth point, at 
first rejected the ultimatum; but his ministers soon convinced 

1 The treaty was afterwards concluded, Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1280. 
' Letter to Persigny, Ashley, Life of Palmerston, vol. ii, p. 103. 



545] THE CRIMEAN WAR , I2I 

him that it would be impossible to face practically all Europe 
with his treasury bankrupt. When, therefore, Frederic Wil- 
liam IV., of Prussia, who still dreaded the possibility of being 
driven from his neutral position, wrote him an autograph letter 
urging him to accept the proffered terms, Alexander yielded 
his adhesion to the Austrian ultimatum without reserve. 

The proposed Congress met at Paris, February 25, 1856. 1 
There appeared at it representatives of Austria, England, 
France, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey. Austria had secretly 
endeavored to prevent the admission of Sardinia, but her efforts 
were unsuccessful. Sweden, who had taken no part in the war, 
did not ask to be represented. But Prussia, although she had 
refused to participate in the struggle, sought to be represented 
in order that she might avoid the appearance of isolation. Her 
wishes were secretly antagonized by Austria, and were openly 
opposed by England, who, with a view to make the conditions 
for Russia as hard as possible, desired to exclude her friends 
from the Congress. 2 Napoleon III., whom the King of Prussia 
had called " the common enemy of Europe," was the only sov- 
ereign who really wished for Prussia's presence at the Con- 
gress. He desired to be on good terms with both Prussia and 
Russia, since his plans with reference to Italy were adverse to the 
interests of Austria. And as the Treaty of the Straits of 184 1, 
of which Prussia was a signatory, was to be renewed, it was 
felt that Prussia's presence was really necessary, and accord- 
ingly, on March 16th, her representatives took their seats. 

The Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, was based on the 
Four Points, with various modifications and additions. 3 The 
great work of Stratford Canning in the resuscitation of the 
Ottoman Empire had culminated February 18th in the publi- 

1 For the various protocols to the Congress, see British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. xlvi, pp. 63-138. 

2 Letter of Prince Albert to King Leopold in Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, 
vol. iii, chap. lxx. 

8 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1250 et seq. 



I2 2 THE EASTERN QUESTION [546 

cation by the Sultan of a Hatti-Humayoun, which, as an act 
of "his Sovereign will," 1 accorded to the subject Christians 
the free exercise of their worship and promised a series of 
reforms that would regenerate the Ottoman Empire. 2 In 
recognition of this act, Article VII. of the treaty admitted the 
Porte " to participate in the advantages of the public law and 
concert of Europe." The powers also guaranteed the inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and 
agreed to consider any act tending to violate this engagement 
as a question of general interest. Article VIII. provided that 
if a dispute should arise between Turkey and one or more of 
the powers, they should, before appealing to arms, present the 
matter to the other contracting parties for their mediation. 
Article IX., which was to become famous in the later history 
of Turkey, declared that the Sultan, wishing to give a further 
proof of his generous intentions, had resolved to communicate 
to the contracting parties his Hatti-Humayoun of February, 
but that it was " clearly understood " that this communication 
could not " in any case " give the powers " the right to inter- 
fere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of . . . 
the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration 
of his Empire." Articles X.-XIV. renewed the convention of 
1 841 and neutralized the Black Sea. The waters and ports of 
this sea, while they were " thrown open to the mercantile 
marine of every nation," were "formally and in perpetuity 
interdicted to the flag of war, either of the powers possessing 
its coasts or of any other power," 3 except that each of the 
powers was to be permitted to station two light vessels at the 
mouths of the Danube, in order to ensure the enforcement of 
the regulations as to its navigation, while the Czar and the 
Sultan were allowed each to reserve the right to maintain in 

1 For Stratford Canning's work in bringing about the firman, Lane-Poole, see 
Life of Stratford Canning, vol. ii, chap, xxxii. 

2 The firman is found in Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1243. 
"Art. XI. 



547] THE CRIMEAN WAR i 2 $ 

the Black Sea six steam vessels of not more than 800 tons and 
four light steam or sailing vessels of not more than 200 tons. 1 
The Czar and the Sultan also agreed not to establish or main- 
tain on the coast of the Black Sea "any military-maritime 
arsenal." 2 Articles XV.-XIX. established the free navigation 
of the Danube according to the principle of the treaty of 
Vienna, and provided for the appointment of commissions to 
improve and to regulate the navigation of the river. Articles 
XX.-XXVII. pledged to Moldavia and Wallachia an inde- 
pendent and national administration under the suzerainty of 
the Porte and the guarantee of the powers, and stipulated for 
a commission to revise the laws and statutes of those princi- 
palities. Portions of Bessarabia were detached from Russia 
and united to Moldavia, much to the vexation of the Russian 
representative. Not only was his pride wounded, but he was 
specially aggrieved by the efforts of Austria to obtain posses- 
sion of the territory. Articles XXVIII.-XXIX. confirmed 
Servia in all her special rights and immunities, which were 
thenceforth placed under the collective guarantee of the 
powers; and, although the Porte was permitted still to main- 
tain its garrison at Belgrade, any armed intervention in Servia 
was forbidden without the previous agreement of the powers. 
After the settlement of the chief points bearing upon the 
Eastern Question, the Congress formulated conclusions upon 
certain other matters. The most important of these was the 
declaration respecting Maritime Law. This act, the object of 
which was admitted to be " to introduce into international 
relations fixed principles in this respect," and to which the 
states not represented in the Congress were, therefore, to be 
invited "to accede," declared: " I. Privateering is, and remains 
abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the 
exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the 
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under 

1 Arts. XIV, XIX, and additional convention of March 30, 1856. 

2 Art. XIII. 



I2 4 THE EASTERN QUESTION [548 

enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be 
effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really 
to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." x In less than a 
year this declaration was adhered to by substantially all civil- 
ized states except the United States, Spain and Mexico. The 
United States, however, offered to accede on condition that 
private property at sea be altogether exempted from capture 
except in case of contraband or of blockade ; and the rules of 
the declaration, except the first, may be considered as un- 
doubtedly forming to-day a part of international law. 

The Congress also adopted a protocol in relation to media- 
tion; 3 but the high expectations which this act seemed at first 
to excite as a measure for the prevention of war were doomed 
to early and sanguinary disappointment. 

Certain other subjects, among which was the Italian ques- 
tion, were considered by the Congress, but they did not get 
beyond the pale of discussion. 

It was formerly the habit of writers to affirm that the 
Crimean war, judged by its results, was a failure, but it is be- 
lieved that a truer perspective of the history of the day, and a 
more impartial estimate of the influence of the conflict on the 
later European situation, justify a modification of that judg- 
ment. Some of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris were 
undoubtedly diplomatic blunders. To promise to maintain the 
territorial integrity of a state which had been undergoing 
decay for a century, and at the same time to renounce all right 
of interference in its internal affairs, was to ignore the lessons 
of the past and to invite trouble in the future. No reform had 
ever been carried out by the Ottoman Porte except under the 
pressure of some outside power, and the man to whom the 
Hatti-Humayoun of February 18, 1856, was chiefly due pre- 
dicted after the treaty was signed that the charter of reform 

1 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1282. 
* Ibid. y vol. ii, p. 1277. 



549] THE CRIMEAN WAR i 2 $ 

would be a dead letter. 1 But so far as the war was designed 
to prevent the Russian absorption of Turkey, it can hardly be 
pronounced a failure. It is true that Russia re-asserted her 
rights on the Black Sea in 1870, and regained Bessarabia in 
1878. But after two centuries of almost uninterrupted progress, 
she was forced indefinitely to postpone her hope of dominion 
over the Ottoman Empire ; for Europe had taken Turkey 
under its protection, and had made the future of the empire a 
matter of common concern. The war, moreover, wrought a 
far-reaching change in the relations between the various Euro- 
pean states. The diplomacy of the period prior to the revolu- 
tion of 1848 had been directed to the maintenance of the 
treaties of 18 15, and the same period was marked by the 
alliance of the two constitutional states of the West, France 
and England, as a counterpoise to the alliance of the absolute 
monarchies of the East, Austria, Russia and Prussia. But the 
Crimean War changed all this. The leadership in Europe 
passed from Austria to France, and one of the principal objects 
of the reign of Napoleon was the destruction of the system 
founded on the treaties of 181 5. After the war, Austria had 
not a friend in Europe, but did have, on the other hand, three 
persistent enemies, France, Prussia and Sardinia, and she be- 
came the object of the machinations of the three men who 
were to control the destinies of Europe during the next fifteen 
years, Napoleon III., Cavour and Bismarck. England with- 
drew from active participation in continental politics during 
that period, and turned her attention to home afTairs, while 
Russia, in order to recover from the losses of the war, was 
obliged to devote herself to the improvement of her industries 
and finances. 

1 The first words of Stratford Canning at Constantinople when he received the 
terms of peace were, " I would rather have cut off my right hand than have signed 
that treaty." Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, vol. ii, chap, xxxii, p. 436. 



CHAPTER VII 



THE TREATY OF BERLIN 



Had the provisions of the Hatti-Humayoun of February 18, 
1856, been carried out, the Ottoman Empire would have been 
regenerated and would have become a lay state. This cele- 
brated edict provided for perfect religious equality ; it opened 
all positions, civil and military, to Christians ; it established 
mixed tribunals which should publicly administer a new code 
of laws that was to be drawn up; it guaranteed equality of 
taxes, did away with the kharadj, decreed the abolition of tax- 
farming, and provided that Christians should have seats in all 
provincial boards of administration ; and it promised general 
improvement by the building of roads and canals, and by new 
methods in the conduct of the finances. Even had the Otto- 
man Porte been never so well inclined to carry out the pro- 
visions of the edict faithfully, almost insuperable difficulties 
stood in the way. Mohammedan contempt for the infidel was 
not lessened, and the Turks refused to be associated with 
Giaours in administration, to recognize their authority in civil 
and military matters, or to accept their verdicts when they 
participated in the mixed tribunals. The Christians, on the 
other hand, preferred to pay an army tax rather than serve in 
the army ; they were afraid to occupy seats in the mixed tri- 
bunals or to hold positions of prominence ; and the Greek 
bishops, though they gladly accepted religious equality, ob- 
jected to relinquishing any of their historic rights, which the 
Sultan thought should be given up under the new regime. 
As a matter of fact, it was not long before all attempts to give 

effect to the edict were abandoned, and things reverted to 
126 [550 



5 5 I ] THE TREA TV OF BERLIN ! 27 

their former condition. The powers had promised not to 
interfere, and could, therefore, only protest. Fanaticism in- 
creased, and in i860 the uprising of the Druses against the 
Maronites in Syria resulted in such massacres that Syria was 
occupied by French troops. 1 The Ottoman Porte answered 
the protests of the powers with new promises of reform, and 
there the matter ended. After the accession of Abdul- Aziz in 
1 86 1, a few attempts at improvement were made by the re- 
formers Fuad and Ali, but the opposition of the Old Turk 
party and the vacillation of the Sultan defeated their efforts. 
The condition of affairs became so outrageous that the powers 
instituted an investigation in 1867, and showed in a published 
memoir that the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 was practically a dead 
letter. But the stirring events of i860- 1870 in central Europe 
to a great extent diverted attention from Turkey, and when 
the next decade opened the tendency to retrogression con- 
tinued unchecked. 

Meanwhile evidences of disintegration in the empire had 
been steadily accumulating. A convention was signed 
August 19, 1858, by the representatives of the powers at 
Paris, by which it was provided that the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia should have a common name, the 
United Principalities ; but they were to retain their separate 
administrations and the Divan of each was to elect its own 
hospodar.* The Roumanians of the two provinces, however, 
determined to form a united state, and elected the same per- 
son, Col. Alexander Couza. The powers yielded before this 
expression of the national will, and in 1859 recognized the 
union, as also did the Porte in 1861. 3 But the Roumanians 
soon discovered that on account of local jealousies, govern- 
ment by one of themselves was not a success; and early in 

1 The convention for that purpose is found in Hertslet, Map of Europe by 
Treaty, vol. ii, p. 1455. 

■ Ibid., vol. ii, p. 1329. 

* Ibid., vol. ii, p. 1377, and ibid., vol. ii, p. 1498. 



I2 8 THE EASTERN QUESTION [552 

1866 Couza was compelled to abdicate and Prince Charles of 
Hohenzollern was called to the throne. 1 With a single head, 
a capital, a ministry and an assembly, Roumania, though 
legally under the suzerainty of the Porte, became practically 
independent, and recognition of its independence was at length 
accorded in 1878. 

The success of the Roumanians inspired the various Servian 
nationalities, who hoped to form a great Servian state. In 
1 86 1, the Herzegovinians demanded a national bishop and 
separate ecclesiastical privileges, and when these were refused 
by the Sultan they revolted. They were soon joined by the 
Montenegrins and Servians, and although the revolt was un- 
successful, the powers compelled the Sultan to withdraw all 
Turkish troops from Servia except from Belgrade and four 
fortresses; 2 and in 1867, by friendly agreement, they were 
withdrawn entirely from Servian territory. 3 Servia thus be- 
came independent in all military and administrative matters, 
and was also ready for recognition in 1878. 

The Cretans, frenzied by the increasing tyranny of the Turks, 
rose, in 1866, with a view to ultimate annexation to Greece, 
with whose people they were allied in blood* and language. 
The Greek government and people aided them, and war between 
Greece and Turkey seemed to be imminent. But the powers 
interfered and decided that Crete should remain with Turkey, 
but that the Sultan should grant a constitution to the Cretans. 
The Organic Law of 1868 was, therefore, promulgated, but 
like all the other reforms, it soon became a dead letter. 4 

Egypt also sought to remove the Turkish yoke, but by the 
use of money rather than of force. In 1867, the Pasha bought 

1 The protocols of conference between the great Fowers relative to the revolu- 
tion are found in the British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lvii, p. 533 et sea. 

1 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 15 15. 
8 Ibia., vol. iii, p. 1800. 

4 For the Organic Law of 1868, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
iviii, p. 137. 



553] THE TREATY OF BERLIN i2 g 

from the Sultan the title of Khedive and obtained independence 
in all that concerned customs duties, police, postal and transit 
affairs. 1 

In Bulgaria the patriotic party, backed up by Russia, ob- 
tained from the Sultan, in 1870, the right to have an Exarch 
of their own and a national church, despite the excommunica- 
tion of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. 

In 1 87 1, Russia, taking advantage of the Franco-German 
war, issued a circular note to the various European powers 
declaring herself to be no longer bound by that part of the 
Treaty of Paris which imposed disabilities upon her in the 
Black Sea. The London Conference, while it condemned the 
method, recognized the fact. 2 

It was evident that affairs in Turkey were fast approaching 
a crisis, which would result in the revolt of the subject peoples 
and the interference of the powers, notwithstanding the stipu- 
lations of the Treaty of Paris. In 1871, Ali Pasha, the last of 
the reformers, died and the disorders in the government in- 
creased. The subject peoples, crushed by their burdens, were 
rebellious, and were, moreover, incited to revolt by Slavic 
sympathizers. At length in July, 1875, the Herzogovinians 
and Bosniaks rose, and men and money poured to their assist- 
ance from Servia and Montenegro. The courts of St. Peters- 
burg, Berlin and Vienna, which had agreed, in 1872, to act in 
concert on the Eastern Question, warned the Sultan, and on 
August 18, 1875, demanded that a commission of their consuls 
should be permitted to proceed to the revolted country, hear 
the demands of the people and transmit them to Constantinople 
where they should immediately be acted upon. This was done, 
and the Sultan, not content with conceding the demands of the 
insurgents, issued, on the 2nd of October, an irade, which not 

1 State Papers, vol. lix, p. 582. 

1 The Russian note is found in Hertslet, vol. iii, p. 1892, and the declaration 
of the London conference at p. 1904. See also Hall, International Law , fourth 
edition, p. 309 et sea. 



^o THE EASTERN QUESTION [554 

only granted what they asked, but gave them extensive local 
privileges besides. 1 Unfortunately for him, the comedy of 
reform had been played too often ; the insurgents ignored his 
edict and kept on with their struggle. 

As in the past, Austria was the power that exhibited the 
greatest concern at the course of events. To permit the exist- 
ing condition of affairs to continue would mean either Russian 
intervention or the formation of a Serb state, either of which 
would be perilous to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Count 
Andrassy, the Austrian chancellor, therefore offered to draw 
up a note of protest to be signed by the signatories of the 
Treaty of Paris. England demanded sufficient delay to per- 
mit the Sultan to carry out the reforms promised in the irade* 
of October 2nd; and on December 12th the Sultan issued a 
second irade" still more munificent than the first, promising the 
most extensive reforms injudicial, financial and administrative 
matters. 8 But the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians refused to be 
conciliated by promises. Andrassay, therefore, submitted his 
note on the 30th of December to Germany and Russia, by 
whom it was accepted.^ It was then sent to London, Paris 
and Rome. At the two latter capitals it received immediate 
adherence, and England promised to give it a general support, 
though she refused to commit herself to any particular action. 4 
The European directory therefore appeared to be in accord, 
and on January 30, 1876, the Andrassy note was sent to the 
Porte. It demanded that the Turkish government put into 
execution without delay the following reforms: (1) The estab- 
lishment of full religious liberty and equality of sects ; (2) the 
abolition of tax-farming ; (3) the application of the revenues 
gathered in Bosnia and Herzegovina entirely to local pur- 
poses, and their distribution by local assemblies composed 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2407. 
1 Ibid. % vol. iv, p. 2409. 
• Ibid., vol. iv, p. 24 1 S. 
4 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2430. 



555] THE TREA TV OF BERLIN 1 3 r 

half of Christians and half of Mussulmans elected by the in- 
habitants ; (4) the amelioration of the condition of the agri- 
cultural population. On February 13th the Sultan accepted 
the note, and a few days later published a new set of promises, 
relating to the government of the provinces, more elaborate 
than any that had preceded. 1 

Austria was satisfied with the results of the Andrassy hote, 
and, fearing a sympathetic uprising of the Slavs in her own 
dominion, employed every effort to check the insurrection and 
to persuade the insurgents to lay down their arms. The 
latter, on the contrary, pushed the war more vigorously than 
before, and Servia and Montenegro began open preparations 
to come to their aid. Moreover, at the suggestion of Russia, 
the insurgents drew up early in April a list of the reforms 
which they demanded should be guaranteed by the European 
powers. The Russian chancellor, Gortchakoff, proposed to 
Austria to send the demands to the Porte with a note to the 
effect that if they were not carried out, the powers would 
adopt measures to enforce them. Austria declined the pro- 
posal; but on May 7th a Mussulman mob in Salonika 
destroyed the French and German consulates and murdered 
the consuls. The necessity for action was evident, and on the 
invitation of Bismarck, Gortchakoff and Andrassy united with 
him at Berlin in drafting a new note to the Porte. At the 
suggestion of Gortchakoff, the demands of the insurgents of 
the month before were made the basis of the note, and on May 
13th the conference agreed to the Berlin memorandum." It 
was much more severe than the Andrassy note. It required 
that the Sultan (1) rebuild all the houses destroyed in the re- 
volted countries, furnish the peasants with cattle and imple- 
ments, and exempt them for three years from taxation ; (2) 
establish a Christian commission for the distribution of this 
aid; (3) withdraw the Turkish troops except in specified 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2441 et seq» 
% Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2459. 



!32 THE EASTERN QUESTION [556 

places ; (4) authorize the Christians to remain armed until the 
reforms were effected ; and (5) delegate to the consuls of the 
powers the supervision of the execution of the reforms. 
Moreover, the memorandum demanded that an armistice of 
two months be granted, and declared that, if at the expiration 
of that time the desired end had not been accomplished, the 
powers would resort to efficacious measures "to arrest the evil 
and prevent its development." The Berlin memorandum was 
then sent to Paris, Rome and London. At the two former 
capitals it was immediately accepted, but in London it was 
rejected without hesitation. 1 Disraeli would accept no plan 
bearing the stamp of Russian suggestion. 

Nevertheless, the other powers decided to send the memo- 
randum to the Porte, and May 30th was fixed as the day, but 
on the night of the 29th an event occurred which caused the 
memorandum to be forgotten. An opposition had long 
existed among the patriotic Turks against Abdul-Aziz because 
of his indifference to the welfare of his country, and this oppo- 
sition determined on a revolution. Led by Midhat-Pasha, 
Young Turkey, as the reformers were called, obtained the 
necessary Fetva from the Sheik-ul-Islam, deposed Abdul-Aziz 
and placed his nephew Mourad V. on the throne. The new gov- 
ernment immediately adopted a vigorous policy and demanded 
of Servia the meaning of her extensive war preparations. 
Servia, believing herself thoroughly prepared for a conflict, 
demanded in turn that the Turks evacuate Bosnia and Herzo- 
govina and allow the first to be occupied by Servian and the 
second by Montenegrin troops. The Porte answered with an 
immediate refusal, and on May 30th Servia, and on July 2nd 
Montenegro, declared war. 2 To the surprise of Europe the 
Turks were generally victorious, and overran Servia, upon 
whom they sought to impose severe terms, comprehending a 
return to the state of things existing previously to 1867, an 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p, 2464. 

1 Ibid. t vol. iv, pp. 2471 and 2475. 



557] THE TREATY OF BERLIN ^3 

indemnity for the expenses of the war, and an increase in the 
amount of the tribute. 1 

Fortunately for Servia, an event had meanwhile taken place 
which was to result in her salvation. Bulgaria had not been 
concerned in the general rising of the Slavs of the Ottoman 
Empire, having been satisfied with the ecclesiastical privileges 
obtained in 1870 and the reforms introduced by Midhat Pasha. 
But a small outbreak at Batak, fomented by outsiders, caused 
the government to send bands of Bashi-Bazouks 2 into the 
country, all the regular troops being engaged against the reb- 
els elsewhere. During the month of May, the Bashi-Bazouks 
massacred Christians to a number variously estimated from 
12,000 to 25,000, and -committed wanton outrages upon the 
remaining population. The civilized world was horrified at 
the atrocities as they gradually became known, and England 
particularly was stirred by the speeches and writings of Mr. 
Gladstone. When, therefore, in August, 1876, Servia appealed 
to the powers to mediate with the Turks, and the powers re- 
ferred her petition to Great Britain as the government whose 
advice the Porte was most likely to take, Disraeli did not dare 
openly to refuse to act as mediator. In September, he pro- 
posed an armistice of six weeks, the maintenance of the status 
quo ante bellum in Servia, and a certain amount of adminis- 
trative independence for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. 3 
But Young Turkey was determined to settle the affairs of the 
empire without the tutelage of Europe. On August 31st, the 
leaders of the party deposed Mourad V., who was an imbecile, 
and elevated in his stead Abdul-Hamid II., who though 
ignorant and inexperienced, was energetic and full of zeal for 
the defense of his faith. Instead of answering the proposal of 
Great Britain, the new government issued an extraordinary 
edict of reform, which was to change Turkey into a modern 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2482. 

9 The Bashi-Bazonks were irregulars drafted from the heart of Asia Minor. 

* Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2488. 



134 THE EASTERN QUESTION [558 

constitutional state. There was to be a responsible ministry, 
an assembly of two chambers, freedom of speech and of the 
press, permanent judges and compulsory education. The 
Turkish government, moreover, demanded that the armistice 
should be extended to six months, and that during that time 
the revolted provinces, as well as Servia and Montenegro, 
should receive no aid from without. Its apparent design was 
to employ the interval in improving its own forces. 

The patience of the Czar was now exhausted. Alexander II. 
was himself a lover of peace, but the bureaucrats who sur- 
rounded him were strong for war with Turkey, and they were 
supported by the Russian people, who demanded the protection 
of their co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire. In the pre- 
vious July, Alexander had met Francis Joseph at Reichstadt, 
where it is generally assumed that he obtained the consent of 
the latter to Russian intervention in case Turkey should re- 
fuse the demands of the powers, provided that, in the event of 
Bulgaria's liberation, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be given 
to Austria. 1 At all events Austria appeared to take less in- 
terest in the war after the interview. The Czar was also sure 
of the neutrality of Germany, for Bismarck was«known to hold 
the opinion which he afterwards avowed that the Eastern 
question was not worth to Germany the bones of a single Pom- 
eranian grenadier. On October 15th, Alexander sent Gen. 
Ignatieffto Constantinople with full powers to agree upon the 
following terms: (1) An armistice of six weeks without re- 
serve; (2) autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria; 
(3) a guarantee of their rights by Europe. The Turks pro- 
crastinated, and at the same time pushed the war in Servia so 
vigorously that by October 30th the road to Belgrade was en- 
tirely open to them. The moment the news reached IgnatiefT 
he sent in the Russian ultimatum — the acceptance of the armis- 

1 Bismarck distinctly states in his Autobiography, vol. ii, chap, xxviii, p. 235, 
that such an agreement was made. 



559] THE TREATY OF BERLIN ^5 

tice in forty-eight hours or war. The Porte, overawed, imme- 
diately yielded, and the armistice began November 2d. 1 

The action of the Czar aroused the suspicions of English 
statesmen, notwithstanding that Alexander had assured Lord 
Loftus, the British ambassador, that Russia desired no eon- 
quest or territorial aggrandizement. 2 Gladstone fell from 
favor and Disraeli once more became popular. On November 
9th, at the Lord Mayor's banquet, Disraeli declared that if a 
war broke out, no country was better prepared for it than 
England, and that she would not hesitate to undertake it. 
But Lord Derby, then minister for foreign affairs, who 
accepted the friendly words of Alexander in good faith, had 
on November 4th proposed the holding of a conference at 
Constantinople to consider the Eastern Question ; and the 
proposition was accepted by all the powers.3 Lord Salisbury 
was chosen as the delegate of England, and on his way to the 
Turkish capital he stopped at Berlin, where he represented to 
Bismarck that it was advisable to give the Porte more time to 
carry out its reforms, and that, if it should afterwards become 
necessary to employ coercive measures, they should be under- 
taken by Europe, and not alone by Russia. Lord Salisbury, 
however, received little comfort from the German chancellor. 4 
The preliminary sessions of the conference were held on the 
nth to the 22d of December, and were marked by the mutual 
opposition of the British and Russian representatives. On 
December 24th, the Ottoman Porte was invited to send a 
delegate to sit at the formal sessions, which were about to be 
occupied with the conditions agreed upon during the pre- 
liminary meetings. These conditions 5 included an increase 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, pp. 2502, 2504. 

2 Lord Loftus to the Earl of Derby, Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2506. 

s Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2516. 

* Salisbury's instructions are found in vol. 68, p. 1064, of the British and For- 
ei%n State Papers. 

5 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2541; State Papers^ vol. lxviii, p, 1114. 



l $6 THE EASTERN QUESTION [560 

of territory for Servia and Montenegro, and autonomy for 
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, which were to enjoy the 
right to have a national militia, and to use the national lan- 
guage in official acts, and were to be occupied by Belgian 
troops until the accomplishment of reforms under an inter- 
national commission. 

During the discussions the conditions underwent certain 
modifications favorable to Turkey, and as thus modified they 
were on January 15, 1877, formally presented to the Porte. 
But, on the 23d of the preceding December, the new constitu- 
tion of Turkey had been proclaimed with elaborate cere- 
monies, 1 and when the powers presented their conditions, the 
Turkish government answered that it was impossible to accept 
them, (1) because they were a menace to the independence of 
the Sultan, (2) because they were in violation of the Treaty of 
Paris, and (3) because they were contrary to the new constitu- 
tion. The delegates of the powers then quitted Constanti- 
nople on January 20th, and Abdul-Hamid II., as though to 
show the worthlessness of his constitutional reforms, on 
February 5th dismissed and disgraced the man who had 
instigated them — Midhat Pasha. On January, 31st, Gortcha- 
koff invited the powers to make known what measures they 
intended to employ to bring the Porte to reason, and he let it 
be understood that the Czar was resolved to act alone, if 
necessary. 2 At the end of February, Gen. Ignatieff was sent 
to the various European capitals to request that, if the various 
powers would not unite with Russia in requiring the Porte to 
accept the programme which it had rejected, they would 
permit Russia to proceed alone. The general was well re- 
ceived at all the capitals except London. There Lord Derby 
insisted upon one more concerted effort to bring Turkey to 
terms. A conference was opened at London, with representa- 
tives of all the great powers present; and on March 31st they 

x The Constitution is found in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2531. 
* State Papers, vol. lxviii, p. 1 104. 



j6 1 ] THE TREA TV OF BERLIN 1 37 

agreed to a protocol, 1 the principal features of which were a 
demand that the Porte should really put into execution the 
reforms so often promised, and a statement to the effect that 
the powers proposed, through their representatives at Con- 
stantinople and their consuls in the various localities, to watch 
carefully how the reforms were applied. The London protocol 
was presented to the Sultan on April 3d, and he transmitted it 
to his make-believe parliament, by which it was rejected April 
9th. 2 The Porte notified the powers two days later that 
Turkey was making its own reforms, and as an independent 
state could not submit to outside interference. April 1 6th the 
Czar concluded a convention with Roumania for unobstructed 
passage through her territory ;3 and on the 24th of the month 
he proclaimed war against Turkey, 4 declaring that he did so 
without any ambitious designs, and merely for the purpose of 
succoring the oppressed Christians of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Porte invoked article VIII. of the Treaty of Paris, which 
provided that in case of a conflict between Turkey and 
another state, the great powers should try their friendly 
mediation ;5 but the good old days of 1856 were gone. Every 
power except England soon declared its neutrality, and Eng- 
land was by no means a unit in supporting the bellicose 
policy of Disraeli. England also finally declared her neutral- 
ity, April 30th, 1877, 6 on condition that the Czar should not 
interfere with Egypt or the Suez Canal, and above all should 
not occupy Constantinople. 7 Gortchakoff assented to these 
conditions, with the reservation that the exigencies of war 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2563. 

% Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2568. 

3 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2576 et seg. 

* Ibid. , vol. iv, p. 2598. 
5 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2598. 

* State Papers, vol. lxviii, p. 859. 
1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2615. 



!38 THE EASTERN QUESTION [563 

might demand the temporary occupation of the city. 1 Lord 
Derby replied that in case of such occupation England would 
consider herself free to take whatever measures of precaution 
might seem to be necessary. 2 

Immediately after the declaration of war, the Russian troops 
crossed the Turkish frontier both in Europe and in Asia, but 
the bad roads and high waters and the poor administration of 
the military service prevented their reaching the Danube till 
the end of June. Once across the river they forced the pass- 
ages of the Balkans, and by the end of July they occupied 
Hermanli, only two days march from Adrianople. In Asia 
they were equally successful, and in May the fortress of Kars, 
the key to the Turkish Asiatic dominions, was besieged. 
These rapid achievements astonished Europe and caused the 
greatest apprehension at London and Vienna. Disraeli or- 
dered the English fleet to Besika Bay, and Andrassy began 
the mobilization of the Austrian troops. But the tide of war 
soon changed. Osman Pasha, the Turkish commander, in- 
trenched himself at Plevna in front of the main body of the 
Russian army and stopped all further advance; Suleiman 
Pasha drove the right wing of the Russian ar,my back across 
the Balkans, and in Asia the Russians were compelled to raise 
the siege of Kars and beat a general retreat. By the opening 
of November the Turks apparently were masters of the situa- 
tion. But the Russians were goaded by these blows into put- 
ting forth the greatest exertions. Todleben, the hero of 
Sebastopol, was sent to supervise the siege of Plevna. 
Roumania, who had concluded on May 14th an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Russia, hurried forward an army corps 
which did excellent service, 3 and Servia broke the peace which 
she had signed on March 1st, and put her armies in motion. 4 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, pp. 2624-34. 

2 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2646. 

8 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2618. 

4 The Servian Declaration of War is found in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2468. 



5$3] THE TREATY QF BERLIN 1 39 

The resources of the Turks were overtaxed, and the fortunes 
of war once more shifted. Kars was taken in Asia ; Suleiman 
Pasha was defeated in Bulgaria, and finally on December 10th, 
after one of the most heroic defenses known in history, Plevna 
surrendered to Todleben. The Russians immediately pushed 
across the Balkans, massed the main army at Adrianople and 
established two posts on the Sea of Marmora. Constantinople 
was at their mercy. 

The Ottoman Porte hastened to solicit the collective media- 
tion of the great powers. But this was unattainable without 
the concurrence of Germany, and Bismarck would not inter- 
fere. On January 3, 1878, the Porte therefore agreed to treat 
with Russia alone. Meanwhile, all the old-time distrust of 
Russia had revived in England, and the war-party had steadily 
been gaining ground. Disraeli maintained that the affairs of 
the Orient could not be settled without the agreement of the 
signatories of the treaties of 1856 and 1871. 1 The Russians 
worked to gain time, and prolonged negotiations with the 
Porte till their troops were at the very gates of Constantinople. 
On January 30th an armistice and preliminaries of peace were 
signed at Adrianople. 2 When the powers inquired as to the 
terms of the preliminaries, Gortchakoff replied that their basis 
was the independence of Roumania and Servia, an increase of 
territory for Montenegro, autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina 
and Bulgaria, and the payment of a war indemnity to Russia. 
It was not improbable that the terms thus vaguely announced 
would be hardened in the definitive treaty. So at least 
thought Andrassy and Beaconsfield. On February 3rd 
Austria, indignant at the disposal of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in a manner contrary to what was believed to be the promise 
of the Czar in the previous July, notified Russia that she would 
consider null any agreement between the belligerents which 
should modify existing treaties and which should affect the 

1 See memorandum to Gortchakoff in Hertslet, voi. iv, p. 257. 
1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2661. 



!4o THE EASTERN QUESTION [564 

interests of Europe, and especially those of Austria-Hungary, 
unless it were submitted to a conference of the powers ; and 
she suggested that such a conference should meet at Vienna. 1 
As to Beaconsfield, he went a step further, and on February 
15th ordered the English fleet with troops on board to pass 
the Dardanelles and anchor in front of Constantinople. The 
Czar then promised that if the English would abstain from 
landing troops, his forces would not enter the city. 2 Gortcha- 
koff had answered the note of Andrassy evasively, demanding 
that a distinction be made between what in the treaty affected 
all Europe and that which concerned only Russia and Turkey. 
At the same time he treated with Bismarck, who had up to 
this time been favorable to Russia, for the opening of a con- 
gress at Berlin, and on the 3d of March Bismarck invited the 
powers to send representatives to such a congress. 

On the very day that Bismarck took this step, the definitive 
treaty of San Stefano was signed.* By its terms Turkey was 
required to recognize the independence of Roumania, Servia 
and Montenegro, all of which were to be increased in size. 
But the most important stipulation was that for the erection of 
the autonomous tributary principality of Bulgaria, with a 
Christian government and a national militia, and with bound- 
aries extending from the Black Sea on the east to Albania on 
the west, and from the Danube on the north to the ALgean on 
the south. This would have practically blotted out Turkey as 
a European power. What was left was to be divided into four 
parts unconnected with each other : The environs of Constanti- 
nople on the east, the peninsula of Salonika in the south, 
Thessaly and Albania in the west and southwest, and Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Novi Bazar in the northwest. The prince of 
Bulgaria, who was not to be a member of any of the reigning 
dynasties of the great European powers, was to be elected by the 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2668. 

2 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2670. 

8 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2672 et seq. 



565] THE TREATY OF BERLIN I4I 

the people, and confirmed by the Porte, with the assent of the 
powers; but the constitution of the principality was to be 
drawn up by an assembly of Bulgarian notables under the 
supervision of a Russian commissioner, who was to superin- 
tend the administration of affairs for two years, supported by 
50,000 Russian troops. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to 
receive the reforms demanded for them at the conference of 
Constantinople, with such modifications as might be agreed 
upon by the Porte, Russia and Austria-Hungary. The Porte 
engaged to apply to Crete the Organic Law of 1868, to extend 
analogous reforms to the other Greek provinces of the Empire, 
and to improve the condition of Armenia, and guarantee the 
safety of the inhabitants from the Kurds and Circassians. 
Turkey also assumed to pay a war indemnity of 1,410,000,000 
rubles, but the Czar, in view of the " financial embarrassment " 
of Turkey, agreed to commute 1,100,000,000 rubles for terri- 
tory in Asia, and for the Sandjak of Tultcha, which Roumania 
was to be obliged to take in exchange for that part of Bessa- 
rabia which was detached from Russia in 1856, and which was 
now to be restored to her. Russian ecclesiastics, pilgrims and 
monks traveling or sojourning in the Ottoman Empire, together 
with their property and establishments, were placed under the 
official protection of the Czar, and priests and others in holy 
places, and especially the monks of Mt. Athos, of Russian 
origin, were confirmed in their privileges. The Straits were to 
be always open to the merchant ships of the world, and the 
old treaties of commerce between the two countries were to be 
maintained. 

There were two states that were determined to prevent the 
carrying out of the treaty of San Stefano — Austria- Hungary 
and England. The latter took immediate action. March 13th 
Lord Derby notified Bismarck that England would not send a 
representative to the congress at Berlin unless the treaty of 
San Stefano should be considered in its entirety. After two 
weeks of spirited correspondence between London and St. 



142 THE EASTERN QUESTION [566 

Petersburg, the Czar announced on March 26th his refusal to 
submit to the congress those portions of the treaty which con- 
cerned only Russia and Turkey. Both countries began to 
sound the other powers. In France the Due Decazes, sup- 
ported by the Royalists, who were friendly to Russia, had 
just been driven from office, and M. Waddington, who was 
known to be friendly to England, succeeded him in charge of 
foreign affairs. Austria-Hungary naturally supported England. 
Italy, who had hoped for something on the Albanian coast, did 
likewise. There remained only Germany, who, before and 
during the war, had given to Russia a friendly support. But 
Gortchakoff was now to be grievously disappointed, for Bis- 
marck gave his approval to the plan of laying the entire treaty 
before the proposed congress. -Under such circumstances, 
Beaconsfield felt justified in defying Russia. On March 28th 
he allowed Lord Derby to resign from the foreign office, and 
replaced him with Lord Salisbury. He then reinforced the 
British fleet before Constantinople, and sent additional troops 
to Malta, and on April 1st Lord Salisbury notified Europe 1 
that the treaty of San Stefano placed the Black Sea under the 
absolute domination of Russia, destroyed the real independence 
of the Ottoman Empire, and was in general contrary to the 
interests of Great Britain. Russia, weakened by war and 
diplomatically isolated, could only submit, and on April 9th 
Gortchakoff, incensed at what he considered his betrayal by 
Bismarck, addressed a note to London asking for the modifi- 
cations which England would demand in the treaty. 9 They 
were communicated to Count ShuvalofT, then Russian ambas- 
sador at London, who bore them to St. Petersburg, where 
they were accepted by the Czar. ShuvalofT immediately 
returned to London and signed the secret treaty of May 31st, 
which provided for almost all the important modifications 
which we shall soon see were made in the treaty of San 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2698. 
* Ibid.) vol. iV, p. 2707. 



$6y] THE TREATY OF BERLIN ^3 

Stefano. While this transaction was in progress, Beaconsfield 
was negotiating with the Porte for the cession of the island of 
Cyprus, in return for which Great Britain was to defend the 
Turkish possessions in Asia Minor against Russia, the Porte 
promising to introduce into those possessions reforms which 
were to be agreed upon later between the two powers. A 
treaty to this effect was secretly signed June 4th. 1 

The Congress of Berlin opened its sessions on June 13, 1878, 
and exactly one month later the Treaty of Berlin was signed. 
The chief figures at the congress were Beaconsfield and Salis- 
bury/who appeared for England; Gortchakoff and ShuValoff, 
for Russia ; Bismarck, who was president of the Congress, for 
Germany ; Andrassy, for Austria, and Waddington, for France. 
Italy and Turkey, and when their interests were in question, 
Greece and Roumania, were also represented. The twenty 
sittings of the Congress formed one continuous struggle be- 
tween the representatives of England and Russia. Germany 
and Austria almost always, and France and Italy usually, sup- 
ported England, and on almost every important question the 
Russian representatives found themselves alone. Gortchakoff 
never forgave Bismarck for his attitude at the Congress, 2 and 
as the sessions continued, and the treatment of the Slavic cause 
at the hands of the Germans and Magyars became known, 
there sprang up in Russia an intensely angry feeling, not so 
much against England, from whom Russia expected nothing, 
as against Germany, from whom she expected much. 

By the Treaty of Berlin, as signed July 13, 1 878,3 the Bul- 
garian principality erected by the treaty of San Stefano was 
divided into three parts: (1) Bulgaria proper, which was to 

1 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2722. 

2 For Bismarck's view as to the causes of Gortchakoff 's enmity, see chaps, xxviii 
.and xxix of his Autobiography. 

* The protocols of the Congress may be found in the State Papers, vol. 9, p. 
82. Abstracts are given in Hertslet, vol. iv, pp. 2729 et sea. The treaty is given 
irt English in Hertslet, vol. iv, pp. 2759 it seq. 



I4 4 THE EASTERN QUESTION [563 

extend from the Danube to the Balkans, and which was to 
become an autonomous principality, and to pay an annual 
tribute to the Sultan; the prince, who was not to be a member 
of the reigning dynasties of the great powers, to be elected by 
the people and confirmed by the Porte, with the assent of the 
powers. (2) Eastern Roumelia, a name invented to designate 
southern Bulgaria, which was to have rn autonomous adminis- 
tration and a Christian governor-general appointed by the Sul- 
tan for five years with the assent of the powers, but was to 
remain under the political and military control of the Porte. 
(3) Macedonia, which was given back without reserve to the 
Sultan. This division reduced the new principality, as it was 
constituted under the Treaty of San Stefano, by more than 
one-half, both in territory and in population, and removed it, 
and incidentally Russian influence, entirely from the jEgean 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under the control of 
Austria-Hungary for an indeterminate period, and the same 
power was also authorized to keep garrisons and have military 
and commercial roads in the Sandjak of Novi- Bazar, privileges 
which placed her on the road to Salonika, the goal of her am- 
bition. The Turkish representatives protested vigorously 
against this action, which displeased Servia and Montenegro 
also; but the congress was obdurate. Servia and Montenegro 
were recognized as independent principalities, but received 
only slight accessions of territory, instead of the large in- 
creases allowed them by the treaty of San Stefano. To Greece 
nothing was given ; but the treaty provided for direct negotia- 
tions between Turkey and Greece under the supervision of the 
powers, which resulted in 1 88 1 in her securing Thessaly. The 
Greek representatives had demanded Albania, Epirus and 
Crete; but all these were left to Turkey, though it was stipu- 
lated that the Organic Law of 1868 should be applied to Crete. 
Roumania was treated harshly; for, although her independence 
was recognized, she not only was not compensated for her sac- 
rifices in the war, but was compelled to restore to Russia the 



569] THE TREATY OF BERLIN l ^ 

detached portion of Bessarabia, a fertile country inhabited by 
Roumans, receiving in exchange the Dobrudja, inhabited 
chiefly by Tartars backward in civilization. Religious disabil- 
ities were done away with, and freedom of religion and of wor- 
ship provided for in the new Slavic states, as well as in the 
Ottoman Empire; ecclesiastics, pilgrims and monks of all na- 
tionalities were to enjoy the same rights and privileges in that 
ampire, and were, together with their establishments, to be 
under the official protection of the diplomatic and consular 
agents of the powers, though the special rights of France in 
the Holy Places were to be respected. Russia, besides receiv- 
ing Bessarabia in Europe, obtained a large part of Armenia 
and of neighboring districts in Asia; but it was agreed that 
the reforms to be instituted in Armenia should be applied 
under the superintendence of the powers, and not, as by the 
treaty of San Stefano, under that of Russia alone. Two days 
after the settlement of the Russian claims in Asia was made, 
England disclosed her secret treaty with Turkey, and an- 
nounced that she would immediately take possession of Cyprus. 
To GortchakofT this was a stunning blow. He had seen Bea- 
consfield succeed at almost every point, and he pointedly asked 
the congress to make known the principle and the methods 
according to which it designed to insure the execution of its 
august decrees. The last three days of the congress were con- 
sumed in a passionate discussion of this question, and then at 
the suggestion of Lord Salisbury it was dropped. The Rus- 
sian chancellor went back to St. Petersburg greatly humiliated, 
while Beaconsfield returned back to London bringing " Peace 
with Honor," to receive the plaudits of his countrymen. 

The work of the Congress of Berlin was not calculated to 
increase friendliness among the powers of Europe. Turkey 
felt outraged at being despoiled, not only by her enemy 
Russia, but by her professed friends, England and Austria. 
The states of the Balkans found their high hopes all dashed to 
the ground. Roumania complained of the loss of Bessarabia ; 



14 6 THE EASTERN QUESTION [570 

Servia and Montenegro, of the disposal of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina; and Greece, of the scant attention paid to the aspira- 
tions cherished by her people. Russia deeply resented the 
attitude assumed by the Germans and Magyars toward the 
Slavs. Indeed, so violent was the manifestation of feeling in 
Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary that Bismarck 
deemed it prudent to form an alliance with the latter power in 
October, 1879, for mutual protection, an alliance which was 
joined by Italy in 1882, because of the colonial activity of 
France in northern Africa. It is only with the lapse ol years 
and the development of new interests that the ill-feeling en- 
gendered at Berlin in 1878 has faded away. 



CHAPTER VIII 

PRESENT STATUS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Greece, Roumania, and Servia had been successively torn 
away from all connection with the Ottoman Empire. But the 
process of disintegration did not end with the treaty of Berlin. 
The diplomats at the congress, fearful of the erection of a 
great Bulgarian state under the protectorate of Russia, had, 
as we have seen, divided Bulgaria, and given to the southern 
part a new name — Eastern Roumelia. The Russians orga- 
nized Bulgaria proper, gave it a constitution, 1 filled its official 
positions, officered its militia and obtained from the new 
assembly the election as prince of the Czar's candidate, 
Alexander of Battenberg. The prince at first was pro- Rus- 
sian, and for four years was involved in conflict with the 
assembly, which was nationalist and anti-Russian, and de- 
manded the annexation of Eastern Roumelia. September 18, 
1883, Prince Alexander, wearied with the insolence and arro- 
gance of the Russians, answered the address of the assembly 
praying for the restoration of the constitution, which he had 
suspended in 1 881, by immediately granting its request. The 
Russians then withdrew in resentment from all official posi- 
tions. In the meantime, Eastern Roumelia had been orga- 
nized 3 as a self-governing province with a Christian governor, 
an elective assembly, and a national militia. But the people 
longed to be united with their brethren of Bulgaria, and on 

1 The Constitution is found in full in State Papers^ vol. 70, p. 1303. Abstract 
in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2866 et seq. 

8 The Organic Statute for Eastern Roumelia is found in State Papers^ vol. 70, 
p. 759. Abstract in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2860. 

571] 147 



I 4 8 THE EAS TERN Q UEST10N Vcy 2 

September 1885, assembly, militia, officials and people rose in 
rebellion, imprisoned the governor and the commander of the 
forces, and declared themselves united to Bulgaria. Prince 
Alexander was aware that the Czar, who was already dis- 
pleased at the Bulgarians, would feel deeply aggrieved if the 
union was consummated ; but he deemed it better to break 
with Russia than with his own people, and on September 20th 
he assumed the title of Prince of the two Bulgarias, and occu- 
pied Eastern Roumelia with his army. 1 

The Sultan immediately protested against this violation of 
the Treaty of Berlin, but the state of affairs at Constantinople 
and in Crete prevented action. Greece and Servia, however, 
who were both anxious to extend their own boundaries, at 
once prepared for war. The powers restrained Greece by 
blockading her coasts, 2 but Servia declared war November 
15th. 3 The Bulgarians were dependent on their own resources, 
the Russian officers having left their army ; but they defeated 
the Servians at Slivnitza, and although they obtained neither 
indemnity nor additional territory in the treaty which fol- 
lowed/ they secured the union of the two Bulgarias. 

The powers held a conference at Constantinople in Novem- 
ber, 1885, to consider this violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and 
Russia demanded that the union be disregarded and annulled; 
but she was opposed by England, who had changed her policy 
with regard to the Balkan state since 1878. Though the 
powers were unwilling to depart from the letter of the Treaty 
of Berlin, they accepted a compromise s to which the Porte 
had become a party, viz., the appointment by the Sultan of 
Alexander as governor of Eastern Roumania, a device which 
did not conceal the real union of the two Bulgarias. Since 

1 Annual Register, 1885. 

* Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 3158 et seq. 

* Ibid. i vol. iv, p. 3141. 

* Ibid., vol. iv, p. 3151. 

* Ibid., vol, iv, p. 3152. 



573] THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE QUESTION Y/ ^g 

the union the Bulgarians have shown a remarkable 'aptitude 
for sound politics, and their country has made great progress 
in economic and social development. The dependence on 
Turkey is merely nominal ; the principality being virtually 
independent. 

Abdul Hamid II. devoted himself in the years following 
1878, to carrying out the main provisions of the Treaty of 
Berlin. He displayed unexpected energy, and in 1884 took 
the control of affairs out of the hands of the viziers and divan ■ 
and he has since personally conducted the government. 
Although there had been occasional disorders, the empire had 
enjoyed a decade of comparative peace when in 1889 outbreaks 
occurred in Armenia and in Crete. We have seen that by the 
treaty of San Stefano and then by the treaty of Berlin, the 
Porte had promised to introduce reforms in Armenia and to 
protect the inhabitants ; 1 and the duty of seeing that the 
promise was kept seemed especially to rest upon England by 
reason of the Cyprus convention. Though nothing had been 
done towards fulfilling the promise, the Armenians during the 
years of peace after 1878 had themselves improved their con- 
dition, and both in their own province, and in the various 
cities of the Empire where they were scattered, they had 
become quite prosperous. This brought upon them increased 
demands of the tax-collectors, which resulted in 1 889-1 890 in 
bloody conflicts. At the same time the Armenians formed a 
national party and demanded autonomous government. The 
Porte condemned the leaders of the movement as rebels and 
incited the mountain Kurds to commit outrages upon the 
Armenians. The latter retaliated, and a state of war soon 
developed. In November, 1894, a commission appointed by 
England, France, and Russia, which sat in the troubled coun- 
try, drew up a scheme of reform, 2 but this only served to 
render more intense the antagonism between the races ; and 

1 Treaty of Berlin, Article lxi. 
3 Annual Register, 1895. 



T50 THE EASTERN QUESTION [STA 

in 1 895- 1 896 there occurred the massacres which seem to 
have been designed to Islamize the Armenians or else to 
destroy them. The European powers protested, and in Eng- 
land urgent demands were made upon the government to 
interfere. But Russia let it be known that she objected to the 
creation of another Bulgaria in Asia Minor ; if Turkish Ar- 
menia was endowed with autonomy, then Russian Armenia 
would want it, and the next demand would be for union. As 
Russia was supported by France, Austria and Germany, Eng- 
land could do nothing. In order to compel the powers to act, 
a number of Armenian revolutionists attacked the Ottoman 
Bank in Constantinople in August, 1896. The government 
immediately ordered a massacre of the Armenians in Con- 
stantinople, and the order was carried out ; but the powers 
could come to no agreement in the matter, and nothing was 
done. 1 

Crete had been in a state of unrest since the signing of the 
Treaty of Berlin. The Cretans had expected that the congress 
would unite them to Greece, and were sorely disappointed at 
the outcome. Outbreaks began in 1885 which culminated in 
1889 in a revolt for autonomy, but the Turkish government 
was able to repress it. In 1894, however, a new revolt took 
place, and this time the demand was not merely for autonomy, 
but for independence and annexation to Greece. The Cretans 
progressed so far as to set up a provisional government in 
August, 1896, but the powers intervened and brought about a 
cessation of hostilities by requiring the Sultan to appoint a 
Christian governor and institute reforms. 2 In the meantime 
the war fever had spread all over Greece ; the government 
massed its troops along the Macedonian frontier and sent war- 
ships to Crete ; but the Greek forces were prevented from 
landing in Crete by the fleets of the powers. The Greeks 
were enraged at the intervention of the powers and raids were 

1 Annual Register, 1896. 
*Ibid., 1896. 



575] THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE QUESTION x ^ j 

made across the border into Macedonia. The Turkish gov- 
ernment on April 18, 1897, then declared war, and in a month 
had completely defeated the Greeks. The latter were com- 
pelled to accept the mediation of the powers, to agree to 
autonomy for Crete, and to rectify their frontier to the ad- 
vantage of Turkey. 1 The powers had great difficulty in 
selecting a governor for Crete, but finally agreed upon Prince 
George of Greece. The ultimate absorption of Crete by 
Greece is perhaps only a matter of time. 

In 1878, the Egyptian government became bankrupt, and 
France and England established a condomimum or dual con- 
trol over the government in order to take care of its finances. 2 
The Khedive Ismail during the next year endeavored to get 
rid of this control. He was deposed by the two powers, and 
Tewfik Pasha, who was elevated in his stead, showed himself 
so complaisant to the wishes of the intervenors that an insur- 
rection was raised, in 1 881, by Arabi Pasha with the cry of 
" Egypt for the Egyptians." The representatives of the pow- 
ers gathered at Constantinople to consider the crisis, but noth- 
ing was accomplished ; and as France refused to unite with 
her, England sent a fleet to Alexandria which bombarded the 
city. Troops were then landed and Arabi was defeated, and 
the English took practical control of the government in Sep- 
tember, 1 88 1. 3 Turkey and France protested, but although 
England assured the powers that she intended to keep her 
troops in Egypt only until peace and order were restored, they 
are there still. October 24, 1885, a convention was signed 
between Great Britain and Turkey which provided for the 
sending of a British and a Turkish High Commissioner, who 
were to take measures for the tranquilization of the country, to 
re-organize the army and to reform the administration. 4 Since 

1 Annual Register •, 1897. 

2 Ibid., 1878, p. 347 et seq 

3 Ibid. y 1882, p. 359 et seq. 
4 Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 3274. 



!52 THE EASTERN QUESTION [576 

that time the English have re-organized the judicial and ad- 
ministrative systems, and although they have declined to de- 
clare a protectorate over Egypt, they practically control the 
country, which is now but nominally bound to the Porte. 

The question of the further dismemberment of Turkey is an 
open one. The small states of the Balkans — Servia, Bulgaria 
and Greece — have their eyes covetously fixed upon Macedonia. 
But they are checked in their ambitions by Russia and Aus- 
tria. Austria, by the extension of her railroads and the con- 
clusion of commercial treaties, has undoubtedly increased her 
sphere of influence in the direction of Salonika, upon which 
her gaze has long been fastened. Russia has relinquished her 
former plan of settling the Balkan question by the establishment 
of independent nationalities, and adheres for the time being to 
the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Em- 
pire. As a result her influence at Constantinople during the past 
decade has been very high, while England, once all-powerful, 
has often seen her suggestions rejected there, as notably in 
respect of Armenia. As a matter of fact the attitude of the 
various Powers on the Turkish question is no longer deter- 
mined by political conditions in Europe, but by colonial and 
commercial rivalry in Asia and Africa. The Turk in the 
meanwhile, enjoying increased security, has reorganized his 
army with the aid of German officers, has to a great extent 
re-established his financial credit, and by his rapid successes 
in the Greek war, which has greatly increased his prestige, 
has apparently assured himself of an indefinite stay at Con- 
stantinople. 



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